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Abstract. 
 
Policy analysis has not been a part of mainstream Sri Lankan research or 
academic tradition, and hence there exists a lack of research on policy studies 
in Sri Lanka. Given also a paucity of research on illicit drug use and 
contemporary drug policy, this research study generated and analysed a body 
of evidence about the response to drug misuse and its related policies in Sri 
Lanka between 1984 and 2008. As the subject of drug policy can be viewed 
through a variety of perspectives, this thesis adopted a multi-disciplinary 
approach. It drew on ideas, theories, concepts and research from a variety of 
social science disciplines such as sociology, political science, international 
relations, public administration and social policy and included an historical 
approach to understanding policy development. The study provides an 
informed narrative describing the rationale for the development of Sri Lanka’s 
drug policies, their course and outcome and the roles of the various actors, 
institutions, organisations and interest groups already established, or which 
came into existence to respond to drug misuse. This shows how, and why, 
particular policies are shaped and influenced by the actors, institutions and 
organisations, and by particular discourses. The conceptual foundations for this 
study were epistemic community theory, stakeholder analysis and policy 
transfer theory; and the thesis will seek to explain policy in changing contexts. 
Semi-structured key informant interviews and documentary analysis were the 
main research methods employed. The analysis revealed that external 
influences, stakeholder dynamics, consensus in policy approaches, and moral 
frameworks have combined to sustain a criminal justice model to the 
management of drug problems and to ward off attempts to introduce a system 
with a stronger focus on treatment and public health. This study demonstrates 
that the interests of stakeholders and their relative power significantly 
influenced the legitimisation of consensual knowledge diffused by epistemic 
communities which underpinned policy outcomes. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction. 
 
Literature on health policy analysis in low and middle income countries is 
limited, diverse, fragmented and descriptive in nature, and is dominated by 
authors based in western countries (Gilson and Raphaely, 2008). Similarly, 
health policy analysis has not been part of mainstream research or academic 
tradition in Sri Lanka1 and there exists limited research on policy studies, 
particularly investigating policy change processes that integrate politics, 
process and power. Given the paucity of research on illicit drug use and 
contemporary drug policy, this thesis aimed to generate and analyse a body of 
evidence on the drug problem and its policies in Sri Lanka between 1984 and 
2008, a key period in the emergence of the formulation of policy.  
 
The thesis will argue that drug policy has followed a punitive course, with the 
prevailing response established within the criminal justice system to manage 
the drug problem, and has not adopted a health or social welfare model. This 
has been largely consistent over the period studied although there was some 
limited success in attempts to challenge the criminal justice model and 
persuade policy-makers to follow an alternative approach. Many economic, 
political and social factors have combined to sustain the criminal justice model 
and avert attempts to introduce a stronger health focus. External influences 
                                            
1
Sri Lanka is an island located in the South of the Indian subcontinent with an approximate 
population of 20.9 million (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015). Its location is 
considered to be of strategic importance from the time of the ancient Silk Road through to 
World War two. It is home to many different ethnic groups, religions and languages and is 
known as one of Asia’s oldest civilisations. The majority of the people are Sinhala Buddhist and 
the country has a rich Buddhist heritage. Sri Lanka gained independence from the British 
colonial rule in 1948 and has been a democracy since. Constitutional changes in the 1970s 
moved it from a “Westminster” model to one that concentrates power in the hands of an 
Executive President.  
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shaped the direction of national drug policy and the recent shift towards 
including drug rehabilitation can also be attributed to external pressures along 
with the influence of national policy actors’ interaction with international 
knowledge networks.  
 
Aim of the Thesis. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to provide an informed narrative describing the 
rationale for the development of Sri Lanka’s drug policies (1984-2008), their 
course and outcome and the roles of the various actors, institutions, 
organisations and interest groups already established, or which came into 
existence to respond to the problem of drug misuse. This will show how and 
why particular accounts are shaped and influenced by the actors, institutions 
and organisations, and perhaps by particular discourses. The protocol for the 
thesis detailed the research questions as follows: 
 
1. How was drug policy developed over time, and why? 
2. Which organisations and individuals were behind this development, and 
why? 
3. Who was influential in making policy decisions, and why? 
4. What was the role of international organisations in the development of drug 
policies in Sri Lanka? 
5. Have there been other agendas, tensions, contradictions and coalitions 
identified during the development of policies, and if so how were they 
managed? 
 
The questions were researched utilising a qualitative research design where 
interviews with policy-makers and people in positions of power were 
triangulated with documentary sources. These approaches enabled the 
generation of rich information on the process of policy development over time 
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and place and uncovered the many meanings attached to drug policies in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
The following sections provide an overview of: the four key drug policy 
initiatives that emerged post the British colonial period which ended in 1948; 
the policy background which provides the rationale for the choice of the study 
period and introduces some of the factors influencing the direction of policy; 
major policy initiatives and events which recognises the influence of external as 
well as internal policy developments; the conceptual framework and the 
research methodology; and, finally, the structure of the remaining chapters of 
the thesis.  
 
The Development of Drug Policies During the Period 1984-2008. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, drug policy is defined as the “system of laws, 
regulatory measures, courses of action and funding priorities concerning (illicit) 
psychoactive drugs and promulgated by a governmental entity or its 
representatives” (EMCDDA, 2014:2) as adapted from Dean Kilpatrick’s (2000) 
definition of public policies.  
 
The research was informed by historical perspectives which Berridge (2001: 
611) notes, draw attention to the value of “long-term and contextual 
perspectives on current health issues”, seek to place policy developments in 
the context of the times in which they emerged, and facilitate a critical narrative 
of current policy. In short, the historical approach helps to explain and 
contextualise policy development without adopting an advocacy position or 
attempting to justify policy choices. More recently, Berridge (2013) analysed the 
attitudes towards alcohol, tobacco and drugs in the UK as an evolving process 
situated in the history where the role of the state, economic and professional 
interest groups, and various other local, national and international stakeholder 
interests had been influential.  
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The thesis focuses around four key drug policy initiatives introduced during the 
period 1984-2008, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
First, the amendments made in 1984 to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous 
Drugs Ordinance of 1929 require discussion as they solidified and 
strengthened a penal approach to managing drug problems and gave effect to 
some of the international drug control conventions that Sri Lanka had become 
party to in earlier years. Legislative amendments led to the creation of the 
National Dangerous Drug Control Board (NDDCB) as a formal government 
entity, charged with the responsibility of devising a national policy on drugs and 
coordination of all drug control activities in the country. The role, interests and 
interrelations of the NDDCB as the focal organisation concerning drugs 
requires examination as it was instrumental in the development and 
maintenance of drug policy. Further legislative amendments in 1984 resulted in 
significant changes to the way that criminal justice agencies, government 
ministries and departments, health and the non-government organisation 
(NGO) sector responded to the drug problem.  Actors came into existence and 
inter-related with external organisations, influenced and instigated national 
action, though not always rapidly, and became the instigators for contemporary 
drug policy development.  
 
Secondly, a decade later, the first national policy on drugs emerged as a 
cohesive single document in 1994. By this time, illicit heroin had supplied local 
drug markets and reached epidemic levels. Divergent views existed among 
professional groups on the drug problem, which resulted in the problem being 
viewed and framed within different disciplinary perspectives. A multi-agency 
approach to drug policy implementation within an established and dominant 
penal approach emerged as the basis of the first national policy on drugs. 
Treatment and rehabilitation of drug users was endorsed and appeared for the 
first time in a national policy document alongside supply reduction strategies.  
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Thirdly, the updated national drug policy in 2006 further strengthened the penal 
approach and the rehabilitation ideology, which were intertwined with the 
government’s ambition to achieve a drug-free society. Although moral 
overtones in policy-making existed previously, they peaked after 2005 as the 
government aspired to moving towards a “righteous society”, based upon 
abstinence. Whilst the multi-agency approach to policy implementation had 
been re-emphasised, policy continued to be based on the four pillars identified 
in the first national policy in 1994: enforcement; preventative education and 
public awareness; treatment, rehabilitation and after-care; and international 
coordination.  
 
Other areas included were the development of restrictions over precursor 
chemicals used in illicit drug manufacture and “a requirement for drug 
dependants to seek treatment” (Updated National Policy for the Prevention and 
Control of Drug Abuse, 2006:4), a re-wording of the term for compulsory 
treatment which had been announced in the first national policy on drugs 
although it had not been implemented by 2006. 
 
Finally, the thesis will discuss the development of the Drug Dependant Persons 
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act introduced in 2007, which aims to tackle two 
aspects: the regulation of drug treatment centres, introducing a legal licensing 
requirement to establish facilities for the purpose of drug treatment and 
rehabilitation; and the introduction of compulsory drug treatment for drug 
dependants. This extended the power of the criminal justice system, whereby, 
following a medical examination, a person could be compelled to have 
treatment.  
 
The Policy Background. 
 
During the period under investigation, there have been considerable changes 
to the way in which the problem of drugs was framed and defined, including 
significant changes to the social policy framework and to the legislative system 
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which attempted to regulate drug use. The thesis analyses social factors 
influencing the development of policy, examines the policy-making processes 
and the wider economic, political and social contexts. The start date of 1984 
was selected because this was the year when the Poisons, Opium and 
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1929 was amended, the death penalty for drug 
related offences was introduced and the NDDCB was established to co-
ordinate all drug related activities. Policies adopted since 1984 ensured that the 
response to the drug problem was firmly located within the criminal justice 
system leading to a large number of drug users being imprisoned.  Out of the 
total prison population in the country, nearly 45% of men and women were 
admitted for narcotic-related offences in 2000, the largest single category 
(Handbook of Drug Abuse Information, 2002). By 2003, the majority of drug-
related prison admissions were for heroin related offences (88%) with the 
remaining (12%) for cannabis (Handbook of Drug Abuse Information, 2004). 
 
Successive governments strongly condemned drugs and their responses have 
been directed at either total eradication or reduction in the supply and use of 
drugs to the barest minimum. Drug policy has been largely uncontested 
throughout the period under investigation. There was cross-party political 
support and strong consensus among policy makers on an abstinence-based 
approach built on stringent law enforcement and rehabilitation. The 
responsibility for dealing with drug problems comes under the Ministry of 
Defence. The Presidents have had a keen interest and control over drug 
policies. The President has additionally been the Minister of Defence from 
1984; he is the most powerful politician in the country and is at the core of 
economic, political and social decision-making. Prominent Buddhist monks 
have periodically taken an interest in addressing drug problems but the more 
recent politically active monks have become adept at influencing the 
development of drug policies.  
 
It is suggested that drug policy is a highly politicised and sensitive research 
area, particularly in the developing world. Many researchers might not have 
studied this area due to its political nature, a lack of data on this subject in the 
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country and difficulties in gaining access to interview powerful policy-makers. 
The significant influence of politics in the area of drug policy-making in the 
developing world requires scrutiny and understanding beyond the point at 
which many drug policy analysts cease their research. The content of drug 
policy is not separate from the politics of policy-making (Duke, 2002; Lancaster, 
2016), questions such as who?, how?, what?, and why? related to drug policy 
and policy decisions require examination. In this context, there is a need to 
engage and communicate with those who are in positions of power, those who 
influence the introduction or maintenance of drug policy, to understand the 
conflicts, contradictions and coalitions in the policy process. Hence, 
progressing beyond a content analysis of drug policy documents indicates a 
need to understand the economic, political and social contexts in which these 
documents have been produced and used, including if they too had a role in 
the introduction and maintenance of drug policies in Sri Lanka. 
 
Summary of Initiatives. 
 
The focus is particularly on Sri Lanka, but takes cognisance of some external 
drug policy or programme initiatives as they have influenced the development 
of drug policies within Sri Lanka. National, as well as related international policy 
initiatives, including the national structures created to respond to drug misuse 
are depicted chronologically in Table1. Significant events that had an impact on 
drug policy are also included. The range of policies, initiatives and events 
provides a flavour of how drug policies were embedded in government 
activities.  
 
Table 1. Policy initiatives, structures and events.  
1983 Civil war began in Sri Lanka. 
1984 Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1929 amended. 
1984 The NDDCB was created under the Ministry of Defence. 
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1985 SAARC members’ first summit and the adoption of SAARC Charter. 
1985 The NDDCB holds a workshop on medical aspects of drug abuse. 
1986 
NDDCB Amendment Act No 41 expanded the membership of the 
Board. 
1987 
Sri Lanka participates in the UN conference on drug abuse and illicit 
trafficking convened in Vienna.  
1987 UNDCP adopts the CMO of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control. 
1987 
Navadiganthaya, the first residential treatment centre for drug users 
opens. 
1987 
FONGOADA created as an umbrella organisation to represent all 
NGO’s working in the drugs field. 
1987 UNDCP funds the NDDCB to develop drug prevention and treatment. 
1987 UNDCP funds the drug abuse monitoring programme. 
1988 
UN Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances adopted. 
1988 
The SAARC Islamabad Declaration commissioned a regional 
convention on drug control. 
1989 
Declared as SAARC Year for Combating Drug Abuse and Drug 
Trafficking. 
1990 SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 
1990 The NDDCB opens Meth Sevana drug rehabilitation centre. 
1991 UNDCP funds phase 1 of drug prevention and treatment programmes. 
1991 The NDDCB published the first Handbook of Drug Abuse Information. 
1991 The NDDCB opens two more drug rehabilitation centres. 
1992 SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk established in Colombo. 
1992 
President Premadasa appoints a committee to inquire into the need for 
prevention of alcohol and tobacco use. 
1993 UNDCP funds phase 2 of drug prevention and treatment programmes. 
1993 The NDDCB takes over Navadiganthaya drug rehabilitation centre. 
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1993 Colombo Plan seminar on drug rehabilitation takes place. 
1994 The first national policy on drugs published. 
1995 Memorandum of understanding between SAARC and UNDCP. 
1995 
Resolution in Parliament to implement capital punishment for drugs 
and violent crimes. 
1997 
President Kumaratunga appointed a new committee to draft a national 
policy on tobacco and alcohol. 
1999 Presidential proclamation to implement capital punishment. 
2000 
UNDCP regional workshop to restrict precursor chemical availability in 
SAARC countries. 
2001 National STD/AIDS control programme launched 
2004 JHU Buddhist monks contested Parliamentary elections. 
2005 Mahinda Chinthana2, presidential election manifesto launched. 
2005 The JHU joined the UPFA coalition. 
2005 
The JHU Buddhist monk tables tobacco and alcohol control Bill in 
Parliament 
2006 The National Drug Policy updated. 
2006 Tobacco and  Alcohol Regulation Act passed. 
2006 National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol created. 
2007 Drug dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act. 
2008 
Conventions Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances act No 1 of 2008 introduced in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
 
                                            
2
 Mahinda Chinthana is President Mahinda Rajapakse’s election manifesto published in 2005. 
He contested the Presidential elections in 2005 from the coalition, the United People’s Freedom 
Alliance. This election manifesto urges people to support his vision of building a new Sri Lanka. 
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Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Drug Policy. 
 
To answer the identified research questions, due consideration of the domestic 
policy-making context is required by reading the relevant policy documents and 
previous research conducted by the author (Samarasinghe, 2006, 
unpublished). The development of a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
drug policy is relevant. The three theories of epistemic communities (Haas, 
1992), stakeholder analysis (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000) and policy 
transfer (Dolowitz, 2000) are used to provide the basis for the thesis to describe 
and analyse the development of drug policies in Sri Lanka. While stakeholder 
analysis can examine the dynamics of stakeholder action within the policy 
process, epistemic community and policy transfer will seek to explain policy in 
changing contexts. The inter-connections of these theories in conjunction with 
documentary analysis aim to provide a comprehensive account of the 
development of Sri Lankan drug policies.  
Epistemic communities is a term used to describe a network of professionals or 
expert individuals who come together to share their knowledge and 
understanding of a complex problem in an unbiased, truthful, impartial, 
apolitical and neutral manner (Haas, 1992). The intention is to generate 
solutions for identified problems related to illicit drugs, which may include the 
formulation of law, policy and practice. A knowledgeable group of experts on 
drugs can supposedly bring confidence and experience along with learning to 
address problems existing at national or international levels which may be 
outside the ability of a local group to resolve or to provide an outside, informed 
opinion. Epistemic community members can be regarded as stakeholders in 
the policy process and play a pivotal role in the social construction of reality. 
Thus, some of the meanings attached to domestic drug policies are constructed 
by epistemic communities existing at national and international level. However, 
this theory has not been widely applied to either policy studies on drugs or to 
those within low to middle income countries. The thesis will identify national 
and international epistemic communities concerning drugs and discuss their 
influence on shaping drug policies in Sri Lanka. It is suggested that the 
epistemic community theory and its features are evident in the establishment of 
various expert committees and institutions set-up in the country to deal with the 
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drug problem, and subsequently having an impact on policy outcomes. The 
theory is not without criticism, as will be evidenced in the thesis. For instance, 
there may be a blurring of roles among members of epistemic communities that 
could result in decisions being susceptible to political influence, making 
impartiality somewhat difficult to maintain.  
 
Stakeholder analysis is complementary to the application of epistemic 
community theory in that it does not primarily investigate the role of knowledge 
experts but examines the characteristics of policy actors their dynamics and 
interrelations. The thesis will employ stakeholder analysis theory to look at 
policy actors’ role in knowledge utilisation, decision-making process and any 
power, influence, prevailing interests or other characteristics which may affect 
drug policy outcomes. It suggests that powerful elite individuals and groups can 
exert significant influence in the development of drug policies in Sri Lanka and 
that elite theory (Laswell,1958) as applied to stakeholder analysis is probably 
dominant over pluralist (Dhal and Lindblom, 1976), structuralist (Blackburn, 
2008) and bounded-pluralist views. However, stakeholders’ power and 
influence is dependent on a number of mediating factors and does not remain 
static. The thesis considers if power can shift between individual and 
stakeholder organisations concerning drugs policy and if this is subject to any 
changing economic, political and social factors.  
 
As with the application of the epistemic community theory, stakeholder analysis 
requires a context and time period to be identified and explored. It is applied 
retrospectively here as it lends itself to tracing the development of drug policies 
between 1984 and 2008. Stakeholder analysis is utilised to identify the 
influence of institutions and policy actors operating within the country’s main 
drug policy-making institution, the National Dangerous Drug Control Board 
(NDDCB), government departments and ministries, political and other interest 
groups and NGOs.  
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Policy transfer is the final theory utilised in this thesis and is congruent with the 
application of epistemic community and stakeholder analysis theories in 
addressing significant social problems. Policy transfer refers to the adoption of 
a policy used in one area to be used to address a similar problem in another. 
The theory has gained momentum to inform policy change in various fields and 
across countries as societies become more alike due to influences of 
industrialisation, modernity and harmonisation. It has been described through a 
number of terms: policy convergence, policy diffusion, lesson drawing, policy 
mimicry, policy learning, policy translation and emulation (Bennett, 1991; 
Majone, 1991; Rose, 1991; May, 1992; Howlett, 2000; Stone, 2012),  However, 
policy transfer remains the main or umbrella concept in the academic literature. 
It can be voluntary, negotiated or coerced. Reflecting on the historical 
developments of drug policy, Sri Lanka has been subject to coerced and 
negotiated types of policy transfer as applied by the colonial administrations 
from Portugal, the Netherlands and Great Britain respectively. Following the 
country's independence in 1948, organisations such as the United Nations, the 
Colombo Plan3 and their actors have also engaged in transferring the 
internationally agreed norms and principles of drug control onto the domestic 
policy-making context. The diffusion of knowledge and ideas by epistemic 
communities, their role, interests and influence and the inter-relationships 
among national stakeholders in contemporary drug policy development in Sri 
Lanka is worthy of study.   
 
Research Methodology. 
 
The application of the afore mentioned three theories are the conceptual 
foundations of this qualitative thesis and lend themselves to the use of key 
informant interviews and documentary analysis to provide an informed and in-
depth view of the origins and development of drug policy in Sri Lanka. The 
objective is not only to test one kind of gathered data, such as documents 
against another i.e. interviews, but to use them in conjunction with each other. 
                                            
3
 Colombo Plan and Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme are terms used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis.  
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The notion of methodological triangulation and how it improves validity of the 
data collected, methods for recruiting key informants and a reflexive account of 
the fieldwork is discussed later. 
 
Stakeholders involved in the policy process include individuals who represent 
the Ministries of Defence, Health and Justice; NDDCB, Police, Customs, 
political parties, religious groups, and NGOs. Key to this thesis is the 
understanding of factors and processes which influence these stakeholders’ 
perceptions and experiences in relation to policy development. A qualitative 
research design is able to demonstrate how and why particular accounts are 
shaped and influenced by stakeholders, institutions, and perhaps by particular 
discourses. It is well suited to capture rich descriptions of complex phenomena, 
both in terms of the policy process and its implementation. A quantitative 
research design is not being applied since its methods are unlikely to capture 
the level and depth of data required to answer the research questions. 
Furthermore, due to the existence of limited data and research on drug policy in 
Sri Lanka in comparison to western and more developed nations, the adoption 
of a developmental approach inherent in a qualitative research design enabled 
the identification of the areas of policy for investigation.  
 
Interviewing elite and powerful individuals generates a unique set of dilemmas 
and complexities for the researcher (Duke, 2002; Lancaster, 2016). Gaining 
access to interview influential people, power relations between the interviewer 
and the interviewee, the researcher’s positionality and identity are some of the 
issues discussed in detail as reflections in the research methodology chapter.  
 
Preliminary interviews, also known as initial key informant interviews in this 
thesis, conducted with a few key informants, were based on purposeful or non-
probability sampling. These key informants can be defined as individuals who 
were all involved in formulating and implementing national drug policies, 
directly involved in either amending or developing legislation, were members of 
the National Dangerous Drug Control Board, and occupied powerful positions 
 14 
 
to influence and shape policy decisions. The second stage of the interview 
process involved a snow-ball sample, based on other informants identified 
through preliminary interviews.  
 
The interview schedules for key informants were devised with the intention of 
generating data anchored to significant policy events such as the amendments 
made to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1929 in 1984, 
the formulation of the first Sri Lankan national policy on drugs in 1994, the 
updated national drug policy in 2006 and the creation of the Drug Dependant 
Person’s Treatment and Rehabilitation Act in 2007.   
 
Policy-makers, politicians, public sector administrators, civil servants, legal 
experts, non-governmental organisations and the public are routinely involved 
in the production and consumption of written records and documents. However, 
policy studies conducted by social scientists have largely ignored the 
systematic use of documents to analyse and enlighten certain public policy 
events and processes. In social research, documents can go beyond being 
only a source of data and can be viewed as actors in their own right, recruited 
into schemes of organised activity and regarded by others as allies, enemies or 
perhaps instigators of further action (Prior, 2008). Hence, documents are 
considered to fulfil a dual role as they appear both as sources of content and as 
active agents in the drug policy-making process. Selected documents for 
analysis are: legislation related to drugs, national drug policies, election 
manifestos, Hansards, international drug control conventions, annual reports 
and handbooks produced by the INCB and NDDCB respectively, national 
HIV/AIDS policy, minutes of the NDDCB meetings and documents summarising 
national and international conference proceedings related to drug control. Many 
of these were able to provide a version of past policy events supplying 
sufficient material to design preliminary research questions as well as the 
establishment of some chronological certainty about policy events.  
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This analysis of drug policy documents shows the social, political and economic 
contexts in which the above mentioned documents have been produced and 
used and their attached cultural meanings. It includes a textual analysis of key 
policy documents regarding them as resources as well as actors extending 
beyond a silent or non-contributory role. As Atkinson and Coffey (2004:70) 
argue, “it is part of the facticity of many official and organisational documents 
that they are not identifiably the work of an individual author and their very 
anonymity is part of the official production of documentary reality”. However, 
while consultation lists and acknowledgements recorded in published official 
documents assisted with the identification of key informants for interview, key 
informants were able to identify the documents they had written or identify the 
authors. The key informants’ role in the production of policy documents, 
influence in the content meaning of inscribed text, and any contradictions or 
consensus encountered during the document’s production requires further 
understanding and discussion.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis. 
 
As briefly discussed, external drivers of national policy, policy drivers that had 
been unique to the national context, the moral frameworks and power and 
politics involved in the policy-making process are the running leitmotifs of this 
thesis. They are interwoven and cut across all chapters. The chapters follow a 
chronological sequence and introduce the key policy initiatives, concepts, 
literature and documentary sources.  
 
This chapter has provided the rationale for the thesis, briefly introducing the key 
policies and related initiatives or events, including the main concepts that will 
run through the thesis. It has also touched briefly on the conceptual framework 
and research methodology employed to analyse drug policy development in Sri 
Lanka. 
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Chapter Two is written with the broad aim of developing a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of drug policies. It will discuss in more detail the 
rationale and benefits of utilising the three theories of epistemic communities, 
stakeholder analysis and policy transfer. The inter-connections of these 
theories with documentary analysis are also explored with a view to explaining 
policy development at national level, instigated and influenced by knowledge-
based policy experts operating at national and international level. Attention is 
paid to the human actors inherent within epistemic community theory, the 
integration of epistemic community theory with stakeholder analysis where 
power relations can be examined in particular, and the combination of these 
with policy transfer theory will be elaborated to discuss policy in changing 
contexts. 
 
Chapter Three discusses the research methodology employed to answer the 
research questions and exploration of Sri Lankan drug policies. It provides a 
rationale for utilising a qualitative research design whereby key informant 
interviews and documentary analysis become the main research methods 
employed. Adopting a reflexive approach, methods for key informant 
recruitment, identification of documents for analysis and the fieldwork process 
are described. It includes challenges encountered and how they were 
addressed, which contributes towards the literature on fieldwork undertaken 
with influential people in developing countries.  
 
Chapter Four examines the historical developments and the identification of 
stakeholders and interest groups concerning drugs prior to 1984. To describe 
contemporary drug policy without consideration of past policy events fails to 
appreciate the country’s history and misses an opportunity to understand and 
interpret the processes and influences in the period covered by this thesis. 
While highlighting the social, political and economic factors that prevailed in the 
history, this chapter traces the existence of epistemic-like communities, 
stakeholders and policy transfer in the area of drugs.  
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Chapter Five provides a comprehensive empirical account, which concentrates 
on external organisations, actors, policy events, and their influence on shaping 
drug policies in Sri Lanka. The role of expert knowledge, the diffusion of 
internationally recognised principles and norms on drug control and how they 
resulted in policy transfer or translation, including evidence and rationale for 
non-transfer is explored.  
 
Chapter Six is interwoven with Chapter Five, although the empirical account is 
primarily focused on national policy actors’ involvement in drug policy 
development. It pays close attention to how national policy actors responded to 
external influences previously discussed, how the drug problem was framed 
and defined by local groups, which led to the desired, legitimate policy 
responses. Consensus, contradictions and coalitions formed amongst national 
policy actors in the policy-making process are discussed.  
 
Chapter Seven is concerned with the politics and power inherent in the drug 
policy-making process with specific reference made to national stakeholders 
and their ideologies operating at the political level and how they influenced 
policy development. In this context, power structures and their relationship with 
stakeholders are examined. The overlap between prohibition and the moral 
underpinning of policy-making amongst politicians and interest groups is 
discussed. 
 
Chapter Eight will provide a concluding overview of the key findings of the 
previous chapters and offer some remarks on the nature of drug policy 
development in Sri Lanka during 1984-2008. In doing so, ‘documents as actors’ 
in the policy process and the usefulness of applying the conceptual framework 
is revisited. The latter part of this chapter will discuss the limitations and 
contributions of this research, and the course of drug policies after 2008. 
 
This thesis does not include a traditional literature review and as noted at the 
beginning, there has been little research on drug use in Sri Lanka, no research 
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on drug policy and limited research on policy analysis in general. Relevant 
bodies of literature have been used to inform the study design and methods 
and to provide insight into drug issues discussed. Both primary and secondary 
sources of information are used.  
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Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Drug Policy. 
 
Introduction. 
 
This chapter is written with the broad aim of developing a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of drug policy in Sri Lanka. It discusses three main 
theories; epistemic communities, stakeholder analysis and policy transfer, and 
how they can be integrated to describe and analyse drug policy development 
1984-2008. The three theories seek to explain policy in changing contexts. The 
interconnections of these theories with documentary analysis and the tenets of 
a pluralist conceptual framework for the analysis of policy are also examined. 
While some of the concepts discussed in this chapter favour structural 
explanation of policy development, others favour agency, the human actors 
involved in the policy process. It is acknowledged that structure and agency 
should be integrated to present a broader understanding of policy-making in Sri 
Lanka.   
 
Epistemic Communities and the Role of Knowledge Experts.  
 
Policy studies have increasingly demonstrated an interest in the role of expert 
knowledge, values, ideas and technical understanding in shaping policy 
outcomes, particularly under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. This has 
led to the introduction of the concept of ‘epistemic community’. “An epistemic 
community is a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas,1992:3). Thus, epistemic 
communities are a source of policy innovations and 'expert knowledge' (Stone 
1996:87). In international relations and political science, an epistemic 
community can also be referred to as a global network of knowledge-based 
professionals in scientific and technological areas that often have an impact on 
policy decisions. As described by Haas (1992:3), these ‘knowledge experts’ 
who belong to a variety of professional backgrounds have: 
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 a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-
based rationale for the social action of community members 
 shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices 
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and 
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes 
 shared notions of validity- that is, inter-subjective, internally defined 
criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise 
 a common policy enterprise- that is, a set of common practices 
associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.  
 
Increasing uncertainties and complexities associated with problems of global 
concern, the growing interdependence between countries, the expansion of 
communication and globalisation have led policy-makers to turn to epistemic 
communities for advice and help to understand current issues and anticipated 
future trends. While policy-makers’ goal may be to ameliorate the uncertainty, 
the specialists called upon for advice impart their interpretations of the 
knowledge, which are in turn ‘based on their causally informed version of reality 
and their notions of validity’ (Haas, 1992:21). Epistemic communities not only 
provide insights and knowledge, they influence policy-makers by diffusing ideas 
and play an important role in the social construction of reality. This is possible 
through the application and diffusion of broad ideas, knowledge and reasoning 
patterns where policy actors are able to construct the meanings attached to 
social problems. ‘Reality’ or ‘truth’ is then constructed through the interpretation 
of diffused knowledge and ideas emanating from epistemic communities, the 
‘cognitive baggage handlers’ of constructivist analyses of politics and ideas 
(Haas, 2001:27).  
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In addition to uncertainty and the interpretation of knowledge and ideas, the 
third major dynamic in the causal chain that plays a role in policy change is 
institutionalisation (Haas, 2001). New ideas and knowledge, shed on social 
problems and resulting in new frames for understanding policy through their 
interpretations, can give rise to the creation of new institutional processes and 
frameworks. As Balch (2009:615) argues, “the extent of the impact of epistemic 
communities can be observed by the extent to which they can embed their 
influence in mechanisms that institutionalise the use of expert knowledge”. 
Once institutions are in place, ideas are likely to prevail as governments and 
their key actors become socialised to institutionalised regimes and practices, 
which are generated by the application of new ideas. Eventually, ideas are 
likely to convert into domestic laws and to be enforced as routine policy and 
practice (Balch, 2009). “It also becomes politically costly to reverse such 
practices as new interest groups and policy communities mobilise around them 
after recognising that material gains are possible from the application of new 
ideas” (Haas, 2001:11583).  
 
Epistemic Communities- a critical appraisal. 
 
The socially constructed truth tests and shared causal beliefs makes epistemic 
communities stand out from other types of policy networks and groups active in 
policy-making (Haas, 2001). They are also different to organised interest 
groups in that they are bound by the truth tests to which they were socialised, 
consequently providing information that is politically innocent or unbiased 
(Haas, 2001). However, it is argued that there may be limits to political 
innocence (Sebenius, 1992), especially when epistemic community members 
are located at the core or on the periphery of political parties, interest groups 
and government decision-making systems. Impartiality may be somewhat 
difficult to maintain as epistemic community members are required to promote 
certain ideas and political interests in the policy-making process. Epistemic 
actors are politically empowered to conduct their activities (Dunlop, 2012) but 
are unable to exist without links to politicians (Smirnova and Yachin, 2015), 
which Haas underlined when he coined the theory. Furthermore, there are 
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criticisms on the definition of the expertise and the manner in which they are 
called upon for advice (Sugden, 2006). Although epistemic communities 
generate consensual knowledge, they do not always produce truth (Haas et al., 
1993), suggesting that there are distinctions between consensual knowledge 
and scientific evidence. 
 
From a developing country perspective, the role of knowledge experts in drug 
policy-making and their links to political parties, interest groups or elite 
decision-makers is an area that has not been investigated in the academic 
literature. This thesis will argue that the epistemic community members do not 
remain static, but change their roles as a result on being appointed into 
different government departments which are not always related to the subject 
of drugs. These role changes can be subject to the ideologies and interests 
shared between successive governments and epistemic actors. For example, 
some members of the NDDCB are political appointees and alter as a result of 
change in government and/or leadership. However, some Chairs have 
continued to be engaged in epistemic activity related to drug control despite 
moving positions. Other analyses which provide a critical perspective on the 
concept of ‘epistemic community’ are found in the literature. 
 
Concepts and theories similar to ‘epistemic communities’ such as policy 
communities, policy networks and advocacy coalitions were considered but are 
not covered in this thesis. Cognate literature suggests that policy communities 
(Richardson, 1995) explore the common interests and causal beliefs shared by 
policy makers in policy development; but, the theory falls short of fully 
developing a causal model and diffusion, unlike the epistemic community 
theory. Similarly, critics of policy networks argue that cognitive frameworks and 
beliefs of network members are not elaborated adequately by the model 
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1992). Analysts of advocacy coalitions note the 
presence, at different points in time, of people from multiple interest groups and 
organisations coming together to advocate for a particular policy option. 
According to Haas (2001) this theory does not address systematically issues of 
beliefs, nor does it look at the causal role of a kernel of individuals sharing 
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beliefs and involved in the same policy enterprise over time (Haas, 2001). 
Although later work by Sabatier and colleagues does address issues of shared 
belief systems and the processes by which advocacy coalitions attempt to 
influence policy (Sabatier, 1998; Weible et al., 2009), this theory was not used 
in the thesis largely because advocacy coalitions generally operate within 
contexts where there are conflicting views regarding the appropriate nature and 
direction of policy developments – a situation which did not apply to Sri Lanka 
where the tendency was towards a high level of consensus. Analysts of 
epistemic communities primarily focus on agency and the shared beliefs of a 
community which has a set of common practices or policies associated with a 
set of social problems; this was more relevant to the Sri Lankan policy context.  
 
Conducting an Epistemic Analysis. 
 
The application of the epistemic community theory into policy analysis is not 
limited to international relations literature or policy transfer across transnational 
governments. It has been applied to domestic areas of policy concern where 
the role of knowledge experts has been examined to describe policy change. 
For example; security sector reform in the UK (Sugden, 2006), the case of 
managed migration under the Labour government in the UK (Balch, 2009), 
inter-organisational learning in the case of biotechnology in France (Stranger 
and Emmanuel, 2010), and scientific research and the policy agenda in the 
United States Congress (Chung-Li, 2008). Closer to the area of health policy, 
Hadii et al., (2011) investigated the nature and scope of the global tobacco 
control epistemic community. The theory has also been applied to policy 
studies on drugs at European level where Elvin (2003) analyses the evolution 
of enforcement-based anti-drugs policies, which demonstrates the increasing 
importance of epistemic communities or knowledge societies in the formulation 
of drug policy. 
 
There is no evidence indicating the use of the epistemic community theory 
within low to middle income countries into the study of drug policy. The logic for 
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the application of this theory is to study the cognitive perspective of the 
concept, which assumes that consensual knowledge can influence drug policy 
and practice. Interviews with key informants identified epistemic and epistemic 
like communities, both national and international. The theory provides a 
framework that proposes a role for experts in the transformation of drug policy 
addressing; why, when, how and with what effects the Sri Lankan government 
turned to expertise. This also involves thinking about why, how and when 
knowledge experts were involved in the problem definition, agenda-setting, 
directing and shaping the policy debate, that is, consideration of the 
preconditions for knowledge utilisation.  
 
Epistemic communities can be identified at national and international levels. 
The first part of the analysis will be to identify epistemic community 
members/actors present in government expert committees, Cabinet, 
Parliament, National Dangerous Drug Control Board, other government and 
non-governmental departments and international organisations. In order to 
investigate the use of knowledge by identified community members and to 
explain the timing and tempo of policy change, it is imperative to pay closer 
attention to what kinds of principal and causal beliefs were held by knowledge 
experts and how they may have changed or been maintained overtime. It also 
involves tracing their activities and demonstrating their influence on decision-
makers at various points in time. For example, members from international 
epistemic communities have had an impact on domestic drug policy decisions 
at various points in the history. A brief description of this is provided in the 
chapter on historical developments.  
 
Epistemic community members may well appear on delegation lists at 
governmental, inter-governmental or transnational meetings and conferences. 
Some of these individuals are involved in the production of important 
documents that diffuse knowledge and play a crucial part in shaping public 
discourses. Identifying the beliefs of epistemic communities calls for an 
investigation into the study of these documents, the speeches delivered by 
knowledge elites and the public interviews they have given. Some epistemic 
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community members may be members of the Parliament or have close 
relationships with Members of Parliament who have an interest in drug policy. 
Therefore, an investigation into Hansards will uncover some of the beliefs held 
by them on the subject of drugs.  
 
Although the epistemic community theory has enjoyed good currency across 
political and policy studies, it is not without its critics. While Balch (2009) argues 
that disaggregating the role of ideas from those of interests is somewhat 
problematic, Sugden (2006) states that unequal dynamics and differences 
among members of an epistemic community can influence the direction of the 
community. The latter is possible through the existence of a dominant member 
who may pose a threat. The consensual aspect of the theory also put forward 
an impression of homogeneity within the community. Dunlop (2009:289) states 
that the variety of roles and levels of influence epistemic communities have 
over decision-maker learning are not fully captured by the framework and 
argues that “variety is best captured by differentiating the control enjoyed by 
decision-makers and epistemic communities over the production of substantive 
knowledge that informs policy from the policy objectives to which that 
knowledge is directed”. 
 
Stakeholder Analysis. 
 
The concept of ‘power’ and ‘influence’ exercised by interest groups and policy 
actors in the policy-making process has been central to many policy studies. 
Stakeholder analysis as a tool for policy analysis has its origins in political and 
policy sciences and the organisational and management literature in the 1970s 
and 1980s, which primarily investigated the distribution of power amongst 
actors and interest groups in the policy process (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 
2000). The model has the potential to generate knowledge about individual’s, 
groups’ and organisations’ behaviour that may have an impact on the decision-
making process. Power and influence to facilitate or impede policy reform of 
course depends on stakeholders’ interests, influence and the resources they 
bring to the policy process (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000; Walt, 2006). 
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Stakeholder analysis considers not only the power relations; it also has the 
potential to illustrate the characteristics of stakeholders and their interrelations 
overtime.  
 
With regards to drug policy analysis, recent work has focused on the 
emergence, interests, influence and dynamics of stakeholders in opioid 
substitute treatment policy in six European countries (Thom et al., 2013), and 
stakeholders’ debates around methadone maintenance and the negotiation for 
a recovery orientated drug treatment system in Britain (Duke et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the shifting roles of medical 
stakeholders in opioid substitution treatment in Denmark and UK had been 
examined from the point of medical stakeholders’ expertise in the field of drugs 
and their influence on the policy processes (Bjerge et al., 2015).  
 
First, it is useful to have a general understanding of who stakeholders are. 
From a policy perspective, Walt (2006:177) states that stakeholders are those 
“individuals and groups with an interest in an issue or policy, those who might 
be affected by a policy, and those who may play a role in relation to making or 
implementing policy”. Thus, actors (persons or organisations) who have a 
vested interest in a policy that is being promoted, or, in some cases 
discouraged, can be considered as stakeholders. They are usually grouped into 
categories such as; international actors (e.g. donors, international and 
transnational organisations, knowledge networks), national or political actors 
(e.g. legislators, politicians, political parties), public sector agencies (e.g. 
ministries and government departments or people representing these), interest 
groups (e.g. unions, medical associations), non-profit organisations (non-
governmental organisations), civil society members, and users/consumers. 
Epistemic communities in considering the knowledge they bring onto the policy 
agenda, also have a ‘stake’ in policy. Stakeholder analysis, while including 
epistemic communities, embraces a much broader approach to policy analysis 
than just limiting the analysis of drug policy to the role of expert knowledge in 
policy development.  
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Although individuals, groups and organisations may have a ‘stake’ in a given 
policy or issue area, some may be more powerful than others and may have 
varying degrees of influence in the decision-making process.  
 
Stakeholders and Power Relations. 
 
While macro theories of the policy process analyse power in political systems 
reached through consensus or conflict, micro theories focus more on 
mechanisms and administrative routines of policy-making (Walt, 2006). In both 
theoretical levels the determining factor is the influence that stakeholders may 
have on the policy process and decision-making: there are 'pluralist', 'elitist', 
'structuralist' and 'bounded pluralist' views of influence in the policy process 
(Hill, 1997) and the below section will consider each of these theories briefly. 
 
Dahl (1958), the main proponent of the pluralist view, advanced the theory of 
representative democracy where he argued that power is diffused through 
society and there is no dominating group to suppress others' opinion. As a 
result of such a policy process the policy outputs are ‘wise' and represent 
public interests (Walt, 2006). However, even in most countries with long 
traditions of democracy, though power is held by different societies and groups, 
in practice these groups are not equally active and there exist imbalances in 
their influence on policy. Furthermore, conflicts of interests amongst 
stakeholders mean there will be different approaches to resolve policy issues. 
 
An important alternative to pluralism is elite theory. The elitist view (or Marxist 
theory) suggests that policy choice and change is determined by certain social 
classes/institutions, which are represented in policy-making positions, and the 
state ensures the continuing dominance of those classes/institutions. Elites 
could achieve their position through: i) revolutionary defeat; ii) military invasion; 
iii) control of key economic resources; iv) developing large-scale 
organisations/institutions in different areas of life which support their existence 
(Hill, 1997). Institutions are the sources of power for the elite (Mills, 1956). This 
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theoretical perspective is very much relevant to Sri Lanka where power is 
concentrated amongst relatively few organisations and actors, especially in 
relation to the subject of drugs where relatively few organisations and 
individuals are involved. In general, these stakeholders also bring resources 
(expert knowledge and monetary) into the policy-making arena where they 
have an advantage over other stakeholders who may not enjoy these 
resources and status. 
 
As with elite theory, structuralist theory sees political action being determined 
by powerful forces which are not human resources but those beyond individual 
human control. The theory suggests that political choice is predetermined by 
demographic, social and economic factors that are powerful constraints over 
human action, which should be addressed to achieve fundamental change (Hill, 
1997). This theory elaborates on the relationship between structure and action, 
but fails to consider the conditions essential for supporting the actions to initiate 
social change. 
 
Bounded pluralism suggests that issues of high policies (e.g. economic, 
national security issues) are decided through the elite, whereas low policy 
issues (e.g. domestic, social issues) are decided through pluralism. This view 
presents the government as open to legitimate influence. Though health 
policies are considered to be low policies, due to interventions from various 
groups they could become high policies (Walt, 2006). To this extent, the level of 
importance given to a policy can be seen as a fluid concept. In order to not 
'lose' their influence and 'weaken' their positions, policy makers should 'keep 
their hand on the pulse' of events and constantly exert their power. As the 
stakeholders who deal with unimportant issues are appointed by stakeholders 
in higher positions dealing with important issues (to 'please' those who 'trusted' 
them), 'a chain' which serves the same goal is established. However, even low 
policies have their elites who determine the direction of policy development. In 
most cases this elite (stakeholder) is highly dependent in its decisions on the 
elite (stakeholder) making high policies, especially as the high policy-making 
elite decides on resource allocation. Drug policy development in Sri Lanka falls 
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under the Ministry of Defence, a Ministry that is involved in policies concerning 
national security. In general, the President of Sri Lanka additionally held the 
portfolio of Minister of Defence and had vested interests in the appointment of 
members to the NDDCB.  
 
As discussed, stakeholders’ power and influence is dependent on a number of 
mediating factors. However, it is also important to recognise that the notion of 
power is not a static concept and should be seen as fluid, moving from one 
organisation/actor to another. This is dependent on the changing economic, 
political, and social landscape where stakeholders’ positionality and interests 
change. The level of stakeholder support or opposition to a policy or 
programme is somewhat determined by the above mentioned mediating 
factors. 
 
Conducting a Stakeholder Analysis. 
 
Varvasovszky and Brugha (2000) identified three preliminary questions to 
address prior to conducting a stakeholder analysis. They were; what is the aim 
and time dimension of the analysis? What is the context? And at what level will 
the analysis take place? 
 
Similar to applying the epistemic community concept, it is imperative that 
researchers define the area under investigation and identify a time dimension 
for the analysis of stakeholders. Policy studies utilising the stakeholder theory 
for analysis can have a past, present and/or future time dimension. “Its scope 
can range from broad with a strong retrospective dimension, with the aim of 
understanding the roles of stakeholders in the evolution of the policy context 
and processes, to prospectively outlining more long-term and also broadly-
focused policy directions” (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000:338). As stated 
earlier, this thesis looks at the history of drug policy development 1984-2008 
and has a retrospective time dimension. It will identify stakeholders who 
contributed towards the development of drug policies at different times and 
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consider the changing socio-political landscape of policy-making. The initial 
identification of stakeholders is based upon secondary literature and 
documents published concerning the drug problem in Sri Lanka. This approach 
enables the identification of the ‘initial key informants’ who are able to provide 
an overview of past policy events.  The aim is to communicate with these 
individuals and uncover how drug policies evolved overtime, identify influential 
stakeholders in the decision-making process, the rationale for their involvement 
and influence, trace the existence of epistemic communities, their inter-
relationships and the impact upon policy outcomes.  
 
A recent development in stakeholder theory research has been the concept of 
the stakeholder network that considers how a focal organisation exists within a 
network of inter-dependent stakeholder organisations (Rowley, 2006; Neville 
and Mengue, 2006). The influence of individual stakeholders on a policy or an 
issue can be identified by social network analysis and the concept of the 
stakeholder network provides a useful framework for stakeholder analysis as 
the relationships and alliances between stakeholders within a network are likely 
to influence the behaviour of stakeholders, the demand they place on a focal 
organisation and, in turn, the way in which the focal organisation behaves 
towards them. Stakeholders do not behave or make decisions as individuals 
outside a social context. Their behaviour, decisions, and actions are embedded 
in ongoing systems of social relations. It is within the scope of this thesis to 
investigate how the NDDCB, the main drug policy-making organisation was 
afforded its role as the focal organisation and the relationships it has had with 
stakeholders in the creation of policy. For example, there is a need to explore 
the links and inter-relationships the NDDCB has had with government and non-
government organisations, the medical and legal professions, civil servants, 
politicians, religious leaders and other stakeholders. 
 
Negotiating access to interview stakeholders and the ongoing relationship a 
researcher has with a stakeholder, according to Varvasovszky and Brugha 
(2000), should be based on a thorough understanding of the cultural context in 
which the thesis is undertaken. “In many developing countries, essentially, 
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ethnic and cultural affiliations may make demands on politicians and national 
policy makers to maintain channels of communication, and be accessible to 
potentially influential individuals and groups, which are not envisaged in the 
official positions they occupy” (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000:340). 
Stakeholders dealing with ‘unimportant’ issues may act as gatekeepers to 
stakeholders who deal with ‘important’ issues who have resources to mobilise. 
Understanding the wider cultural context and how actors are positioned within 
social networks, assists researchers to understand the process of gaining 
access to influential stakeholders and securing their support. Sometimes 
access may be easier through a personal contact of the researcher. Although 
the personal contact may not have any involvement in the drugs field, due to 
his/her status and influence in a related field, identified stakeholders may be 
more willing to communicate with a researcher than when being introduced by 
an ‘unimportant stakeholder’ in the drugs field. Researchers may need to use 
their street sense when dealing with these issues. A snow-balling technique to 
identify stakeholders is discussed in the research methodology chapter where 
issues such as access and sponsorship are elaborated in detail.  
 
Due to practical reasons, policy analysis in this thesis is limited to national level 
where stakeholders can be reached and interviewed individually. At the same 
time, the thesis will explore the role of stakeholders identified at international 
level. These external stakeholders are geographically dispersed with limitations 
on their access. However, stakeholders identified at domestic level will be in a 
position to provide an account of the role and extent of influence of 
stakeholders identified at international level.  
 
One of the main limitations of the thesis is that it relies heavily on qualitative 
data generated through interviews. Selection bias is another area of concern 
where important stakeholders can be overlooked or omitted. For this reason 
and to minimise bias, careful selection of key informants and triangulation of 
data is pivotal. Furthermore, during the period under investigation a civil war 
was occurring which produced an unsettled society and an unstable political 
landscape with policies subject to sudden change. Consequently, stakeholder 
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interests, action, positions, alliances and influence could also be subject to 
change. Ensuring a thorough understanding of these factors is critical when 
selecting stakeholders for interview.  
 
Policy Transfer- a critical appraisal. 
 
An increasing globalised economic system, internationalisation of politics, the 
growth of supra-national institutions and improvements in technology, transport 
and communication have influenced domestic public organisations to look 
outside to other governments or non-governmental organisations for answers 
concerning public issues (Jones and Newburn, 2007). Policy transfer or the 
conscious adoption of a policy from another jurisdiction is one way of tackling a 
public problem or a potential problem identified at domestic level. Dolowitz 
(2000:344) defines policy transfer as “the process by which knowledge of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system”. Within this 
background, epistemic communities are able to transfer policies from one area 
to another.   
 
In recent years, especially as an analytical tool to explain policy change, the 
policy transfer concept has gained momentum across political science, 
international relations, sociology, public policy and other related fields. 
Considering its multidisciplinary involvement and the multi-organisational 
setting in which policy transfer tends to take place, there is a flurry of 
terminology related to policy transfer appearing in the academic literature. This 
can be confusing when attempting to deepen our understanding of the concept 
and sharpen the research questions that need to be posed for this study. For 
example, terms such as; policy convergence (Bennett, 1991), policy diffusion 
(Majone, 1991), lesson drawing (Rose, 1991), policy learning (May, 1992), and 
emulation (Howlett, 2000) refer to different forms of policy transfer. Although 
‘policy transfer’ has been treated as the chief concept or the umbrella term in 
the academic literature, there are some distinctions between the above terms. 
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This section will provide an overview of policy transfer research and related 
concepts, writing with the broad aim of developing a framework within which 
some specific developments in drug policy can be explored in later chapters.  
 
In the context of industrialisation, modernity and harmonising macro-economic 
forces, policy convergence is defined as ‘the tendency of societies to grow 
more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances’ 
(Kerr, 1983:3). It involves a process in which policies in two or more countries 
become more alike over time (Knill, 2005). A simple definition of policy diffusion 
views it as a process through which policy choices in one country affect those 
made in a second country (Braun and Gilardi, 2006). While Rogers (1995:11) 
defines policy diffusion as ‘the process by which innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system’, 
Ikenberry (1990), along the same lines, states that policy diffusion is a type of 
social learning which involves the dissemination of new information with which 
governments make policy choices. Although these two concepts may appear to 
be akin, policy convergence assumes that similar policies emerge 
independently of policy made elsewhere, while policy diffusion assumes the 
active dissemination of policies and ideas by a number of human agents. 
Therefore, it suggests policy convergence to have a passive role for state 
actors whereas policy diffusion presupposes pro-activity by a range of actors 
with an interest in ensuring the spread of a particular policy’ (Common, 
2001:12). Here, the argument is that policy convergence may occur 
unintentionally without the involvement of any human agents, whereas, 
‘intentionality’ may be the precondition for policy diffusion and transfer from one 
jurisdiction to another (Evans, 2009).  
 
Policy diffusion literature suggests that expert-knowledge, ideas, policy goals 
and content may be spread from one area to another. However, for policy 
transfer to occur, they must be adopted and implemented. Once an adopted 
idea or model becomes institutionalised, diffusion cannot be explained by 
theorisation but by the demands of organisational routines and by being 
promoted by self-interested actors (Strang and Meyer, 1993). A wide variety of 
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actors from different fields may be at work at different points in the policy 
transfer process and they include; politicians, civil servants, pressure groups, 
academics, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
supra-national institutions, think tanks, policy entrepreneurs, global financial 
institutions and other experts (Evans, 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). In 
other words, policies can be diffused without their actual adoption and 
implementation, but, policy transfer literature is concerned about the 
implementation of new policies via institutional frameworks. Therefore, 
structure and agency explain the difference between convergence, diffusion 
and transfer. While convergence literature tends to favour structural 
explanation, the diffusion and transfer literature places more emphasis on 
agency.  
 
The study of policy transfer is better understood when social and political action 
is placed within the structured context in which it takes place (Evans and 
Davies, 1999). Giddens’ (1984) ‘structuration theory’ suggests that all human 
action is performed within the context of a pre-existing social structure that is 
governed by a set of norms and rules which are distinct from those of other 
social structures. Accordingly, all human action is at least partly predetermined 
based on the varying contextual rules under which it occurs. In this context, 
policy actors (agents) cannot be separated from the structure (organisations) 
where the latter may either constrain or facilitate agents’ actions. For example, 
within the international arena, organisations such as the United Nations, World 
Bank and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
through their coordinated efforts, have increased opportunity structures for 
actors to engage in policy transfer in the south Asian region. It is important to 
note that agents who work for these organisations are also involved in 
interpreting those structures, and in acting, change or translate them according 
to their perceived needs and desires. The argument here is that in the 
investigation of policy transfer, one needs to acknowledge that the relationship 
between structure and agency is dialectical, that is interactive and iterative 
(Evans and Davies, 1999). 
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In addition, although the last two decades focused on policy transfer, the notion 
of policy translation has gained traction more recently. This is in response to 
the criticisms levelled at policy transfer ideas, whereby policies (and practices) 
cannot be transferred directly from one context to another but must be adapted 
and modified to be relevant to the particular cultural, economic, political and 
social context into which it is being transferred – in other words, the policy has 
to be translated (Stone, 2004). As Hulme (2005: 423) argues, policies and 
practices are not easily ‘transferrable’ since they have evolved from legal, 
social and educational settings unique to their host-states and are neither 
ideologically nor culturally proximate.  
 
Unlike western studies on policy transfer where the emphasis has been on 
investigating already established international organisations and on how they 
were involved in diffusing knowledge and ideas across affluent societies, 
developing countries have been somewhat behind in coming into contact with 
various international and transnational structures and their actors. Similarly, at 
national level, some organisations and institutions concerning drug control may 
have been established far more recently in comparison to the western world. 
Relationships in newly established institutions with external organisation might 
still be in their infancy. In view of the developmental approach adopted in this 
thesis and the phases of drug policy development between 1984 and 2008 in 
Sri Lanka, domestic, and international structures and agencies, need to be 
described in terms of how they have evolved, changed and influenced policy 
outcomes.  
 
Policy Transfer Processes. 
 
Policy transfer analysts refer to three different processes of transfer. They 
include voluntary transfer or lesson-drawing, negotiated transfer and direct 
coercive transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009). It is helpful to 
consider voluntary and coercive transfer on a continuum, with lesson-drawing 
as a rational action-orientated approach to dealing with public problems at one 
end (completely voluntary) and the direct imposition (completely coerced) of 
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constitutional reforms, social and political changes and other policies against 
the will of a government at the other end (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Within 
this continuum, there are concepts such as policy learning, mimicry, 
competition, and coercion identified as mechanisms of policy diffusion and 
transfer. Although these mechanisms receive varying degrees of attention in 
the diffusion and transfer literature, ‘learning’ is the chief mechanism identified 
in the transfer literature and other mechanisms receive more attention in the 
diffusion literature (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The next section will look at 
this continuum, exploring the four afore mentioned mechanisms identified in the 
academic literature and discuss how some of these terms are complementary 
of each other.  
 
Lesson-drawing or policy learning implies a rational decision by governments to 
emulate foreign institutions and practices to tackle public problems identified at 
domestic level (Rose, 1991). For Rose, the object of policy learning is to find a 
suitable program that is acceptable while Bennett (1991) states that the central 
characteristic of emulation is the use of evidence of a programme or 
programmes from overseas and drawing lessons from that experience. In the 
context of a growing drug problem in Sri Lanka, the government may have 
looked for models of good practice and evidence to deal with the problem as 
incentives might be high to utilise a program from elsewhere as a ready-made 
solution. “Learning can lead to complete or partial policy transfer and may take 
place on a strictly bilateral basis, or through transnational problem solving in 
international policy networks or epistemic communities” (Marsh and Sharman, 
2009:271). Rational learning can be contested when considering the cognitive 
obstacles to learning. Cognitive obstacles refer to the process by which public 
policy problems are recognised and defined in the pre-decision phase, the 
breadth and detail of the search conducted for ideas, the receptivity of existing 
policy actors and systems to policy alternatives and the complexity of choosing 
an alternative (Evans, 2009). Additionally, the prevailing organisational culture 
and ideology, domestic public opinion, the absence of effective cognitive and 
elite mobilisation strategies deployed by agents of policy transfer, and 
technology and resource limitations may inhibit successful policy orientated 
learning. To this extent, Weyland (2005) has emphasised the importance of 
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bounded rationality and cognitive heuristics in learning, which may lead to 
patterns of diffusion distinct from fully rational learning. 
 
Policy ‘mimicry’, also known as ‘copying’ in the literature, may involve copying 
attractive foreign social and political standards in terms of symbolic and 
normative factors. According to Rose (1993:30) copying is to enact ‘more or 
less intact a program already in effect in another jurisdiction’.  During the 
1980s, within the Asia Pacific region, countries such as Malaysia, India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka 
introduced the death penalty for drug related offences. The rapid spread of this 
populist policy option across the Asia Pacific region may be the result of a 
process whereby government elites copied the social commitments made by 
other governments, considering them to be advanced, progressive and morally 
praiseworthy. It can be argued that governments may know that the policy in 
question is technically ineffective, but, nevertheless, place a greater value on 
the social pay-offs among domestic and foreign audiences. The importation of 
the death penalty as a policy option to tackle the drug problem at domestic 
level requires examination in terms of its adoption and context in Sri Lanka.   
 
Policy transfer is not independent from the agents of transfer where learning is 
negotiated largely on the interpersonal relationships between bureaucrats and 
politicians operating within inter-organisational settings. These agents share 
common values and beliefs expressed through culture, and it is important to 
emphasise in analysing the structure of decision-making through which policy 
transfer takes place, the relationships between agents of transfer and their 
dependencies. Rose (1993) demonstrates the importance of who has 
relationships with whom and how these relationships have an impact on policy-
making. However, while Rose’s approach is useful for understanding the nature 
of the policy transfer process, it is limited in its tendency to explain why transfer 
takes place in the first place. This is due to the limited reflection on the role of 
exogenous forces in lesson-drawing (Evans, 2009). Additionally, the pre-
occupation of researchers with the voluntary processes of transfer between 
developed countries has given less prominence to the study of lesson-drawing 
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in developing countries. Lesson-drawing within developing countries may be 
subject to various forces operating at international level. On some occasions it 
is beyond the control of developing nations where lesson-drawing can 
potentially become a coerced activity informed by developed countries and 
their representatives working for international organisations.   
 
Negotiated policy transfer involves varying degrees of coercion and is more 
common in developing countries. It takes place in the context of affluent donor 
countries, global financial institutions, transnational and international 
organisations, and other influential institutions which introduce (coerce) policy 
change in order for the dependent government to secure loans, grants or other 
forms of aid and investment (Evans, 2009). It is acknowledged that confining 
drug policy analysis to the borders of Sri Lanka gives a highly skewed picture. 
As Walt (2006:122) argues, “developing country policies are sometimes 
decided by external institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the huge empire of United Nations’ institutions”. 
Furthermore, countries such as India, Japan, China, the United States, Russia 
and regional organisations such as the Colombo Plan are major funding donors 
to Sri Lanka. Some may argue that foreign aid to Sri Lanka comes at a price 
where domestic bureaucrats and politicians are coerced to change legislation 
and social policy, particularly in the economic and security interests of 
developed nations. Sri Lankan drug policy is not an exception here.  
 
Direct coercive policy transfer is the ‘imposition of a policy on a country by 
either another country or a transnational actor and is usually executed against 
the will of a government or the will of its people’ (Common, 2001:18; Evans, 
2009). It can arise from international law or conventions that countries are 
signatory to, which will impose penalties on countries that break the law. For 
example, Sri Lanka is a signatory to all three United Nations Conventions on 
drug control. This prompted changes within domestic legislation and the 
operating framework for drug control activities. Once a country is a signatory to 
international drug control convention, it is expected that nation states conform 
to the conventions/law, and coercion is most likely where relatively few 
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powerful international actors operate within a global system such as the United 
Nations.  
 
Direct coercive policy transfer was also “widespread in periods of formal 
imperialism and its implications can still be seen today in contemporary Mexico, 
Kenya, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and South Africa” (Evans, 
2009:245). Drug policy development during the British colonial period is 
explored in Chapter Four, Historical Context of Drug Policy-making in Sri 
Lanka, where coercive elements of policy change and the birth of local interest 
groups on the subject of drugs will be investigated. Demonstrating these 
historical aspects of coercive policy transfer during the colonial period will help 
understand if contemporary policy development has also been subject to 
coercion.   
 
Policy Transfer Analysis. 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identify a five step framework to analyse the nature 
and extent of policy transfer. The framework is a useful starting point for the 
consideration of policy transfer in the arena of drug policy in Sri Lanka and 
helps inform the development of an analytical framework for this thesis: 
 
1) The subject of analysis 
It is imperative that the subject under investigation is clear at the outset and, 
specifically, whether the thesis has a prospective timeline facilitating policy 
transfer, exploring policy transfer as it is occurring, or when making a claim that 
transfer has taken place in the past (Evans, 2009). The methodological 
approaches for a retrospective study are further discussed in the chapter on 
research methodology. 
 
2) Who/what are the agent(s) of transfer? Who wants it? What do they want 
from it? How are they going about effecting it? To whose benefit? And why? 
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This thesis will identify the agents of transfer who operated at domestic, 
international and transnational levels, and explore why they have engaged in 
policy transfer, to whose benefit and how they went about it. As discussed 
earlier, structure and agency will be considered as dialectical and the wider 
social and political contexts in which transfer took place will be identified. It is 
also worth exploring the factors that enabled or hindered transfer. This includes 
the identification of voluntary and coercive forms of policy transfer. While some 
of the agents of policy transfer can be identified within international 
organisations, others may be stakeholders or epistemic community members 
operating at domestic level.  
 
3) Is there evidence of non-transfer? 
 
‘Non-transfers’ will include elements of an idea or programme that have been 
taken from domestic antecedents or which are genuinely innovative (Jones and 
Newburn, 2007: 30; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Parts of an original idea or 
programme discarded or filtered out by the subject/agent are also non-
transfers. Robust comparison of identified drug policies during the period under 
investigation against both domestic and original settings is considered as 
essential to demonstrate the real extent of policy transfer. Although, this 
comparison may not be between Sri Lanka and another neighbouring country, 
a comparison between domestic drug policy and the policies adopted or 
promoted by transnational and international organisations can explain the true 
extent of policy transfer from one jurisdiction to another. Evidence for non-
transfer can be established within identified documents for analysis and the 
transcripts of interviews held with policy actors.  
 
4) What is the evidence offered to support the claim of policy transfer and how 
good  is it? 
 
The scrutiny of data from documents and interviews will be able to demonstrate 
the evidence of policy transfer in this thesis. To demonstrate whether an idea or 
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a perception has been transferred, published documents will be examined 
where more concrete ‘physical’ evidence of policy content in different 
jurisdictions can be verified. The section on documentary analysis in the 
research methodology section will further elaborate the search for evidence to 
support the claim of policy transfer.  
 
5) What conclusions can be drawn from the nature/extent of policy transfer? 
 
This includes an overall examination of the extent to which ideas and 
programmes have been culturally and organisationally assimilated in the 
domestic context and if policy transfer has been successful or not. As 
suggested by Evans and Davies (1999), distinctions will be identified between 
‘soft’ transfers (including ideas, concepts and attitudes) and ‘hard’ transfers 
(including actual policy programmes and implementation), which have been 
either imported voluntarily or coerced by foreign organisations and 
governments.  
 
Conclusion. 
 
As discussed, there are a number of similarities between epistemic 
communities, stakeholder analysis and policy transfer. Stakeholder analysis is 
considered as a general concept as applied to this thesis. However, epistemic 
community members and actors involved in policy transfer can equally be 
identified as stakeholders. They are also involved in the production and 
consumption of policy documents and when these concepts are integrated, a 
broader and rich understanding of policy-making can be presented that reflects 
different policies under shifting circumstances.   
 
As argued by Marsh and Sharman (2009), the thesis will acknowledge that 
policy transfer and diffusion are complementary and that five key issues that 
cut across both literatures should be considered in a thorough analysis of policy 
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transfer (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). They include; a greater focus on the 
interaction between actors engaged in policy diffusion and transfer; the 
adoption of an approach which recognises the dialectic relationship between 
diffusion (structure) and transfer (agency); the integration of pattern-finding and 
process-tracing inherent in diffusion and transfer literature; application of these 
concepts into developing countries due to the present case studies being 
limited to developed countries; and finally if diffusion/transfer is likely to be 
successful or not.  
 
The focus on human actors in epistemic community theory, the integration of 
epistemic community theory with stakeholder analysis wherein stakeholder 
interests, inter-relations and power can be examined, and the theory of policy 
transfer will lend to a thorough analysis of drug policy development in Sri 
Lanka.  
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology and Methods 
 
Introduction. 
 
This chapter describes the rationale for the chosen research design and 
discuss its strengths and limitations. In keeping with a qualitative research 
design, the methods employed by this thesis are key informant interviews and a 
documentary analysis. It is concerned with ‘human action and interaction’ and 
with ‘imperative power, meaning and illumination, and not with ‘generalisation 
and prediction’ (Usher, 1997:5). Adopting a reflexive approach, the method of 
key informant recruitment, identification of documents for analysis, the manner 
of undertaking the fieldwork, the challenges encountered during the research 
process and how they were overcome are discussed. The latter part of this 
chapter explores the process of data analysis in order to understand how the 
study findings were reached and the ethical issues that arose during the field 
work. 
 
Study Aims. 
 
The aim of the study is to provide an informed narrative describing the rationale 
for the development of Sri Lanka’s drug policies, their course and outcome and 
the roles of the various institutions, organisations and interest groups already 
established, or coming in to existence to respond to drug misuse. This will 
show how and why particular accounts are shaped and influenced by the 
individuals, institutions and organisations, and perhaps by particular 
discourses. As discussed previously, the reader is reminded about the research 
questions for investigation so as to justify the research design and methods 
employed in answering the research questions in subsequent sections of this 
chapter.  
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1. How was drug policy developed over time, and why? 
2. Which organisations and individuals were behind this development, and 
why? 
3. Who was influential in making policy decisions, and why? 
4. What was the role of international organisations in the development of drug 
policies in Sri Lanka? 
5. Have there been other agendas, tensions, contradictions and coalitions 
identified during the development of policies, and if so how were they 
managed? 
 
Research Design. 
 
In order to answer the research questions, it is necessary to understand the 
complexity of factors and processes influencing drug policy-making in Sri 
Lanka. Fundamental to this is the need to identify stakeholders who are in 
powerful positions or who make decisions about national policy. They include 
individuals who represent the Ministries of Defence, Health and Justice, the 
NDDCB, Police, Customs, politicians and political parties, religious groups, 
international and non-governmental organisations. These individuals need to 
be identified and then interviewed in order to obtain access to their decision-
making domain and their experience and to ascertain their prevailing influences 
in the drug-policy process. The role of knowledge experts and epistemic 
communities concerning the subject of drug control and their influence on 
national drug policy can also be revealing. For this reason a qualitative 
research design is selected, as it is well suited to capture rich descriptions of 
complex phenomena, both in terms of the policy process and of its 
implementation. In short, qualitative research methods are capable of: 
providing rich descriptions of complex phenomena; tracking unique or 
unexpected events; illuminating the experience and interpretation of events by 
actors with widely differing stakes and roles; and giving voice to those whose 
views are rarely heard (Sofaer, 1999).  
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Use of qualitative research designs in policy research is not new. Academic 
scholars and policy analysts have for some years been venturing out into the 
field as ethnographers or participant-observers, to study first-hand the 
experiences of legislators, policy implementers, agency clients, community 
members and other policy relevant stakeholders (Yanow, 2007). Based upon 
the view that reality is socially constructed and negotiated, qualitative research 
aims to uncover the situated, contextual, and changing nature of reality as a 
socially constructed experience. The qualitative research design attempts to 
understand policy action, or in some cases, inaction, as socially organised and 
influenced by different social, cultural, political and economic factors. A 
quantitative research design is not being used since this method is unlikely to 
capture the level and depth of data required to answer the research questions. 
As Pollitt et al (1992) argue, positivistic research models are of limited use in 
the investigation of contemporary policy whilst qualitative approaches offer 
distinct advantages. Furthermore, Ramazanoglu and Holland (2006:155) state 
that “quantitative methods offer limited access to accounts of experiences, 
nuances of meaning, the nature of social relationships, and their shifts and 
contradictions”. Key to this study is the understanding of factors and processes 
which influence policy makers’ perceptions and experiences within a particular 
and fluid social context. This includes conducting an examination of both 
consensus and disagreement on major issues between, and within, 
government departments, political parties, knowledge networks, various 
professional and interest groups and international organisations.  
 
Some researchers argue that quantitative methods are based on reliable and 
valid measurement tools which are informed by prior knowledge and 
understanding of the area under investigation (Babbie, 1998). Considering the 
limited amount of data and research about drug policy in Sri Lanka, it was more 
beneficial to approach data collection as an evolving process that reduced the 
uncertainty of missing issues that needed to be addressed in this study. The 
adoption of a developmental approach, a key feature of a qualitative research 
design, enabled the consideration of what might be the policy issues for 
investigation, the right questions to ask from key informants and how they 
should be framed to capture meaningful answers. Against this background, it is 
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difficult to test a pre-determined hypothesis through the use of a survey 
questionnaire or any other quantitative measurement tool. Some preparation is 
required to discover the appropriate research questions and ensure that the 
subsequent documentary analysis and key informant interviews are mutually 
supportive so as to capture a version of past policy events and lead to finding 
more refined investigative questions.  
 
The analysis has not been limited to one particular shift in policy, but includes a 
series of policy decisions extending over a period of twenty-four years. During 
this period, there have been remarkable changes in how drug control activities 
were co-ordinated in Sri Lanka, including the involvement, or omission, of 
different stakeholders from multi-disciplinary backgrounds. As well as 
identifying these changes, the thesis will study key policy changes that took 
place such as; the introduction of legislation to amend the Poisons Opium and 
Dangerous Drugs Act in 1984, the initiation of the death penalty for drug related 
offences, creation of the first National Drug Policy in 1994, emergence of  
rehabilitation and its underpinning ideology in the 1990s, the updated national 
drug policy in 2006, and the introduction of the Drug Dependant Persons 
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act in 2007 whereby compulsory treatment was 
introduced. 
 
A qualitative research design was best suited to the above developmental 
approach adopted in this study. It allowed sufficient flexibility during data 
collection, especially during the design and administration of interview 
schedules with key informants and the identification of documents for analysis. 
Different interview schedules had to be developed for those informants who 
represented a particular period or policy event where rich, descriptive 
information unfolded. The flexibility in the design permitted the expansion of 
data collection efforts to new key informants and new documents. Where 
issues had to be further clarified or when unexpected events transpired, re-
interviews of the same informants over time also proved illuminating.  
 
 47 
 
Qualitative research also plays an important part in clarifying the values, 
language, and meanings attributed to key actors who play different roles at 
different times in transnational, government and non-governmental 
organisations. Interviewing the actors allows them to give their own views and 
accounts, rather than conforming to categories and terms imposed on them by 
others. This style of data gathering has the advantage of probing beyond the 
official line of inquiry (Duke, 2002; McDonald et al., 2005) or getting inside the 
‘black box’ of decision-making process where hidden agendas and politics can 
be uncovered. This was particularly useful in generating insights into the 
sensitive areas of drug policy.  
 
Although a qualitative research design brings advantages to policy studies, it is 
not without limitations. Due to the in-depth nature of inquiry occurring in 
qualitative methods and the analysis of data from a small sample, it may be 
argued that knowledge produced might not be generalised to other settings. 
There are a small number of policy actors or key senior personnel working in 
drug control, enforcement and treatment in Sri Lanka. Interviewing policy actors 
who are restricted to a particular background may result in findings that are 
biased. In general, it can be argued that the findings may be unique to a 
relatively few people included in the study and cannot be taken as being 
representative of a particular group or organisation. However, Becker and 
Bryman (2004) state that qualitative research is not necessarily dependent on a 
representative sample and the aim of qualitative research is to gather rich, 
descriptive accounts of information from the respondents. Similarly, Blaikie 
(2000:73) states that “the methods used to conduct exploratory research need 
to be flexible and do not need to be as rigorous as those used to pursue other 
objectives. The researcher may need to be creative and resourceful in gaining 
access to the information required”. Furthermore, samples in qualitative 
research studies are selected purposefully to build theory rather than to be 
representative.  
 
In the following sections, the researcher will look in more detail at the two main 
methods used in the thesis: documentary analysis and interviews. 
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Methods. 
 
Documentary Analysis.  
 
Over the last twenty years, policy studies conducted by social scientists have 
largely ignored the systematic use of documents to analyse and enlighten 
certain public policy events and processes. Interviews, questionnaires and 
direct observation have become the basic tools of social research, while 
documents were of marginal utility.  Many social scientists continue to produce 
ethnographic accounts of complex, literate social worlds as if they were entirely 
without writing or texts (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004). In relation to policy studies, 
policy-makers, politicians, public sector administrators, civil servants, legal 
experts, interest groups and, in some instances, the public are routinely 
involved in the production and consumption of written records and documents. 
These documents may function as props, allies, rule-makers, calculators, 
decision-makers, experts and illustrators, and are considered to be of 
significant value in policy studies. In brief, they appear as what might be 
justifiably called ‘hybrids’ (Prior, 2008), aimed at achieving a particular 
government or interest group objective or goal. In social research, documents 
can go beyond being only a source of data and can be viewed as actors in their 
own right, recruited into schemes of organised activity and regarded by others 
as allies, enemies or perhaps instigators of further action (Prior, 2008). In this 
process, documents may be part of the methods organisations might use to 
identify and publicise themselves, compete with others in the same 
marketplace or justify themselves to the public and other interested parties 
(Atkinson and Coffey, 2004). They may be useful in the instigation, 
maintenance or change of public policies.  
 
From an international perspective, there are few studies that examine in-depth 
the role of documentary sources in social research. The most significant is 
John Scott’s book A Matter of Record, (Scott, 1990). He looked at the use of 
documents in relation to specific problems in social and historical research and 
defined a document as “an artefact which has as its central feature an inscribed 
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text” (Scott, 1990:5). While Scott’s work primarily focused on administrative 
papers produced by government and private agencies, work carried out by 
Plummer (2001) explored the analysis of personal documents. Similarly, 
Steedman (2001) has conducted an in-depth analysis of archives, the single 
largest class of documents available to social researchers, which contain a 
great deal of material directly related to administration and policy. Prior’s (2003) 
work on documents in social research treats documents in more general terms 
and looks at the theoretical basis of document analysis. 
  
Hence, documents are considered to fulfil a dual role as they appear both as 
sources of content and as active agents in their spheres of action. However, 
most research on document analysis has tended to stress the content role, 
concentrating upon content analysis. Documents as inert carriers of content are 
well reflected in standard textbook statements on the place and position of 
documents in social research (Bryman, 2004; Hodder, 2000). Content analysis 
is often associated with the idea that documents and humans exist in entirely 
separate realms. Scott (1990), however, argues that documents serve only as 
sources of social scientific evidence and the key issues in the research process 
concern matters of document authenticity, credibility and the degree to which a 
document is representative of a genre and the meaning of its content. This 
thesis’s analysis of drug policy and related documents will aim to show the 
social, political and economic contexts in which drug policy or related 
documents have been produced and used and their attached cultural 
meanings. It includes a textual analysis of key documents, which regards 
documents as resources as well as actors extending beyond a silent or non-
contributory role.  
 
There are a number of reasons why documentary analysis contributes towards 
a study of drug policy in Sri Lanka. In the absence of research on contemporary 
drug policy, documents offer material for study and provide a version of past 
policy events and processes. Landmark policy documents on drugs or in a 
related field are a useful method to sketch significant policy developments over 
time and consequently divide the period under investigation into manageable 
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phases of policy development. Documentary analysis offers sufficient material 
to map discourses and design preliminary research questions without the need 
to interview policy actors. Additionally, ethical issues are far less frequent with 
documentary analysis and there are few problems of privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality to be negotiated (Rapley, 2007; Abbott et al., 2004; Hodder, 
2000). A vast amount of documentary material is available in the public domain, 
either in print or electronic form on the World Wide Web and offers a non-
intrusive method of data collection in comparison to the often lengthy process 
of obtaining consent to recruit and interview busy professionals.  
 
Although there are a number of advantages with documentary analysis, the 
assumption that documents are reliable data sources requires discussion. 
Documents may contain only a limited amount of detail and debate and certain 
texts may be carefully crafted as mere political rhetoric that is of populist 
appeal. Therefore, documents represent only a partial or superficial account of 
the reality they purport to describe (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004). For example, 
the balance between the stated intentions of a policy document and hard 
information such as ‘policy at ground level’ or the actual implementation of it 
may be skewed. There are also limitations to the study of opposing views, 
power struggles, changing agendas and policy priorities through the analysis of 
textual information as these may have been consciously deleted in the text 
under investigation. Furthermore, Atkinson and Coffey (2004) argue that 
documents are not transparent representations of organisational routines and 
decision-making processes. Indeed, documents which embody plans for the 
future represent aspirations to a possible future reality rather than one that 
actually exists, and it is usually difficult to test the realism of such aspirations by 
documentary analysis alone (Abbott et al., 2004). The approach to 
documentary analysis within this thesis will attempt to bring documents and 
their creators together in order to explore the content meaning of inscribed text 
and identify any contradictions or consensus encountered from those who 
produced or contributed towards their formulation. It is not surprising that 
policies are often under-defined as a way of accommodating the tensions 
between various policy actors operating at domestic and international level.  
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Documentary analysis and semi-structured key informant interviews with policy 
actors exemplify the broader notion of triangulation and methodological 
pluralism inherent in the study design. The interconnection of these methods 
and their value was also elaborated by Duke (2002) who examined the role and 
influence of policy networks in the development of prison drugs policy in the 
United Kingdom. More recently, Duke and Thom (2014) integrated these 
research methods to examine opioid substitute treatment policy in England.  
 
Bringing documents and their creators together, generates a host of problems 
as a majority of official documents are devoid of named individual authorship. 
In general, national and international institutions imply authorship of key policy 
documents, on some occasions identifying a consultation list of those who 
contributed to the formulation of policy documents and/or names of individuals 
as acknowledgements. As Atkinson and Coffey (2004:70) argue, “it is part of 
the facticity of many official and organisational documents that they are not 
identifiably the work of an individual author and their very anonymity is part of 
the official production of documentary reality”. However, while consultation lists 
and acknowledgements identified in national and international documents 
related to the drugs field assisted with identification of the key policy actors for 
interview, these actors were able to identify the documents they have, or 
someone else had, authored or edited. Their role in the production of policy 
documents is described, how they influence the content meaning of inscribed 
text and identify any contradictions or consensus encountered during its 
production. These interrelationships are explored in more detail in the section 
on semi-structured key informant interviews. 
 
In relation to this study, a number of public documents published by 
government, non-governmental and international organisations are included. 
They are largely official documents of public nature developed around the 
subject of drugs. They represent the government’s approach to dealing with 
drug control, enforcement, treatment and rehabilitation. Selected documents for 
analysis included: national drug policies, election manifestos, Hansards, 
international drug control conventions, annual reports produced by the INCB, 
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UNODC and the NDDCB, National HIV/AIDS Policy, Poisons, Opium and 
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance and amendments, Drug Dependant Persons 
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 2007, available minutes of NDDCB meetings 
and documents summarising conference and workshop proceedings. The 
majority of these documents were printed hardcopies. Modern methods to 
documentary research in the twenty-first century involve accessing documents 
via the World Wide Web: some online documents were also included for 
analysis. They originated from institutional websites held by the Sri Lankan 
Parliament, NDDCB, PNB, Ministry of Planning and Implementation, the 
Department of Census and Statistics, INCB and the UNODC.  
 
The analysis of key policy documents will enable the investigation of the links 
that arise between documents and people, documents and concepts, and 
documents with each other. It will also endeavour to discover how and why 
documents were produced, how they were consumed and received or their use 
for a wide variety of purposes. Furthermore, the analysis will highlight if 
documents provided potent evidence of continuity and change in beliefs, 
ideologies and in practices, including how the drug problem was framed over 
time. Content analysis of documents published between international and 
national levels will also provide evidence for policy transfer, policy translation or 
non-transfer. The rationale for including some of the above mentioned types of 
documents is discussed below.  
 
Hansard, the transcript of Parliamentary debates, indicates directions in future 
policy and reviews contemporary debates and data on various social problems. 
Similarly, political parties and presidents in Sri Lanka prepare electoral 
manifestos setting out aspirations, strategic plans, and prospective legislation 
should sufficient support be won in an election to serve in government. This 
thesis was interested in identifying specific discourses occurring in key 
Parliamentary debates on drug policy and also in political manifestos such as 
Mahinda Chinthana (Mahinda’s vision) 2005. Mahinda Chinthana outlines the 
strategic plans to tackle drugs, alcohol and tobacco problems in Sri Lanka, in 
which a section has been dedicated under the title of ‘Mathata Thitha’ or ‘full 
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stop to intoxicants’. As Hansard documents past and current policy, and 
indicates potential changes in drug policy, it is worth looking for any sign of 
cross political party conflict or consensus on major changes to drug policy in 
the history of Sri Lanka. 
 
Annual reports produced by the UNODC, INCB and the NDDCB provide 
information on the prevalence of drug use, amount of drug seizures, price and 
purity, drug related arrests, drug related prison admissions, treatment 
admissions, and reported HIV and AIDS cases. The Department of Census and 
Statistics produces documents on social conditions in addition to reports of 
health surveys which include sections about drug misuse and HIV/AIDS-related 
information. Surveys and reports produce graphs, charts and statistics that 
attempt to describe various drug trends. Such projections have an impact on 
future policy and practice and this thesis attempts to look at the meanings 
attached to official statistics and to explore if any indicators prompt changes in 
policy direction. 
 
International relations literature on networks expanded with the notion of 
‘epistemic communities’ developed by Haas in 1992. In relation to drug policy, 
Sri Lanka interacts with a number of epistemic community members who 
represent organisations such as the INCB, UNODC, Colombo Plan, WHO and 
the SAARC. Epistemic community members are also present within domestic 
organisations and have links with their counterparts overseas. They are 
involved in the production and diffusion of drug policy and other related 
documents into the policy-making domain. The embedding or exchange of 
these policy ideas, beliefs and concepts into different cultural and geographical 
contexts is an area which has not been well investigated in documentary 
analysis literature. National drug policy documents often have links with other 
documents, particularly international documents and suggest that national 
policy documents do not operate in isolation. The relationship between 
documents or text has been referred to as ‘intertextuality’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2004). With this in mind, this thesis will explore whether Sri Lankan drug policy 
documents are a response to internationally published guidelines and 
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conventions. It is therefore logical to compare and analyse the content and text 
between national and international documents and to ascertain what has been 
the Sri Lankan government’s response. 
 
Below preliminary model (figure 1) will attempt to illustrate the influence and 
intertextuality between national and international documents, including national 
and international structures/organisations and their human actors involved in 
policy development. Stakeholders operating within international policy transfer 
networks, epistemic communities in addition to national policy actors are 
involved in the production, diffusion and consumption of policy and other 
related documents. Documents may provide potent evidence of policy transfer 
from one jurisdiction to another. Documentary analysis, combined with 
interviews with policy actors is well placed to uncover the rationale behind 
similarities and differences between text and the meanings attached to the 
language inscribed in drug policy documents. It also enables the identification 
of different processes of policy transfer: lesson-drawing, negotiated transfer 
and direct coercive transfer.  
Figure 1: National policy documents, human policy actors and organisations 
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Gaining access to documents is not without problems and difficulties. At the 
time of the data collection, there was no Freedom of Information Act in Sri 
Lanka so there was no statutory right or a guarantee to obtain information held 
by the government. Identified documents had to be accessed via people who 
worked in various different government departments. They included librarians, 
research officers and information personnel. These individuals had to speak to 
someone else in their department, usually a person in a position of authority to 
release documents to a member of the public. Due to practical limitations, 
including the limited time available for fieldwork, people in positions of authority 
were approached via the researcher’s personal contacts to obtain these 
documents. However, it still involved having to travel to various different 
institutions, building a rapport with key people controlling access to documents 
and sometimes waiting for long hours for the material to arrive. 
 
There were some shortcomings with documents in terms of their completeness 
and gaining access. For example, transcripts of some external meetings on 
drug control prior to 1990 were on occasions illegible or not available. Pages of 
Hansards dating back to the British colonial period were also missing or not 
numbered, making it difficult on occasions to follow a logical sequence of ideas. 
Additionally, according to the NDDCB library, the Handbooks of Drug Abuse 
Information published prior to 1995 were not available. The researcher was 
also unable to obtain copies of the NDDCB board minutes pertaining to the 
discussions held on the key policy events previously mentioned in Chapter One 
apart from some on the Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation 
Act. 
 
Semi-structured Interviews. 
 
Historically, social scientists have researched hidden population groups or 
those marginalised in society such as drug users, sex workers, those living with 
HIV and offenders. However, as Berridge (2000) argues, the real hidden 
populations are the policy-makers, the civil servants, and the members of 
organisations and interest groups who influence drug policy and decision-
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making. According to Berridge, they too should be included within the 
qualitative investigation. As this thesis is concerned with policy development, it 
was considered appropriate to communicate with those who are/were in 
powerful positions to influence and implement drug policy in Sri Lanka. Semi-
structured interviews with key policy actors are considered to be the most 
appropriate medium of communication to generate insights and insider 
perspectives of national policy development and decision-making. 
 
Semi-structured interviews have been referred to as conversations with a view 
to generating purposeful information (Burgess, 1984). They are capable of 
eliciting key informants’ views, opinions, values, attitudes and experiences, and 
are considered a useful technique to generate rich, descriptive data that cannot 
be easily captured through survey questionnaires or fully 
structured/standardised interviews (Arksey and Knight, 1999). The choice of 
semi-structured interview rather than a survey has been employed as it offers 
sufficient flexibility to approach respondents differently while still covering the 
same areas of data collection. For example, given the novelty of policy issues 
being discussed (initially, when it was not clear to the researcher what would be 
the most important questions to ask) and the need to ensure that the views of 
the most important policy actors were obtained, the flexibility of semi-structured 
interviews greatly outweighed the limitations on statistical analysis that would 
result from using a survey. Semi-structured interviews enable the modification 
or adjustment of interview guides with different stakeholders such as civil 
servants, politicians, policy-makers, doctors and lawyers, and NGO 
representatives who have been involved in policy-making. In fact, flexibility in 
designing and refining the interview guides and conducting the interviews is 
probably the key to success in using this technique (Horton et al, 2004). Semi-
structured interviews were chosen to allow the key informants a degree of 
freedom to explain their thoughts, to highlight past policy events and their 
subsequent experiences, as well as returning to some responses for further 
clarification e.g. to elicit and resolve apparent contradictions, where conflict 
seemed to have arisen between stakeholders on the topic of drug misuse.  
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Key Informant Interviews. 
 
Crabtree and Miller (1999) define key informants as individuals who possess 
special knowledge, status, or communication skills, who are willing to share 
their knowledge and skills with the researcher, and who have access to 
perspectives or observations denied the researcher through other means. The 
key informants included in this study can be defined as individuals who: were 
involved in formulating and implementing national drug policies, have extensive 
knowledge and experience on the subject of drugs, were directly involved in 
either amending, formulating or implementing legislation, and were in powerful 
positions to influence and shape policy decisions. Preliminary interviews were 
conducted with five key informants. They had extensive knowledge and 
experience on the subject under investigation and had represented either 
government or non-government sectors.  
 
As information comes directly from knowledgeable people, the five initial key-
informants provided data and insights that cannot be obtained from the use of 
other research methods. The selected five key-informants were a valuable 
resource to offer insights into the reasons for any changes in policy direction 
over time and offer inside-perspectives on policy decisions occurring during 
their time served as members of the NDDCB. They also enabled the 
identification of a list of priority stakeholders along with: perceptions of their 
vested interests, their knowledge in the area of drug control, the inter-
relationships and alliances they have had with government and non-
government organisations. The initial key informants were able to comment 
upon cultural meanings attached to drug policies, some of the drug policy 
documents and the role of stakeholders in the creation and implementation of 
drug policy. They were also in a position to identify their own relationships with 
national and international organisations concerning drugs as well as others who 
had close relationships with such organisations.  
 
The selected initial five key informants were in privileged positions in Sri 
Lankan society due to their knowledge, expertise and the positions they have 
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held. Some had worked directly with presidents, ministers and other powerful 
individuals and organisations who had been influential in drug policy-making. 
This invested them with authority, whereby they were able to identify and 
provide access to other informants whom they thought would be beneficial for 
this study. Additionally, key informants were able to provide access to other 
important information such as national and international policy documents, 
some of which were either authored or edited by these individuals. For 
example, during interviews, some key informants said “have you seen the 
report I edited on...........?” or “you can speak to Mr....... He was the author of 
............”  
 
The good working relationship the researcher had with some of the initial five 
key informants enabled them to provide a guiding role for the researcher on 
data collection. As discussed in the previous section, documentary analysis 
and semi-structured interviews are interconnected and this approach to 
triangulation helps in the identification of individual authors of national policy 
documents. Direct quotations and information extracted from key informant 
interviews are labelled throughout this thesis. Where the same data is provided 
by two or more key informants, the label ‘Interview data’ is given to denote the 
multiple sources of the information.  
 
Designing Interview Questionnaires. 
 
Nievaard (1996) suggests a four step model for the qualitative interview, which 
requires the use of literature review, the development of an interview schedule, 
exploratory or piloted interviewing and more direct interviewing. This study 
followed this four step model in the development of semi-structured interview 
schedules by a process of drafting and amendment, following consultation with 
project supervisors. Interview schedules were developed in two stages. The 
first stage involved the development of interview schedules for pilot interviews 
with identified key informants. Here, the primary aim was to sketch major 
 59 
 
changes to drug policy and legislation in Sri Lanka during the study period and 
was informed by a literature review and documentary analysis.  
 
The interview schedules for key informants were devised on the premise of 
investigating the following identified areas: 
 
1. Amendments made to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance 
of 1929 in 1984 
 
This seeks to establish the rationale for amending the law in relation to drugs in 
1984 and to identify both national and international forces behind these 
amendments. It is interesting to discover the nature and extent of the drug 
problem prior to these amendments, and how they were perceived by both the 
stakeholders representing the NDDCB and those outside it. The 1984 
amendments led to the establishment of the NDDCB so it was considered 
necessary to look at the rationale for the setting-up of the board, its original 
membership and the nature of its work. This involved investigation into 
decision-making processes to understand who had the authority and power to 
influence policy and why. These initial insights into the work of the first board 
enable a description of how the NDDCB has evolved and serve to identify any 
changes to its governance structure, membership and its relationships with 
other stakeholders. This was revealed in subsequent interviews with key 
informants, who commented on any marked contrasts or similarities in the way 
the NDDCB has operated since its inception. Appendix A depicts the interview 
schedule for this area.  
 
2. The first Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug 
Abuse (1994) (see appendix B) 
 
Here, the rationale behind the creation of a national policy on drugs in 1994 
and the identification of national and international influences is explored. The 
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interview schedule was drafted so respondents were able to describe prevailing 
economic, political, social and cultural contexts, identify any tensions or 
coalitions between policy makers and organisations in the creation of this 
policy. It was within the remit of this thesis to recognise any prevailing 
discourses during the policy design stage and identify how these had an impact 
on the resulting policy. Appendix C depicts the interview schedule for this area. 
 
3. The role of different stakeholders in policy formulation  
 
Within the context of incremental changes towards drug policy, it is useful to 
see who is behind drug policy development, their roles and responsibilities and 
the overarching governance framework they have operated within. Professional 
groups who represent the NDDCB include: police officers, medical doctors, 
lawyers, civil servants, and Buddhist monks. These individuals who have a 
‘stake’ in drug policy interact with each other and have links to other people in 
similar public policy arenas. Whilst multi-disciplinary involvement is appreciated 
as being beneficial in bringing a wide variety of opinion from a variety of 
disciplines and backgrounds, it is interesting to explore whether policy-making 
was restricted to a singular professional opinion, and if so why? The interview 
schedule to explore the role of different stakeholders is depicted in Appendix D. 
Additionally, a further interview schedule was developed for a Member of 
Parliament, to explore the rationale for introducing the ‘Mathata Thitha’ or full 
stop to intoxicants concept. See Appendix E for this interview schedule.  
 
4. The updated drug policy in 2006 
 
The first drug policy published in 1994 was not revised until a decade later. It 
was prudent to identify the rationale and the drivers for updating this policy, 
including the identification of the prevailing economic, political and social 
contexts and how they may have shaped policy outcomes identified in the 
updated policy in 2006. There was also a need to study the stakeholders 
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behind this policy development and if there had been any conflicts or 
contradictions. See Appendix D for the interview schedule.  
 
5. Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 2007. 
 
The rationale for introducing compulsory drug treatment and the regulation of 
drug treatment centres, which are covered by this legislation required 
examination. It involved looking at national as well as international drivers for 
policy action and the various actors and agencies involved in introducing 
compulsory drug treatment. Again, the broader economic, political and social 
climates in which this legislation emerged needed to be understood in order to 
have an in-depth understanding of the meaning attached to this policy 
development. See Appendix F for the relevant interview schedule.  
 
Access to Policy Actors. 
 
The majority of key informants interviewed can be considered as elites, those 
possessing power and authority as opposed to those who may be more 
obviously disempowered, such as drug users. These elites belonged to a 
higher social stratum in Sri Lankan society and are from privileged 
backgrounds where education and status had both been forthcoming. It is 
frequently argued that elite groups are more difficult to penetrate than other 
groups as they are better equipped to protect themselves from scrutiny and 
resist the intrusiveness of social research (Duke, 2002; England, 2002; 
Desmond, 2004). Obtaining consent from elite individuals, defining the nature 
of access once agreement is obtained and maintaining this negotiated access 
during data gathering was considered to be a critical part of the interview 
process.  
 
A number of different strategies were used to gain access to the key informants 
and this process can be separated into two stages: 
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1. The first stage involved negotiating access. As discussed earlier, the 
researcher had already come across or interviewed some national drug policy 
actors in earlier research (Samarasinghe, 2006). Sponsorship to gain access 
to, and interview, newly identified key informants (initial key informant 
interviews) was sought from some of these ‘known elite individuals’. 
Additionally, personal contacts of the researcher were employed to approach 
identified potential key informants, or the researcher contacted them directly 
stating that the researcher’s personal contact (stating the name) suggested 
speaking to them. While negotiating access to face-to-face interviews, the 
internet was routinely used to find potential key informants’ current contact 
details, and then send them an e-mail informing them of the researcher’s 
interest in their current or past work, stating that the researcher would 
telephone them in the next few days to discuss the possibility of an interview. 
Attached to the e-mail was a standard letter outlining the purpose of the 
research, promising the anonymity of respondents and informing about the 
researcher’s professional status. This was a successful technique for giving the 
key informant advance notice of the researcher’s interest and reduced the 
chance of them refusing the telephone request, a format much less easy to 
ignore than an e-mail or a letter alone. The subsequent telephone 
conversations took place either while the researcher was in the United 
Kingdom or during visits to Sri Lanka and were particularly useful in terms of 
allowing flexibility in arranging interviews with busy people in influential 
positions.  
 
2. The second stage involved snowballing. Snowballing started from the initial 
interviews with five key informants during which they were asked to identify 
additional key informants for interview. This generated a further number of key 
informants, where the process was repeated until either no new informants 
were suggested or no new data emerged. A contact list was created from 
talking to the initial key informants and was continuously updated as 
subsequent key informants were identified through the snowball method. Initial 
key informants provided contact details for some of the new key informants 
they identified and on occasions where this was not available, the researcher 
found their contact details through personal contacts, searching the hard copies 
 63 
 
of the Sri Lanka telephone directory and via the internet. Details of the contact 
list included information on work, home and mobile telephone numbers and 
email addresses. Where they were not available, work telephone number and 
the email addresses were noted for the secretaries or the personal assistants 
of potential new key informants.  
 
As the five initial key informants were from widely different backgrounds with 
varying roles in relation to policy formulation and implementation, they were 
able to identify other informants who did not belong to the same network of 
policy actors. Whilst this minimises a bias effect of using informants from the 
same setting, key informants are not homogeneous and some drawn from one 
group may not accurately represent the views of another group. To further 
minimise problems with validity, the key informants were asked to identify other 
informants who both share, and do not share, their views. This enabled 
gathering a range of different views and perspectives from people coming from 
different backgrounds. In no particular order, a brief summary of all those 
interviewed is depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2. Interviews with key informants. 
Interview number Role of person interviewed Date of interview 
Interview 1 NGO Director 2009 
Interview 2 Policy-maker 2009 
Interview 3 Policy-maker 2009 
Interview 4 Psychiatrist 2009 
Interview 5 NGO Director 2009 
Interview 6 Civil Servant 2010 
Interview 7 Policy-maker 2010 
Interview 8 Policy-maker 2011 
Interview 9 Civil Servant 2011 
Interview 10 Police Officer 2011 
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Interview 11 Civil Servant 2011 
Interview 12 Civil Servant 2012 
Interview 13 Member of Parliament 2012 
Interview 14 Police Officer 2012 
 
The below table provides the background of interviewees, the positions they 
held within government and non-government organisations as well as their 
connections or links to international organisations. As depicted, the typical 
profile of policy-makers/epistemic actors is variable, whereby one can 
represent many different organisations simultaneously, consecutively or 
following being appointed into an international organisation after retirement.  
 
Table 3: Types of people interviewed  
Role Background National 
Positions held 
Links to 
government 
and non-
government 
organisations 
and key people 
Links to 
international 
organisations 
NGO 
Director 
 
Lawyer 
Drug education 
and prevention 
Member of 
FONGOADA. 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
Ministry of 
Health. 
Customs. 
PNB. 
Colombo Plan. 
Policy-
maker 
 
Prisons Member of the 
NDDCB. 
 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
Colombo Plan 
SAARC 
Policy-
maker 
 
Customs Member of the 
NDDCB 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
SAARC 
Psychiatrist 
 
Medical Doctor Member of the 
NDDCB. 
Professor at 
Colombo 
University. 
Ministry of 
Health. 
WHO Mental 
Health 
Committee 
South Asia 
NGO 
Director 
 
Buddhist Monk 
Drug and 
offender 
rehabilitation  
Secretary to the 
Ministry of 
Finance. 
Member of 
NDDCB 
Member of 
FONGOADA 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
Dharmavijaya 
Foundation. 
Swarna Hansa 
Foundation. 
President. 
Colombo Plan 
UNODC 
SAARC 
 
Civil 
Servant 
Civil service Ex-officio 
Member of 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
Colombo Plan 
SAARC 
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 NDDCB. 
Lecturer at 
Colombo 
University. 
 
AG Department. 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
Ministry of 
Health. 
Customs. 
PNB. 
Employed by 
CPDP following 
retirement 
UNODC 
Policy-
maker 
 
Prisons Commissioner 
of Prisons. 
Chair of 
NDDCB. 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Police 
Department. 
Prisons. 
President. 
Colombo Plan 
Policy-
maker 
Medical Doctor Chair of 
NDDCB. 
Member of 
ADIC. 
Member of 
FONGOADA. 
Member of 
National 
Authority on 
Tobacco and 
Alcohol. 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Ministry of 
Health. 
Swarna Hansa 
Foundation. 
Dharmavijaya 
Foundation.   
Police 
Department. 
President. 
Colombo Plan 
SAARC 
WHO 
Civil 
Servant 
 
Civil Service 
 
Member of the 
NNAC. 
Ex-officio 
member of the 
NDDCB. 
Secretary to 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Police 
Department. 
President. 
UN 
Colombo Plan 
Police 
Officer 
Police Officer Head of PNB. 
Member of 
NNAC. 
Deputy 
Inspector 
General of 
Police. 
Chair of 
NDDCB. 
 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Police 
Department. 
President. 
SAARC 
Employed by 
CPDP following 
retirement 
Civil 
Servant 
 
Civil service 
 
Secretary to the 
Ministry of 
Defence. 
Presidential 
Advisor. 
Senior 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Ministry of 
SAARC 
UNODC 
Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
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Presidential 
Advisor. 
Ex-officio 
member of the 
NDDCB. 
 
Defence. 
Police 
Department. 
President. 
Dharmavijaya 
Foundation.   
Civil 
Servant 
Lawyer 
Civil service 
Diplomat 
 
Ex-officio 
member of the 
NDDCB 
Secretary to 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Secretary to 
Ministry of 
Justice 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
President. 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
AG Department. 
 
SAARC 
UN 
Commonwealth 
Secretariat 
EU 
Member of 
Parliament 
 
Politician Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Various Cabinet 
Portfolios. 
Adviser to 
President. 
All government 
ministries and 
departments. 
Parliament. 
Dharmavijaya 
Foundation.  
President. 
SAARC 
UN 
Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
EU 
Police 
Officer 
 
Senior 
Superintendent 
of Police. 
PNB. 
Ex-officio 
member of the 
NDDCB. 
Head of PNB. 
Ministry of 
Justice. 
Customs. 
Prisons. 
SAARC 
 
Interview Process and Procedures. 
 
While the majority of interviews were held in the respondent’s departmental 
office at an agreed convenient time, some interviews were held in the 
respondent’s home. It became common practice for interviews to be held at 
home for those who were either retired or with those who no longer held an 
official position in the drugs field. Prior to each interview, the ‘information sheet 
for research participants’ (see appendix G) was introduced, along with the 
‘research consent form’ (see appendix H). The interviewee was then given an 
opportunity to ask any questions about the study and clarify any issues prior to 
signing the consent form and conducting the actual interview. Twelve 
interviews were conducted in English and two were conducted in Sinhalese. 
Prior to conducting the Sinhalese interviews, the interview schedules were 
translated into Sinhalese.  
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All interviews were face-to-face, lasted between forty five and ninety minutes 
and were tape recorded with the key informant’s consent. On all occasions, the 
researcher made detailed reflections shortly after the end of the interview and 
departure from the interview site. In most instances this occurred either in a car 
or nearby café. The researcher's reflections were tape recorded to minimise 
problems with recall. They have proved invaluable in looking back on the 
interview data and have been particularly helpful in reflecting the atmosphere of 
the interview and the feelings which were engendered at the time. It became an 
iterative process whereby the researcher was able to learn and adapt the 
interview style and approach in general with subsequent interviews. Two key 
informants were re-interviewed via the telephone as information arising from 
their initial interviews required further exploration.  
 
Reflections: power and elite interviewing. 
 
From the start, it was important to acknowledge and recognise the researcher’s 
knowledge in the area as a study had been undertaken as part of a master’s 
dissertation on “Drug policy-makers’ perceptions on harm reduction in Sri 
Lanka”. Although the focus of this thesis is broader, it was important to 
recognise how prior knowledge and experience might bias this research and 
not adhere to a previously held theory, or respond to intuition of the prevailing 
policy process. Rather, the intention is to pursue and investigate the history and 
development of drug policies in Sri Lanka.  
 
Interviewing elite or powerful individuals is not free from problems and a unique 
set of issues can arise for the researcher (Duke, 2002).  As Pile (1991) argues, 
classic approaches to the interviewer-interviewee relationship tend to reveal the 
researcher as the one in the position of relative power. However, when the 
informant is an elite or a powerful individual, some researchers argue that there 
is a shift in the dynamic of power, usually leaning towards the “powerful 
interviewee” (Bradshaw, 2001; Desmond, 2004). It is assumed that the power 
associated with people through their professional positions will transfer directly 
onto the interview space (Smith, 2006). While this was true to some extent 
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during interviews, power relations are context specific and are dependent on a 
number of mediating factors.  
 
Throughout the fieldwork, the researcher was employed as a manager in the 
National Health Service in the United Kingdom. This ‘international status’, 
including how participants perceived the interviewer as a ‘western researcher’, 
was considered as an advantage, they were both a measure of status and a 
descriptor of professionalism. However, it cannot be confirmed whether this 
aided or detracted the ability to gain access to elite respondents. Some of the 
respondents commented on the researcher’s occupational position and role in 
the National Health Service and the fact that Sri Lanka might benefit from 
adopting some of the drug policies and programmes existing in Britain. The 
‘international status’ of this research and the researcher’s involvement with the 
British academia and the National Health Service placed the researcher in a 
position, or at least the researcher was perceived, as having relative power as 
opposed to the researcher's relationship with some of the elite interviewees. 
For example, some respondents questioned the researcher’s experience in the 
drugs field and appeared to show a level of concern that they may not have a 
broad knowledge base (in comparison to the researcher’s) to comment on how 
Sri Lanka should respond to a growing drug problem. Where these comments 
were made, the researcher made the respondents aware that this is about a 
study of the policy-making process and that they were instrumental in 
developing and implementing some of the national policies and programmes, 
and occupy a unique position to comment on these. The researcher also stated 
that their personal views on how policies and programmes should look would 
be equally valuable to this study.  
 
Some key informants also perceived the researcher as a potential ‘international 
funding source’ and were curious to find information on the process of seeking 
funds to develop drug treatment and rehabilitation services in Sri Lanka. 
Although, these elites were in powerful positions, the researcher was made to 
feel that he had some kind of authority and influence over international funding 
decisions. In these situations, the researcher clearly stated that he lacked any 
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influence over ‘foreign funds’. However, when this was brought up, contact 
details for potential international donors were provided at a later stage. These 
experiences during interviews reminded the researcher to be vigilant of power 
relations, particularly being perceived as a ‘western researcher with potential 
funding influence’ and the need to implement techniques to minimise and 
compensate for it in subsequent interviews. 
  
In contrast, there were occasions when key informants demonstrated their 
authority and the elevated position and status they occupied. During these 
instances, the ‘power relationship’ commenced on the route between identifying 
a potential key informant and beginning the interview. Although personal 
contacts were used to gain access to some of the potential key informants, the 
researcher had to overcome a number of obstacles, including having to deal 
with gatekeepers who controlled access to some of the informants. This 
involved having to go through a third party such as a secretary or a personal 
assistant who managed the diary of the potential key informant. One secretary 
said: 
 
 “You are calling from UK. Call us again when you come to Sri Lanka. Mr...... is 
very busy these days... You won’t be able to speak to him today and I don’t 
book appointments in advance for him”.  
 
Gate keeping also involved being processed via a security office and being 
searched prior to entering the key informant’s office or the building in which 
their office was situated. Security was paramount during the time of key 
informant interviews, especially in the context of the war in the north and east 
of the country and the risk of suicide bombers targeting government offices and 
their staff in Colombo. The respondents’ status, the powerful institutions they 
represented, the security provided to them, and their access via a secretary or 
a security officer, highlighted their important position and initial authority 
relationships.  
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During interviews, key informants emphasised their expertise in a number of 
ways:  an extensive level of knowledge and expertise in the drugs or related 
field; the international conventions, conferences and workshops attended; 
reports and documents authored or edited; whom they are connected to across 
national and international organisations, and whether they were appointed by 
the president or any other influential person or entity. This was not always 
unexpected since background work had been undertaken to uncover as much 
relevant information as possible on key informants. However, some mentioned 
their expertise and appointment to their current position possibly due to a 
desire to demonstrate their power and authority. As more research interview 
experience unfolded with key informants interviews, the researcher brought up 
in conversation the speeches delivered, articles published in national 
newspapers and scientific journals, the prestigious positions held and the 
interests of key informants identified through secondary information sources. 
This technique proved to be useful in breaking the ice and acknowledging the 
authority of the key informant, which enabled their willingness to disclose 
information.  
 
Some key informant interviews were conducted during a period when there was 
mounting international pressure on the Sri Lankan government to withdraw 
their military offensive against the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam4 
(LTTE) in the north and east. This was a period where there was high morale 
and an increased sense of nationalism, which was particularly prevalent in 
southern Sri Lanka as the LTTE were on the point of defeat following a war that 
                                            
4 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was a militant organisation based in the North of Sri 
Lanka. It conducted a secessionist nationalist insurgency to create an independent state in the 
North and East of Sri Lanka for Tamil people. This campaign led to the Sri Lankan Civil War, 
which ran from 1983 until 2009, when the LTTE was defeated by the Sri Lankan Military during 
the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa. During the height of LTTE’s military power, it 
assassinated several high profile politicians in India and in Sri Lanka, including the 
assassination of two world leaders, former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri 
Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. The LTTE is also well known for inventing 
the suicide belt and in pioneering the use of women for suicide attacks in the world. It is 
proscribed as a terrorist organisation by a number of countries. Historical inter-ethnic 
imbalances between majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil populations are alleged to have 
created the background for the origin of the LTTE (LTTE. In Wikipedia, Accessed on 14 May 
2015 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam. 
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lasted for almost three decades. There was a growing sense of distrust and 
suspicion of international organisations, including those which had hopes to 
carry out research in Sri Lanka. Although the researcher is unable to comment 
if any of these views entered the interview space, it was important to be aware 
of the prevailing sensitivities and keep abreast with the local political and 
security situation. This involved reading national newspapers online whilst in 
the UK and speaking to friends and family both in the UK and Sri Lanka about 
significant problems. This increased understanding and awareness was of 
benefit in dealing with key informants, particularly with those who were working 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence.  
 
Henry (2003) argues that the researcher’s identity has an impact on the 
research process and has different meanings in different contexts. The 
researcher was born and brought up in Sri Lanka until age 18 and 
subsequently lived in the UK for the following two decades. The researcher 
made frequent visits to Sri Lanka, keeping in regular touch with friends and 
family and keeping abreast of news and events. Some friends who remained in 
Sri Lanka made periodic comments, stating that the researcher seem to be 
more abreast with developments in Sri Lanka than local residents. Although 
this may be accurate in relation to friendships, an opposing view was 
communicated during some key informant interviews, making the researcher 
feel as if he were a non-native individual attempting to investigate local 
problems and their related responses without any first-hand experience in Sri 
Lanka. This led to the researcher feeling that he was not being identified as a 
Sri Lankan during some interviews. For example, some questions directed at 
the researcher included; “How long have you lived away from Sri Lanka?”, “how 
often do you visit Sri Lanka?”, “so.. can you still speak Sinhalese?”  etc. 
However, as more interviews unfolded, the researcher used techniques such 
as speaking in a typical Sri Lankan accent, introducing Sinhalese words and 
sentences into English interviews and subsequently engaging in conversations 
unrelated to the research, such as cricket, to convey having topical and local 
knowledge. These tactics proved useful and helped the research process.  
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Data Management and Analysis. 
 
According to Dey (1993: 30), data analysis is “a process of resolving data into 
constituent components to reveal its characteristic elements and structure” in 
order to “know how and why as well as what”. Furthermore, “data analysis is a 
related process of describing phenomena, classifying it, and seeing how our 
concepts interconnect” (Dey, 1993:30). In general, the purpose of qualitative 
analysis is to discover patterns in data and ideas which help to explain their 
existence (Lee and Fielding, 2004). The data collected on the subject of drugs 
in Sri Lanka were pieces of messages or communications and their transfer 
into information can be achieved through data analysis by organising it into 
categories. This is a process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the 
mass of data collected (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). Siedel (2010) 
suggested three parts of the qualitative data analysis: noticing things, collecting 
instances of these things, and thinking about these things. The thesis employed 
thematic analysis of interview transcripts and documents, although content 
analysis was also performed on the latter.  
 
Data Coding. 
 
The texts for analysis (documents and interview transcripts) were coded 
manually and utilising Microsoft Word software. Coding is a process of data 
conceptualisation through the use of an abbreviation or symbol applied to a 
segment of words (sentence or paragraph) to classify and clarify segments into 
meaningful and relevant categories (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Pope and 
Mays, 2000). Basit (2003) further states that indexing/coding is the application 
of the codes to the text during which the data is broken down, conceptualised 
and assembled together in a new way, helping to build theories from the data. 
Using an editing style, the text was read, re-read, observations made during a 
systematic reading, and then these observations were organised into codes, 
which were then re-read further for interpretations as described by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). A separate electronic file was created for each code, containing 
information to link coded text with similar codes in other documents. Coded text 
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was then connected and corroborated by sectioning related text together. An 
immersion/crystallization organising style (Crabtree and Miller, 1999) was then 
used to identify themes within those text sections. 
 
Thematic Analysis. 
 
Thematic analysis was conducted using the framework described in the 
literature by (Bryman and Burgess, 1994) and Silverman (2000).  
 
Interview and interview reflection tapes were listened to; documents, transcripts 
and field notes were read initially to familiarise with the material in order to gain 
an overview of the richness, depth and diversity of the data. These enabled the 
drawing out of general ideas and began the process of abstraction and 
conceptualisation.  
 
The material was re-read to support the identification of a thematic framework. 
Key issues and policy events were identified, concepts and themes by which 
data can be examined and referenced were established and sub-headings and 
division into thematic categories were noted. 
 
The aims and research questions of the thesis were reviewed prior to this 
exercise. Based on the main research questions, the codes for each theme 
were developed. Subsequently, indexing of the thematic framework for 
systematic application of the data in textual form was performed with breaking 
into paragraphs, cutting into phrases and coding. On each transcript the 
appropriate code was inserted into the text. 
 
Related text was lifted from its original context and re-arranged according to the 
appropriate thematic references through chopping, extraction, categorization, 
placing in headings and subheadings, quantification and clipping. The indexed 
paragraphs were extracted from transcripts and a separate file was created for 
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each theme, expressing the general ideas and explanations. Finally, mapping 
and interpretation of the data set was performed by putting together the main 
characteristics of the data so associations between themes were examined 
with a view to providing explanations for findings. Again, it was performed 
bearing in mind the original aims and research questions of the thesis as well 
as the themes that emerged from the data.  
 
Ethical Considerations. 
 
Attempts to cordon-off elite research as demanding a different type of ethical 
framework from other types of research are problematic for a variety of 
reasons, not least because this is dependent on the researcher’s ability to 
define who does and who does not exercise power (Smith, 2006). As Bradshaw 
(2001) points out, it is impossible to work with two different ethical codes, one 
for researching up and one for researching down. This research adheres to the 
“Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association” (2002) 
and those of Middlesex University. Ethical issues and dilemmas in social 
research were approached from a position of expertise, which included the 
management of issues concerning consent and confidentiality. The research 
was driven by accepting that maintenance of high ethical standards go hand in 
hand with the assurance of good quality social research, and these 
considerations were central to this study. Factors of data protection, access, 
informed consent and confidentiality were considered as important areas and 
will be discussed further.  
 
Prior to the interview, participants were informed of the purpose of the study 
(both verbally and in writing) and stated that their participation was entirely 
voluntary and they could withdraw at any time without needing to provide any 
reason. Confidentiality was guaranteed and participants were reassured that 
information they supplied would not identify them, their position, or the 
organisation they currently or previously represented. This was particularly 
important when seeking the views of influential and powerful informants as 
obtaining inside knowledge might be considered politically sensitive. 
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Additionally, those who are involved in formulating and implementing national 
drug, alcohol and tobacco policies are an extremely small group of individuals, 
and might be identified if data was attributed. However, some key informants 
were happy to be identified, even in the context of revealing sensitive 
information. They were known to the public for the views they held on the drug 
problem and their disclosure of information was seen as being helpful for this 
thesis and in influencing policy change or further development, particularly as 
they were known as distinguished elites in Sri Lankan society. It was more 
common with key informants who served as members of the NDDCB but no 
longer do so. However, the researcher has not identified any key informant in 
this thesis on the basis of safeguarding key informants from potential harm. 
All participants registered their understanding and consent to participate in the 
study by signing the consent form. The consent form was then counter-signed 
by the researcher and a copy of it was handed over to the respondent along 
with the Information Sheet for Research Participants (Appendix G). None 
refused to have their interviews tape-recorded. The hand-held digital voice 
recorder was capable of recording and storing all the conducted interviews and 
only the researcher had access to this device. Audio interviews were 
transferred onto the researcher’s personal computer and all transcripts, 
including paper records relating to the interviews were stored in a lockable filing 
Cabinet. The study was reviewed by Middlesex University ethical committee to 
ensure that it complies with the appropriate standards and was approved.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the research methodologies used to investigate the 
identified research questions and justify the rationale for employing a qualitative 
research design to answer the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions related to the origins 
and course of contemporary drug policy development in Sri Lanka between 
1984-2008. The methodology utilised has been reflexive in order to allow for 
the emergent research findings to inform the thematic framework for analysing 
contemporary drug policy. Ethical considerations are particularly relevant when 
interviewing subjects for research, especially those regarded as elite individuals 
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who occupy prominent positions and are involved in drug policy-making. 
Although this latter group were small in number they could be identified if data 
is attributed.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the historical context in which drug policies 
evolved prior to 1984, the chosen start date of this study. 
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Chapter Four: Historical Context of Drug Policy-making in Sri Lanka. 
 
Introduction. 
 
To describe contemporary drug policy without consideration of past policy 
events fails to appreciate the country’s history and misses an opportunity to 
understand and interpret the processes and influences in the period covered by 
this thesis. Examination of the past enables the identification of policy actors 
and stakeholders concerning drugs, the commencement, continuity and 
cessation of policies and any ideologies specific to the culture in which drugs 
had been used.  
 
Sri Lanka has a known history of drug use dating back to the sixteenth century 
(Uragoda, 1983). In this chapter, significant landmarks will be highlighted in the 
establishment of drug policies from the early nineteenth century to the middle of 
the twentieth century, when Sri Lanka or Ceylon as it was previously named, 
was a colony under British administration. Details of any previously existing 
drug policies or more detailed information about drug problems are limited. The 
latter part of this chapter will focus on drug policy development post-
independence and identify the key stakeholders and other actors present in the 
policy process. Throughout, specific attention will be paid to the dynamics 
underlying legislative action taken to regulate the use of drugs, highlighting the 
interaction of social, cultural, economic, medical and political factors. This 
chapter is based on a literature review and the analysis of available documents. 
 
Drug Policies during the British Colonial Period (1796-1948). 
 
From the sixteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century, Sri Lanka 
was under the administrations of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British 
respectively. All three administrations regulated the use of opium primarily as a 
revenue-earning measure (Jayasuriya, 1995). When the British took over in 
1796 a system was already partially in force to raise revenue through the 
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lucrative trade of opium. Initially, the British government was keen to promote 
cultivation of certain agricultural products, including opium (Uragoda, 1983). 
Consequently in 1829, imported tools and machinery for the purpose of 
agriculture were given to locals free of tax as a way of encouraging cultivation 
of opium. In addition, it was agreed that land already set aside for opium 
growing would not be claimed or used for other purposes by the government for 
a twelve year period (Jayasuriya, 1978). However, there are no reports or 
evidence of any opium cultivation in Sri Lanka soon after 1796 and this is 
probably due to the poor climate conditions. Opium is known to have grown 
better in India and it is reported that commercial quantities of opium were 
imported into Sri Lanka via the British East India Company (Kandiah, 1994). 
Other items traded by this company were cotton, silk, indigo dye, saltpetre and 
tea. The British East India Company was an early English joint-stock company, 
the first modern multi-national corporation in the world; it was formed initially for 
pursuing trade with the East Indies, but ended up trading with the Indian 
subcontinent and China. It had a significant impact on domestic and regional 
economies and may have had an impact on international relations, 
globalisation and policy transfer in many different areas.  
 
The first legislation concerning opium under British administration appeared 
much later in 1867 when a law, or ordinance (the term in usage in Sri Lanka) 
was enacted to restrict the use and sale of opium and bhang5. This limited the 
use and sale of opium and bhang to people who had obtained government 
licences (Uragoda, 1983), probably marking the first demand reduction 
measure implemented by the British administration. According to the 1867 
ordinance, it was an offence for any person to possess any quantity beyond 
two pounds weight or to sell opium or bhang without a license. The legislative 
change was aimed at establishing control over the sale of opium and bhang, 
but might not have had any significant impact on habitual users who required 
less than two pounds of opium to sustain a daily opium habit. There were no 
reports of any arrests or imprisonment of users with large quantities of opium 
                                            
5
 Bhang is an edible preparation of cannabis commonly used in the history in the Indian 
subcontinent as part of tradition and custom.  
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during this era even though statutory powers were given to police officers and 
municipal inspectors to arrest any persons suspected of being involved in the 
possession or sale of opium and bhang without a license.  
 
A novel feature in the history of opium distribution in Sri Lanka was the 
introduction of government-licensed ‘opium shops’. They were subject to 
several regulations; for example, the hours of business were restricted to 
opening between 6am and 8pm, and the maximum quantity sold to an 
individual was 180 grains (Uragoda, 1983). The sale of opium was forbidden to 
women and to children under the age of fifteen. Following the opening of these 
shops, the use of opium and bhang smoking was allowed on their premises, 
which were known as ‘opium dens’. The smokers paid a monthly rental of less 
than one rupee to the shop owner to consume opium or bhang in the dens 
(Uragoda, 1983). The main objective of the ordinance was to restrict the use of 
opium and bhang to opium shops which allowed the police to keep the 
premises and customers under observation. It can be argued that opium dens, 
more commonly known as drug consumption rooms today in some western 
countries, had then existed in Sri Lanka with the intention of restricting and 
containing drug use. The government’s assumption was that the system of 
surveillance would restrict and reduce the rapid spread of opium in Sri Lanka. 
There is no mention of any opium being injected at this time and it was mainly 
smoked in hookah pipes or else mixed with tobacco and smoked (Uragoda, 
1983). 
 
In 1878, another ordinance, which amended the law regulating the possession 
and sale increased the license fee for the sale of opium or bhang from rupees 
30 to 250 and the license fee to possess opium from rupees 10 to 50 
(Jayasuriya, 1978). In introducing this law, the queen’s advocate stated that: 
 
“There was no doubt that among the least objectionable sources of revenue 
was the taxation of such articles as opium and bhang thereby discouraging 
their use” (Hansard, 9 October, 1878).  
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This ordinance did not prevent any medical practitioner or chemist from selling 
opium or bhang for medical purposes, a practice which had existed among the 
ayurvedic or native practitioners, known as vedalaras, for many centuries. In 
addition to increasing license fees, the 1878 ordinance reduced the quantity of 
opium which a person may possess without a license from two pounds to one 
pound in weight. It also prohibited any medical practitioner or chemist from 
possessing more than five pounds weight of opium at a time without a 
government license. This was the first time vedalaras had restrictions placed on 
their authority to use opium for medical purposes.  
 
These increases in taxes, adoption of a licensing system, and other restrictions 
on imports after 1878 were considered excessive, eventually resulting in an 
increase in opium smuggling into the country. The governor at the time 
participated in an opium taxation debate and pointed out the risk of illicit opium 
being available in the country. He stated: 
 
“With regard to the duty, I would remind the legislative council6 that by putting 
on a too high a duty on opium the risk of illicit introducing of it will be very 
considerable” (Hansard, 25 October 1893). 
 
Uragoda (1983) argues that authorities viewed smuggling as a loss of revenue 
rather than of any danger to the public and overlooked any considerations and 
views expressed by Sri Lankans about any moral decay resulting from opium 
use.  
                                            
6
 The legislative council was the legislative body established in Sri Lanka by the British colonial 
administration. It is claimed to be the first form of representative government in the country and 
consisted of sixteen members including the Governor. The Governor, who was a British 
national presided over the council and appointed five members of the Executive Council (the 
Colonial Secretary, the Officer commanding the Military Forces, the Attorney General, the 
Auditor General and the Treasurer). Four other official members included the Government 
Agents of the western and central Provinces. Government agents were Sri Lankan civil 
servants of the Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS). In addition, six unofficial members 
were nominated by the Governor, three represented the Europeans (British residents in Sri 
Lanka) and three represented Sri Lankans. The nominated unofficial members had no right to 
initiate legislation; they could only contribute to discussion. 
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Further changes to the licensing system were made in 1889, whereby opium 
could be sold at public auction, and a licence to possess and sell could be 
issued to the highest bidder (Uragoda, 1983). Over the succeeding years, the 
number of opium users grew steadily and it was estimated that by 1908 
approximately 19,847 habitual opium users existed in the country (Uragoda, 
1983). This may be an under-report considering the established illicit opium 
trade and the number of users without a license. 
 
Promotion of opium use was a controversial and sensitive issue in a 
predominantly Buddhist society where Buddhists condemned the use of opium 
(Uragoda, 1983). Additionally, the views of the local Sinhala and Tamil people 
were not considered by the British administration. There is no evidence to 
indicate that any request was made by the majority Sinhalese Buddhists or the 
minority Tamils to participate in any part of the promotion of opium. There was 
agitation against the government’s opium policy on cultural and religious 
grounds. This was occurring at a time when the majority of the Sri Lankan 
population were demanding increased representation in the legislative council 
(Jayasuriya, 1995). 
 
Buddhists comprised over seventy percent of the population and resented the 
relegated status given to their religion under an alien government (Uragoda, 
1983). This gradually developed into a movement for the revival of Buddhism 
and had strong nationalist undertones. One of the five precepts of Buddhism is 
abstinence from intoxicants. Although the use of opium is not specifically 
denied to Buddhists, it became evident that a substance imported by the British 
with a profit-making motive was beginning to be more vilified than alcohol. 
Consequently, and in parallel with the Buddhist revival movement, a 
temperance movement aimed at government opium policy began to develop. 
This attitude was later shared by other religions, and the agitation against 
opium found common support among all other ethnicities in the country 
(Jayasuriya, 1995).  
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Against this background, a member of the legislative council submitted a 
petition which was signed by approximately 27,000 Sri Lankans in 1893, urging 
the British administration to take remedial action to prevent the promotion of 
opium in a predominantly Buddhist society (Jayasuriya, 1995). The petition was 
submitted following a public meeting in Colombo and was addressed by Sri 
Lankan members of the legislative council and prominent Buddhist monks. The 
involvement of Buddhist monks in influencing drug policy might have started 
here. They could be considered as activists and became a significant pressure 
group in later years.  
 
Between 1893 and 1907, various Bills were introduced to increase taxes on 
opium, mainly through the introduction of import duty. In 1897, the importation 
of bhang was prohibited although its use was not banned. This was an 
insufficient response for those who had campaigned for a complete prohibition 
on bhang. In 1897, a select committee was appointed to investigate the 
conditions under which opium was imported, sold and consumed in Sri Lanka. 
It concluded that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that there was a 
major opium problem. However, the committee recommended that the existing 
practice of permitting people to consume opium where it was purchased be 
discontinued (Jayasuriya, 1978).  
 
The profit-making motive of the opium trade was periodically criticised by Sri 
Lankan members of the legislative council. It was in the hands of private 
tradesmen, whose main interest was to increase its sale and consumption. 
There are reports where a member of the legislative council called for the 
adoption of a system similar to that existing in the Philippines, whereby sale 
was undertaken by salaried government officials rather than private tradesmen. 
In a hard hitting speech this member stated that: 
 
“The obstacles are official conservatism and British veneration of freedom. Any 
departure from the old lines, from the familiar grooves, is abhorrent to the 
official mind, especially if there is a suspicion that the revenue might suffer. 
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Here I am free to say that the revenue will suffer by reform, but infinitesimally 
as compared with the vast moral gain that will follow. People shout for proof 
that opium tends to crime, as if violence is the only expression of criminality. Is 
there a higher crime than to bring ruin on one’s own family? To bring destitution 
on wife and children? To ruin one’s own body and soul?” (Hansard, 6 February 
1907). 
 
It is evident from the above quote, that by the beginning of the twentieth 
century, people were questioning the meaning of moral values and good 
citizenship in society. Drug use was seen as immoral, and those who use drugs 
were seen as social outcasts. No significant evidence was available at the time 
to suggest high levels of criminal behaviour among opium users, apart from the 
perceived ‘crime of immorality’ arising out of drug use. This was a perception 
shared by the general public and certainly the previously mentioned religious 
groups who had an interest in drug policy at the time.  
 
Although opium is not grown in Sri Lanka, the incidence of opium use was 
rapidly spreading across the country. In May 1907, a resolution was debated in 
the legislative council, seeking to close all licensed opium-selling shops from 
January 1908 and limiting the issue of opium to licensed apothecaries and 
government dispensaries (Hansard, 1 May 1907). However, the resolution was 
defeated, but the strength of feeling left no doubt in the minds of British 
administrators that there was a growing agitation for a new policy on opium.  
 
Developments in 1908 were encouraging to those who had been seeking a 
change in policy for several years. The then colonial secretary introduced a Bill 
to change the law on importation, sale and distribution. Under the proposed 
new Bill, the government would secure a monopoly on importation and maintain 
complete control over distribution within the country. This would mark the end 
of licensed opium shops. Habitual opium users would have to register 
themselves in order to receive opium and the aim was to gradually wean users 
off opium, with the end goal being abstinence.  The colonial secretary stated: 
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“All persons who are habitual consumers of opium will register themselves, and 
will receive a certificate vouched for by their headman or by some other person 
of standing, and the certificate will also state what quantity of opium he 
habitually consumes. Clause 14(f) enables the governor in executive council to 
fix the date after which the daily allowance of opium specified in the certificate 
of registered consumers shall be reduced each month by an amount equal to 
five per cent of the original allowance, the object being that the reduction 
should go on progressively from month to month until such time as even the 
licensed consumer, who is entitled to the largest quantity, will be unable to 
obtain any further supply” (Hansard, 28 October, 1908).  
 
Today this can be recognised as a gradual form of detoxification, although, the 
initiation of such an approach did not form part of any medical treatment or a 
response from vedaralas. 
 
The proposed Bill was not passed until 1910 due to a disagreement on the 
absence of statutory provision enabling vederalas to prescribe opium in the 
treatment of diseases. At the time they were involved in treating nearly seventy 
per cent of the population (Jayasuriya, 1986). The proposed Bill was referred to 
a sub-committee to make recommendations to consider the appropriateness of 
opium prescribing by vedalaras. One of the main concerns was the absence of 
a regulating body overseeing their work. The colonial secretary feared that in 
the absence of any regulation, untrained individuals calling themselves 
vedalaras might not be suitable to be trusted with opium prescribing for 
therapeutic purposes. Towards the end of 1909, a commission chaired by the 
Attorney General recommended a system for registering vedalaras. Under this, 
provincial boards (similar to local councils in the United Kingdom) were to 
register vedalaras who, in the opinion of the board, had undertaken sufficient 
training and were of good character. Upon registration, they were allowed eight 
ounces of opium annually, an amount the commission believed sufficient to 
meet their prescribing needs (Jayasuriya, 1986).  
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Opium was generally used by vedalaras in the treatment of diseases such as 
dysentery, diarrhoea, cholera, rheumatism, and diabetes and in general pain 
management of individuals. However, there was no provision made for 
vedalaras to supply opium, for non-therapeutic purposes, to individuals for 
chewing or smoking i.e. for any purpose other than in the treatment of 
diseases. Furthermore, the opium supplied was only in the form of a medicinal 
preparation and only three days’ supply could be prescribed at a time. There is 
no mention or documented evidence of opium being prescribed by vedalaras in 
the treatment of drug addiction. 
 
The Bill, the Opium Ordinance of 1910 was designed with an end goal of 
eliminating non-therapeutic opium use. However, the new system had financial 
repercussions on many areas of public administration. Financial losses were 
felt by many areas of the administration: the government, municipalities, local 
boards and sanitary boards, all of whom had relied on opium revenue, to carry 
out the various activities of local and central administration (Jayasuriya, 1986). 
In response to this crisis, the governor proposed a new excise policy aimed at 
generating revenue. The Excise Ordinance of 1912 applied to intoxicating 
drugs such as cocaine, bhang and every preparation containing, or prepared 
from, any part of the hemp plant. This law prohibited the hemp and coca plants 
from being sold without a license from a government agent. At the time, 
existing laws prevented vedalaras from possessing or prescribing bhang for 
medical purposes. In 1915, attempts were made to debate the hardships these 
practitioners were experiencing as a result of the new law. The chief medical 
officer opposed any move to allow bhang to be sold, distributed or prescribed in 
a similar manner as opium. This was later supported by the colonial secretary, 
stating that it is not safe for vedaralas to use bhang in the treatment of diseases 
(Jayasuriya, 1986). In 1920, the vedalaras tried to pass a resolution calling for 
the appointment of a committee to consider whether provision should be made 
for the prescription of bhang and other preparations from cannabis for medical 
purposes (Uragoda, 1983). In response, the principal civil medical officer who 
was also the government’s chief spokesman on health stated that: 
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“It will be seen that for the Ceylon government to refrain from imposing 
restrictions, or to give facilities for the use of what appears to be regarded as a 
more or less ‘universal panacea’ or cure-all is to deliberately sanction the 
establishment of a dangerous drug habit, to be followed by the mental, moral 
and physical ruin of a large number of persons seeking medical aid from 
practitioners who, with the best intentions, perhaps, may set up a horrible vice. 
I maintain that to sanction the medical use of this intoxicant would be to 
encourage the establishment of a dangerous drug habit amongst a large 
population. The drug grows wild in some parts of the country. Excise 
restrictions would be ignored. The native practitioners would be looked upon as 
officially sanctioned purveyors of the intoxicant. They would or could realise a 
rich harvest by disguising the drug as decoctions, extracts, pills or powders and 
so on. The more the drug comes into use as a remedy for disease, the more 
would it be in demand as a cheap intoxicant, and a habitual craving established 
among all classes all over the country” (Hansard, 28 June, 1920).  
 
On this occasion, cannabis had been seen as an intoxicant that compromised 
the country's moral values if it were to be made available to the public via 
ayurvedic transaction. Suspicions were raised over its potential for misuse   
subsequently leading to the establishment of a drug habit if it were to become  
more widely available. There were emerging fears that cannabis use would 
lead to a growth in violent crime, which was not a major concern in debates 
around opium policy in the past. Following a review on the toxicology of bhang, 
the civil medical officer stated in 1915 that: 
 
“We have at present a great number of crimes of violence in Ceylon and I am of 
the opinion that a drug should not be allowed which has proved such 
deleterious effects, and to which so little beneficial properties can be ascribed” 
(Hansard, 6 August, 1915).  
 
This statement from the government's civil medical officer, in conjunction with 
the toxicological review and concurrent moral panic fuelled by the government 
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and public, may have been sufficient to justify the policy stance on bhang taken 
by the British colonial administrators. The international policy climate on drug 
control which the British administrators operated within Sri Lanka was also 
changing as increased sanctions and regulation of drugs were becoming more 
internationally recognised and established.   
 
Between 1912 and 1931 some international conventions concerning the 
regulation of opium had come into effect. For example, 
 
1. The International Opium Convention (1912);  
2. The Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of 
Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium (1925);  
3. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution 
of Narcotic Drugs (1931); and  
4. The Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking (1931).  
 
Considering this international policy climate, the British Secretary of State for 
the colonies, in his despatch of 12 June 1925 to the governor in Sri Lanka, 
prompted him to take action to enact legislation to give effect to international 
drug control conventions. In 1927, a Bill to amend and consolidate the law 
relating to poisons, opium and dangerous drugs was tabled in the legislative 
council. This proposal occurred at a time when the internal drug legislation was 
in a confused state. For example, some of the dangerous drugs were controlled 
by the excise commission, others were controlled by the medical and sanitary 
services, and the whole system is further complicated by large numbers of 
excise notifications notified in gazettes, making it extremely difficult to 
understand the extent of the drug laws (Jayasuriya, 1986).  
 
The Poisons, Opium, and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance was passed in 1929, 
but was not enacted until 1935. Section 47 stated that dangerous drugs should 
only be imported into the country under the direction of the director of medical 
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and sanitary services. Previous regulations enabled the importation of 
dangerous drugs by parties outside government under a license obtained from 
this directorate. This change was found to be inconvenient for the government 
and to non-government organisations. An amendment was made in 1935, 
where non-government agencies were allowed to import drugs under a 
government license, thus reverting back to the old importation system. Earlier 
laws on poisons and opium control were repealed by this new ordinance. Under 
the new law, illicit drug possession, consumption and manufacture became 
criminal acts. In detail, it became an offence to sell, give, obtain, procure, store, 
administer, transport, send, deliver, distribute, traffic, import or export such 
(illicit) drugs and aid or abet in the commission of such offences (NDDCB, 
2005).  
 
However, it is important to note that vederalas were legally able to use opium 
and its preparations in therapeutic medical treatment but were forbidden to use 
bhang or any cannabis preparation. The Medical Ordinance of 1927 deals with 
the registration of medical practitioners, dentists, pharmacists, midwives and 
nurses. At first, there had been some opposition in relation to medical 
personnel being allowed to prescribe dangerous drugs. One member of the 
legislative council stated that: 
 
“Because haphazard legislation with regard to wording might afterwards work a 
difficulty and might put fees in the pockets of the wicked tribe who live on the 
troubles of other people” (Hansard, 4 July, 1929).  
 
However, the Bill was passed by the legislative council. There is no 
documented evidence to suggest that the medical profession had a strong 
influence in policy decisions or had any interest in the prescribing of opium or 
cannabis at the time. 
 
Since 1935, the Poisons, Opium, and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance has been 
through many amendments, most recently in 1984 (Act No.13) and remains the 
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principal statutory enactment regulating illicit drugs in Sri Lanka. The 1984 
amendments and changes brought forward as a result will be discussed in the 
proceeding chapters as it is within the period for contemporary drug policy 
analysis (1984-2008) for this thesis.   
 
After Independence and the New Wave of Nationalism (1948-1972). 
 
Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948. Between 1948 and 1960, 
few amendments were made to The Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs 
Ordinance of 1929. Since independence, the Sri Lankan government has been 
more concerned with regaining a cultural identity in society and as a result a 
resurgence of a new wave of nationalism was born. The government has been 
more concerned and preoccupied with moral values in society and less 
concerned with promoting individual liberties. Moral values have been almost 
entirely drawn from Buddhism, a philosophy followed by over seventy per cent 
of the population (Deegalle, 2006).  
 
The general elections held in 1956 marked the era of the ‘common man’. 
Certain groups, which had at one time in the country’s long history occupied a 
position of eminence and influence in society but had subsequently languished 
for the want of patronage by the elitist groups and recognition by those in 
power, came into the social and political limelight almost overnight (Jayasuriya, 
1986). One such group was Ayurvedic physicians. There was a sudden 
awareness at all levels of society of the needs, aims and aspirations of these 
groups. To ignore their demands would have resulted in political disaster 
(Jayasuriya, 1986). Besides, the majority of Ayurvedic practitioners were 
Buddhists, including some prominent Buddhist monks practising Ayurveda at 
the time. This group of people made explicit demands on the government to 
elevate their status in society. One of their arguments was the relegated status 
given to the profession when the British were promoting western medicine, 
channelling all resources to the development of a western medical system. 
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The drafting of an ayurveda law was delayed due to political unrest after 1956, 
arising from communal disturbances and the assassination of the Prime 
Minister SWRD Bandaranaike in 1959. The law was not enacted until 1961, 
although it addressed the arguments raised by ayurveda practitioners, for 
example, resolving difficulties in obtaining opium and bhang for the 
manufacture of medicinal preparations (Jayasuriya, 1986). It was introduced at 
a time when there had been less pressure from international bodies attempting 
to control and shape drug policies in many countries. It is worth mentioning that 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into effect in 1961; this 
endorsed the use of cannabis for medical and scientific purposes, bringing Sri 
Lanka in line with international law. There was no other significant drug 
legislation in this period.  
 
Application of Global Drug Policies to Sri Lanka (1973- 1983). 
 
The international policy climate on drug control 1973-1983, the various actors 
and organisations involved in domestic policy-making and how these actor 
networks have an impact on policy outcomes, require examination. Particular 
emphasis will be given to the role of the United Nations Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs and their strong ally, the Colombo Plan, in sensitising and 
diffusing international principles, norms and policies on drug control into the 
domestic context.  Available evidence on the drug scene during this period, and 
how this was framed and defined, needs to be analysed. Ideas discussed are 
predominantly drawn from a comprehensive report compiled following the first 
ever narcotics and drug abuse seminar held in Sri Lanka on 18th and 19th of 
October 1973. The proceedings were tape recorded and this report contains a 
summary of the discussions (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug 
Abuse Problems, 1974). As a documentary record, this is probably the only 
comprehensive report that traces policy ideas and proposals to deal with the 
drug problem in great detail in the 1970s. Additionally literature was drawn on 
where it was available.  
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With the changing international climate on drug law enforcement, Sri Lanka has 
been compliant in adopting new international drug control conventions. Prior to 
the 1970s, Sri Lanka was already a signatory to the United Nations Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs when the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) was set-up by the United Nations in 1961. In 1971, Sri Lanka 
participated in the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and 
became a signatory to the protocol in 1972. Policy transfer and harmonisation 
across intergovernmental organisations and co-operation between countries 
was a key priority for the United Nations. Confining drug policy analysis to the 
borders of Sri Lanka gives a highly skewed picture, as “developing country 
policies were, and are, being decided externally by financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and the huge empire of United Nations’ institutions” (Walt, 
2006:122., Bernstein and Cashore, 2000). Moreover, as previously discussed, 
external influence on drug policy during the British administration had also been 
traced in the origins of drug policies in Sri Lanka. 
 
During the early 1970s, the need for policy change was periodically highlighted 
by both external and internal parties. The majority of these changes were 
proposed by the Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme (CPDAP), an 
international organisation established under the Colombo Plan in 1973 to 
address drug problems in the Asia-Pacific region. This programme assisted 
member states in organising national and regional seminars, conferences and 
discussions on various aspects of drug abuse prevention and control. It also 
advised and assisted in updating drug legislation and promoting drug law 
enforcement action. At the time, member states of the Colombo Plan included: 
United States of America, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Pakistan, New 
Zealand, Nepal, Myanmar, Maldives, Malaysia, Laos, South Korea, 
Bangladesh, Fiji, Japan, Iran, Indonesia, India, Australia, Afghanistan as well 
as Sri Lanka. Since its inception in 1973, the head-quarters of CPDAP has 
been based in Sri Lanka and might have benefited the local bureau in terms of 
policy application on many different fronts through its dealings with domestic 
actors.  The majority of funds received by the Colombo Plan were from the 
United States and, arguably, policy decisions taken by the Colombo Plan might 
have been shaped by the US government.   
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The first Sri Lankan narcotics and drug abuse seminar in 1973 was jointly 
sponsored by the Colombo Plan and the Sri Lanka police narcotics bureau. It 
was also assisted by the United Nations Representative in Sri Lanka and the 
United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The seminar was timed to 
coincide with the visit of the United Nations Commission on Narcotics Ad Hoc 
Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Far East Region. It was attended by over forty 
participants, representing government ministries, corporations, universities and 
various international, professional and voluntary organisations. While the 
director for Colombo Plan, Mr. I.K McGregor, delivered the welcome address, 
Mr. J.C O’Connor, the Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit Drug Traffic, delivered a speech prior to the 
opening of this seminar (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse 
Problems, 1974). 
 
One of the main objectives of the seminar was to exchange knowledge and 
information, and suggest measures for improving law enforcement, drug 
treatment and rehabilitation. These objectives were not entirely different from 
the key priorities set out by the United Nations. During the seminar, drug abuse 
was presented as a global problem affecting both the developed and 
developing countries. As the Chairman of the UNCND stated: 
 
“This is a problem which is not local to Sri Lanka. It is worldwide, one which 
should be looked at, we think, in that context. Our charter concerns 
international liaison and co-operation to combat the illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs” (J.C O’Conner, 1973, Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug 
Abuse Problems, 1974: 13).  
 
The importance of international co-operation to curb the illicit trade in narcotic 
drugs and cannabis was allotted a high priority. It was particularly aimed at 
politicians and influential people who participated in the Colombo Plan seminar 
and used as an opportunity to diffuse the United Nations’ principles, norms and 
policies related to drug control into the domestic policy-making arena.  
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There was a considerable amount of pressure and coercion from the 
international community, particularly the UNCND, for Sri Lanka to bring its law 
into line with international drug control conventions (Jayasuriya, 1986). The 
seminar was perhaps utilised as an opportunity to spearhead the 
implementation of some of the international drug control policies by Asian-
pacific member states. The UNCND, through their regional representative 
bodies and other bodies such as the Colombo Plan exerted influence on the Sri 
Lankan government to respond to the global problem of drugs at a local level. 
This occurred against the backdrop of Sri Lanka being a signatory to the 1961 
UN convention; although a high acquittal rate for narcotic related offences 
existed in the absence of any domestic legislation to give effect to the UN 
convention.   
 
According to Bennett (1991), the notion of policy penetration involves a 
significant element of coercion. It is via this route that nation states are forced 
to conform to particular policy developments driven by other nations or external 
organisations, in this case, the United Nations and its ally, the Colombo Plan. 
 
There were a number of significant organisational structures established in Sri 
Lanka in response to these international influences. The year 1973 marked the 
establishment of a National Narcotic Advisory Committee (NNAC). It was set-
up administratively almost overnight, under the instructions of the Colombo 
Plan, to coincide with a United Nations mission that visited Sri Lanka 
(Jayasuriya, 1986). The Board’s primary function was to advise the government 
on drug-related issues and advocate on policy options. The Deputy Minister for 
Defence and Foreign Affairs became the chairman of this Board and appointed 
members drawn from the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Health, 
Education and the Departments of Police, Customs and Excise, and the 
Attorney General. Although not provided with a legal mandate, the Board 
marked the start of a multi-agency approach to drug policy development and 
thinking.  
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International interest in domestic drug policies gave rise to an epistemic-like 
community, the members of the NNAC. They hoped to address the drug 
problem in many different ways: law enforcement, treatment, rehabilitation and 
prevention. Those who represented the NNAC were loosely knit and comprised 
of a small group of powerful elites in government office. Representatives from 
non-governmental organisations were not included on the board and hence 
were not within this network. Considering the make-up of this Committee, the 
members shared one characteristic that they all belonged to higher social strata 
in Sri Lankan society. They also shared the belief that drug use is an obstacle 
to socio-economic development and prohibition must be the primary policy 
response (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Problems, 
1974). 
 
The involvement of the Deputy Minister of Defence and the Superintendent of 
police, led to the Committee having a strong focus on law enforcement. This 
was a domestic priority, but still an expectation of the international drug control 
conventions to which Sri Lanka was becoming a part. Although opium was not 
grown domestically, the Committee’s emphasis was to focus on illicit trafficking 
of narcotic drugs particularly opium, into Sri Lanka from India. At the time, India 
was the world’s largest supplier of legal opium for medicinal and scientific 
purposes. Opium had always been a major item in the overall two-way illicit 
traffic between southern India and Sri Lanka and this pattern of trade remained 
much the same during this period (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and 
Drug Abuse Problems, 1974). According to the World Opium Survey (1972), it 
was estimated that five tons of opium was illicitly imported into Sri Lanka 
annually from India by large scale drug traders. Considering that figures for 
local consumption were far less than illicit importation figures, there were 
growing concerns around the illicit traffic of opium to other parts of the world, 
particularly the west. The island’s popularity as an onward-shipment point for 
narcotics from India grew from the early 1970s. Against this backdrop, the 
United Nations was keen on providing assistance to stem this trade.  
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The United Nations narcotics division provided training in law enforcement in 
the form of scholarships to member states. Whilst Sri Lanka had recently made 
its own start in police narcotic control, some police officers were sent for 
training to the United Nations narcotics division in Geneva. These training 
programmes were designed to unite senior law enforcement officers from 
various parts of the world, to establish informal friendship networks, discuss 
professional problems and find solutions domestically, regionally and 
internationally on illicit trafficking operations and generally to make officers 
realise that illicit trafficking is very much an international undertaking (Tufnell, 
1973). This certainly became a platform for exchanging knowledge and ideas 
and for policy transfer. 
 
In contrast to opium cultivation, cannabis sativa or the Indian hemp plant, grew 
easily under the varying climatic conditions prevalent in Sri Lanka. According to 
aerial surveys conducted by the police and air-force in the early 1970s, there 
were about 2,000 acres where cannabis was grown, namely along the south-
east coast of Sri Lanka (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse 
Problems, 1974). Ganja was a cash crop and the illicit cultivation of ganja 
involved approximately 3,000 workmen in the ‘ganja belt’ region. According to 
police intelligence, it was roughly estimated that 200 pounds of ganja arrived in 
Colombo on a daily basis for local consumption (Colombo Plan Meeting on 
Narcotics and Drug Abuse Problems, 1974) and there were several ‘ganja 
dens’ situated in Colombo and its suburbs; ganja cigar-smoking was a habit 
among local groups. In view of this large-scale illicit cultivation, one pound of 
ganja, which was worth rupees 300 in the early 1960s, had reportedly dropped 
to rupees 30, a tenfold price reduction within a decade (Colombo Plan Meeting 
on Narcotics and drug abuse problems, 1974). Law enforcement authorities 
used this information to demonstrate there was a substantial domestic illicit 
ganja trade, a problem needing attention from law enforcement agencies and 
the Ministry of Agriculture. Ganja growing was seen as a threat to the local 
agrarian economy especially in the wake of a concurrent food crisis. The 
Deputy Minister for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr Lakshman Jayakody in his 
inaugural address at the Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse 
problems stated: 
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“I am very happy that we have decided to have the meeting on narcotics and 
drug abuse problems in Sri Lanka and that this meeting is being held in 
Colombo today at a time when we are fighting a food war, because indeed it is 
important that we should also consider the growing of ganja in Sri Lanka as one 
of the problems facing the country” (Lakshman Jayakody, Colombo Plan 
Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Problems, 1974: 11). 
 
The need to cultivate as many crops, food crops as well as other produce, to 
replace more expensive imported food and raw materials was highlighted from 
time to time. The country’s economy was regulated by a socialist government 
and inevitably a food rationing system was in place. The emphasis was to 
promote and increase the production of domestic agricultural products, and the 
flourishing cannabis plantation was perceived as a threat by the Deputy 
Minister for Defence and Foreign Affairs. 
 
Another significant landmark in 1973 was the establishment of the Police 
Narcotics Bureau. Its operational head was the detective superintendent of 
police for crimes division, Mr. R. Sundaralingam, who was also the secretary of 
the newly formed National Narcotics Advisory Committee. He was a leading 
figure in terms of driving the drug law enforcement agenda forward. He 
facilitated a discussion titled “Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and cannabis in 
relation to Sri Lanka” at the first national seminar in 1973. It is reported that he 
was conducting training for local police officers in drug law enforcement. 
Initially, the Police Narcotics Bureau was involved in data collection and training 
activities but the role later changed to include law enforcement, steering drug 
users into treatment and some demand-reduction activities such as drug 
education programmes for schools.  
 
Looking at the drug scene during the 1970s, there was no evidence to suggest 
that heroin had infiltrated the market in Sri Lanka. Although the accurate 
number of opium users was not known during this period, an approximate 
number of between 10,000 and 15,000 was quoted based on quantities of 
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opium that arrived in Colombo (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug 
Abuse Problems, 1974). The majority of opium users were a cohort of an older 
generation who had habitually used opium for many decades. They were 
essentially a non-injecting population and belonged to the low-income earning 
group (Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Problems, 1974). 
In 1978 the Narcotic Advisory Board coordinated the first systematic field 
investigation of drug abuse in the country which showed that opium, cannabis 
and barbiturates were the most commonly misused substances. The use of 
heroin was virtually unknown in Sri Lanka prior to the early 1980s apart from a 
few locals who had migrated outside Sri Lanka and some tourists who visited 
Sri Lanka (NDDCB, 2005). In 1981, Colombo Plan experts from Australia and 
Malaysia estimated a much higher figure of drug users, stating that 34,450 to 
58,800 people used opium, whilst 133,060 to 164,940 people used cannabis in 
Sri Lanka (Spencer and Navarathnam, 1981).  
 
A Christian priest, delivering a speech on ‘the role of the citizen’ at the same 
seminar on drug abuse control stated that drug addiction should be seen as a 
social problem and as a product of inequality in society. He went on to say that 
drug addicts should be treated as human beings and not as criminals: 
 
“The problem of addiction has to be viewed with the primary objective of 
helping the drug addict. If a husband takes ganja, the wife does not consider 
the husband as a criminal. If a son takes ganja, the parents do not consider the 
son as a criminal. But in the eyes of the police and of the public, both the 
husband and the son are criminals” (Rev. Kurukulasuriya, Colombo Plan 
Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Problems, 1974::123). 
 
This was a response to the prevailing societal attitudes towards drug use and 
the moral underpinning of policy-making which then existed. The focus had 
been to arrest and punish drug users as opposed to providing any help to 
overcome their addiction.   
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There were limited treatment facilities or institutions available for the treatment 
and rehabilitation of drug problems at the time. According to Rev. 
Kurukulasuriya, the only place to which an addict could be referred at that time 
was the police. However, a humane response was not to be expected from a 
law enforcement agency, but rather a more punitive one. But it appears that 
most Sri Lankan doctors in hospitals were also unable to understand the 
psycho-social factors associated with drug addiction. This was possibly due to 
the profession’s emergence out of the educated and affluent middle and upper 
middle classes in Sri Lankan society and a lack of interest in the area of drug 
treatment. Commenting on this and on the question as to why the country had 
suddenly become alive to the problem of drugs, Rev. Kurukulasuriya stated: 
 
“As far as the present day society is concerned, doctors tend to take a narrow 
view about their role. For the past several years we have been having addicts 
in our society but it is only now that people are getting worried. The reason is 
that it is only now that the middle class people are being affected. That explains 
why there is so much ‘hoo-ha’. All this while poor people were already affected 
and their welfare was not the concern of anyone at all. Now that the middle 
class society does not want any of the people in their group identified as 
addicts or thrown away or cornered by society everybody is getting highly 
worried about the drug addiction problem. That is how the people with whom I 
have been moving around and I myself think about it. We are in fact happy that 
in one way at least those people are getting involved with us so that at least 
some attention will now be paid to the plight of the lower classes. As far as the 
middle class is concerned, drug addiction spreads through the pop music 
groups. So, when pop groups take to ganja even the Colombo seven (people 
from middle class live in this area) folk will take up drugs” (Rev. Kurukulasuriya, 
Colombo Plan Meeting on Narcotics and Drug Abuse Problems 1974:123).  
 
The drug problem in Sri Lanka in the 1970s exemplifies how the social profile of 
drug users influenced the evolution of national policies (Jayasuriya, 1995). Until 
the early 1970s, it was widely believed that drug problems largely remained 
among the poor and socially disadvantaged in society. This perception resulted 
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in the problem being ignored, a topic which did not form part of any public 
agenda or require a policy response. Although there had been discussions by 
the NNAC concerning measuring the nature and extent of drug problems and 
provision of treatment facilities, the official lack of interest and investment in this 
area continued. 
 
Following the first drug seminar, a recommendation was made to establish 
treatment for drug-dependent individuals. As a result, the Police Narcotics 
Bureau announced through the media that it was prepared to grant an amnesty 
to encourage drug users who were willing to submit themselves voluntarily to 
hospital treatment. The response to this was encouraging as several hundred 
people sought help from the police.  A large majority of them came from 
socially disadvantaged backgrounds (Jayasuriya, 1986). Those who had 
adequate financial resources appear to have sought help from private medical 
practitioners. 
 
Some international researchers believe drug usage became a real problem in 
the 1970s with approximately 3,000 persons reporting to various treatment 
facilities in Sri Lanka between 1975 and 1979 (Ray, 1998). Treatment was 
generally provided via acute hospitals whereby symptomatic prescribing of non-
opioid drugs became the norm to alleviate opioid withdrawal symptoms. 
Considering the fact that these services were not widely available, and that 
available treatment facilities were possibly not known to a majority of drug 
users, suggests that physical, psychological and social problems arising out of 
habitual cannabis, opium or barbiturate use may have pre-dated the early 
1970s. It was only when people were encouraged by the police to seek help 
that drug users started to come forward. Additionally, the concept of treatment, 
as opposed to punishment, was explained via the media and the Police 
Narcotics Bureau as a means to inform both the public and drug users 
(Jayasuriya, 1986). 
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At the end of the 1970s, it is reported that opium users were treated free of 
charge in some state hospitals with methadone prescribed twice a day to 
suppress withdrawal symptoms. This usually lasted for ten days and was 
generally in the form of a gradual daily reducing dosage or detoxification 
(Satkunanayagam, 1979). Only a few doctors were interested in helping drug 
users and in providing treatment. This response was directed at achieving 
abstinence, facilitated by a short term medical detoxification programme. 
Methadone or any other substitute maintenance programmes were unknown at 
the time. There was also a lack of evidence to denote that, before the late 
1970s, residential rehabilitation centres were available or that a concept of 
rehabilitation was fully developed. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Sri Lanka has been a country subject to colonial administration for many 
centuries and its adoption of domestic drug policies from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth century has been influenced by the shifting priorities of these 
administrations. Stakeholders in the policy process identified during British 
administration are; the legislative council, British East India Company, 
Ayurvedic physicians, the chief medical officer, Buddhist monks and the local 
public. Influence over policy decisions were clearly in the hands of the British 
dominated legislative council. The agitation against the government policy on 
opium gave rise to interest groups such as Ayurvedic physicians and Buddhist 
monks, who progressively lobbied against the promotion of opium for revenue 
purposes.  
 
After Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948, there were few 
legislative or policy innovations at first. Later, international organisations such 
as the United Nations and the Colombo Plan exerted influence on Sri Lanka to 
bring domestic law into line with the United Nations drug control conventions. 
External influence prompted the creation of a small network of policy actors 
who represented the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Health, 
Education and the Departments of Police, Customs and Excise, and the 
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Attorney General. The use of knowledge experts to support policy decisions 
during British administration and after independence has been observed. 
Examining these historical developments, the identification of interest groups 
and actors present in the policy process, and the recognition of policy transfer 
in the history, provides a solid platform for the analysis of contemporary drug 
policy in Sri Lanka.  
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Chapter Five: External Influences 
 
Introduction. 
 
“There was an obligation on Sri Lanka to come in line with international drug 
control conventions. The drug control board, in a way, was obliged to move 
things as the UN was trying to get all countries, through their regional offices, to 
get the legislation and policies in line with drug control conventions. That was 
all about it, rather than some great national movers taking it up and delivering” 
(Policy-maker, Interview 8).  
 
International co-operation to fight against the so-called drug menace has 
become a distinctive characteristic of contemporary drug policymaking and 
international relations (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). In this effort, external 
organisations such as the United Nations, South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) and the Colombo Plan were initially formed to address a 
wide variety of problems existing both within and beyond national boundaries. 
These organisations subsequently also became prominent vehicles to tackle 
and shape the drug policy landscape in member countries, including Sri Lanka. 
Their roles included harmonisation of policies in member states and the 
transfer of principles and norms on matters related to drug control from one 
jurisdiction to another.  
 
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive empirical account of external 
events, organisations, actors and their influence on shaping drug policies in Sri 
Lanka. It will elaborate on the role of expert knowledge, the diffusion of 
internationally accepted principles and norms on drug control through various 
forms of transnational policy-making and their impact on national policy. 
Attention will be paid to both continuities and shifts in drug policies, taking into 
account the prevailing economic, political and social contexts. It is argued that 
external influences instigated national action, though not always rapidly, and 
became a preamble to contemporary drug policy development.  
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Transferring Global Principles, Norms and Policies on Drug Control. 
 
As described in Chapter Four, the origins of the Colombo Plan date back to the 
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ Conference in 1950 where the Sri Lankan 
former Minister of Finance, J.R Jayawardena and the former Australian Foreign 
Minister, Sir Percy Spencer, proposed the establishment of a committee to 
prepare a 10-year plan for the socio-economic development of countries in 
South-East Asia through international collaboration (Colombo Plan Secretariat, 
2001). Subsequently, the Colombo Plan was established as an 
intergovernmental organisation in 1951 and Sri Lanka hosted its activities for 
over six decades. The right-wing government led by the late President J. R 
Jayawardena from 1977-1989 continued having a close relationship with the 
Colombo Plan where, at macro level, some normative and principled beliefs 
were shared by key policy actors. It is reported that the Colombo Plan had 
been supportive of member states to ensure that there were fewer 
opportunities for communism in mainstream society and to promote instead a 
neo-liberal market economy (Adeleke, 2003; Lowe, 2010). It also appears that 
due to the physical presence of the Colombo Plan, the headquarters being 
based in Colombo itself, Colombo Plan may have had a significant impact in 
shaping national policies such as transport, education, trade and agriculture 
(Colombo Plan Secretariat, 2001).    
 
Some of the aid provided to the Sri Lankan government via Colombo Plan in 
the 1950s was directed towards the renowned Gal Oya project, which aimed at 
expanding agriculture, river valley development, supply of electricity and 
livelihoods for the residents in the Gal Oya and adjacent areas. A total 
investment of US $ 67.2 million was collaboratively allocated between the US 
and the Colombo Plan for this project. By mid-1960s, Canada, as part of 
infrastructure development, donated diesel-electric locomotives and provided 
financial assistance via the Colombo Plan to expand the main airport in 
Katunayake. Later, the double curvature arch Victoria Dam was built with a 
grant of £113 million from the UK government under the Colombo Plan. This 
was commissioned by Margaret Thatcher, the late Prime Minister in the UK and 
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the late Sri Lankan President J R Jayawardena in 1985. The above information 
is based on a speech delivered by the Secretary-General of the Colombo Plan 
on 23rd November 2007 in an address to a gathering organised by the United 
Nations Friendship organisation on the theme of Colombo Plan’s involvement 
in the eradication of poverty on the Asia Pacific region, including Sri Lanka 
(Yoon-Moi Chia, 2007). 
 
However, the Colombo Plan was not merely an aid programme as it was linked 
to the strategic interests of the west, especially in the background of promoting 
social and economic stability in the newly independent Commonwealth 
countries, making them less likely to embrace communism (Rizvi, 2009). 
Another common criticism of the Colombo Plan is that it became an extended 
arm of British imperialism where it offered economic solutions almost 
exclusively for problems which were political and social (Lowe, 2010). 
Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, the Colombo Plan had become widely 
accepted by the Sri Lankan government as a credible organisation that 
harnessed social and economic stability, institutionalising a stake in influencing 
government policy decisions due to its previous relations with the government 
and to providing financial aid. It is within the context of the Colombo Plan 
maintaining its international membership and outlook, success with securing 
multi-million finance, acquisition of a reputation for good-judgement and 
respect, and its subsequent experience in providing technical advice and in 
developing social and economic projects within its member countries that any 
perspectives on contemporary drug policy analysis should be viewed.  
 
The Drug Advisory Programme of the Colombo Plan (CPDAP) was not 
established until 1973, and can be viewed as an epistemic community whereby 
its actors shared a causal belief in drug use being a major obstacle to the 
eradication of poverty and development within its member states. By this time, 
the principle of prohibiting the use and trafficking of illicit drugs was 
internationalised and formalised through the 1961 and 1971 UN conventions. 
Nadelmann (1990) argues that the global drug prohibition regime was 
exceptionally influenced by American protagonists who advocated a penal 
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approach to manage the supply and demand of psychoactive substances. This 
gave a mandate and a prominent role to national law enforcement agencies to 
spearhead drug law enforcement activities with a focus on attempts to counter 
production and distribution of illicit drugs at national and international level, the 
latter being strongly associated with the transnational dimension inherent in 
drug trafficking.  
 
Initially, Colombo Plan’s policy responses, practices and advice to member 
states originated from the principle of prohibition. According to interview data, 
they were primarily directed towards supporting initiatives to: increase public 
awareness of the dangers of drug abuse and trafficking, rehabilitate drug users, 
assist member states to adopt new legislation for the punishment of drug 
related offences, and secure conformity to international drug control 
conventions. Although these actions were aimed at addressing the problems 
caused by producers, traffickers and users, their emphasis was heavily 
weighted towards law enforcement rather than inclusive of treatment and 
rehabilitation as well (Policy-maker, Interview 8). This was possibly driven by a 
clear set of international obligations set out in the 1961 and 1971 UN 
conventions, underpinned presumably by the conviction that human welfare will 
be enhanced as a result of law enforcement. However, there appears to be a 
shift in Colombo Plan’s emphasis and response from supply reduction 
measures to include demand reduction programmes from the 1990s and this 
will be discussed later in the chapter. 
  
During the early 1980s, the drug problem within Sri Lanka was framed as an 
emerging issue with focus upon the infiltration of diverted, trafficked heroin into 
the country’s drug market. Although opium was not grown locally, Sri Lanka’s 
popularity for heroin as a major trans-shipment point to Europe, the United 
States and Canada had been growing and was concerning to organisations 
such as the Colombo Plan and the United Nations (Police Officer, Interview 
10). This period coincided with the emergence of evidence that traffickers were 
recognising western Europe as a growth market for heroin (Ruggiero and 
South, 1995). Locally, people were also taking up heroin use. This was a 
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practice unknown to the Sri Lankan society and the newness of a heroin scene 
was thought to be more prevalent among the middle classes where affordability 
was perceived as a chief factor for initiation (Civil Servant, Interview 9). 
However, the absence of any scientific evidence, and limited knowledge and 
confidence in managing an emerging heroin problem, including trafficking, 
magnified the uncertainties and complexities around how the problem should 
be approached and tackled. A police officer, who was a member of the NNAC 
at the time stated:  
 
“During the 1970s, the main problem that we had was cannabis and opium. At 
that time we knew how big the problem was and the types of users. But when 
heroin hit the scene in the early 1980s we knew very little about drug users. So, 
if we were to say that there’s a massive drug problem and if people ask us what 
these people used and about their features and how we are going to respond, 
we knew nothing at that time. All we knew was that heroin was affordable 
among middle classes and trafficked via Sri Lanka to countries in the west” 
(Police officer, Interview 10).  
 
These factors along with official uncertainty within the government gave rise to 
a stronger role for policy actors beyond the nation state. By this time, epistemic 
community actors from the Colombo Plan and the UNCND had already 
established informal working relationships with local policy actors, who were 
mainly representing the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, Police 
Narcotics Bureau and the NNAC. As discussed in Chapter Four, the historical 
beginnings of these networks goes back to the 1970s when a NNAC was 
established almost overnight in 1973, following advice from the Colombo Plan 
to coincide with the UN delegation who visited Sri Lanka.   
 
At first, members of the NNAC and some civil servants believed that trafficking 
of heroin was an issue that extended beyond the control of Sri Lankan 
authorities as opium was grown and trafficked from some of the neighbouring 
member states of the Colombo Plan. This was seen as an attempt to leave the 
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ownership of the trafficking problem outside Sri Lanka, to the opium producing 
countries: 
 
“International organisations like the UN and the Colombo Plan were of course 
concerned about drug trafficking at first. We are not producing opium and we 
know that it arrives here from neighbouring countries like India and Pakistan. 
We don’t have a coastguard system in place. The powerful neighbours should 
take care of things from that end as they have a lot of producers in those 
countries” (Civil Servant, Interview 6).  
 
The Drug Advisor and other experts of the Colombo Plan, together with the 
UNCND representatives for the region, helped re-shape this debate by 
highlighting the problem as an issue that needs to be tackled through bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral co-ordination where collaborative interventions would be more 
useful and effective in an interdependent world. The international response in 
the early 1980s had been marked by rigorous attempts to generalise principles 
of combating drug trafficking problems by establishing and revising national 
and international institutional arrangements, enacting domestic legislation and 
harmonising drug control policies across the south Asian region (Civil Servant, 
Interview 9). It was within the remit of the CPDAP to work in close collaboration 
with organisations of the United Nations, governments of Colombo Plan 
member states and other regional and international organisations in pursuing 
activities and diffusing ideas in line with UN policies for drug control. These 
both gave information and confidence to, but also required a response from, 
the Sri Lankan government. The Colombo Plan and the UNCND were mutually 
supportive of each other in their efforts to establish consensus with the Sri 
Lankan government in finding acceptable policy options to manage the 
trafficking problem at regional level. 
 
By the mid-1980s, there was growing concern among law enforcement 
personnel about the steady increase in interceptions and confiscation of heroin 
at the Katunayaka international airport and off the coastline of Sri Lanka (Police 
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Officer, Interview 10). These domestic-level enforcement measures at national 
borders were not considered as sufficient trafficking controls by the UNCND 
(Civil Servant, Interview, 9). Their expectations were to include other strategies 
such as international co-operation with Interpol, and international law 
enforcement agencies both in other South East Asian countries and further 
afield. By mid-1980s, consensus was reached between national and 
international policy actors on the idea that inter-regional co-operation and co-
ordination is a more effective option to deal with trafficking problems. As a 
report produced by the NDDCB states: 
 
“The international community has already launched comprehensive counter 
attacks against illicit drug trafficking and abuse and stronger political 
commitments are being made at the highest levels of Governments. New 
initiatives regularly taken to promote effective and co-ordinated action and 
improving inter-regional co-operation, particularly at the operational level, are 
leading to a measure of success. The joint counter actions all proceed from the 
common conviction that effective and lasting progress can be made in any one 
affected country only if all countries co-operate” (Report on Illicit Drug 
Trafficking and Drug Abuse in Sri Lanka, NDDCB, 1986:1).  
 
Leakage of heroin into the local drug market also increased the level of threat 
whereby law enforcement personnel from the NNAC turned to the UNCND and 
Colombo Plan to employ international norms as devices to assert legitimacy of 
enforcement action they wish to take at national level. Although Sri Lanka had 
been a signatory to the 1961 and 1971 UN conventions by 1983, no domestic 
legislation had been introduced to reflect the content of the conventions. Legal 
structures were not in place to give effect to the conventions and the courts 
continued to apply a more lenient system for drug offences resulting in a higher 
acquittal rate than would have occurred if adhering to the conventions. This 
was of concern to the United States who was contributing substantial funds for 
drug control activities across the Colombo Plan and the United Nations. The Sri 
Lankan government was constantly reminded by the US about its international 
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obligations and the need to bring the laws in line with UN conventions. A civil 
servant who was interviewed, reflecting this period stated: 
 
“There was pressure particularly from the US that we needed to strengthen the 
law in relation to narcotic drugs. At that time, the acquittal rate was extremely 
high in Sri Lanka and the convictions for drug offences were few and far 
between. Although we were a signatory to the conventions, we have not 
amended the law accordingly. In one sense, although we were able to expand 
our knowledge in the drugs field with the help of the Colombo Plan and the UN, 
our legislations and practice did not reflect what was required by the 
international community. This was something the US wanted to address” (Civil 
Servant, Interview 9). 
 
External pressure to introduce legislation gave the impression to members 
representing the drug control board that the desired response in relation to the 
drug problem at national level was largely a legal one, involving legal and law 
enforcement agencies and did not require involvement from other groups such 
as health and social services. This perception led to a requirement from only 
legal experts representing the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General’s 
Department and the Police Narcotic Bureau to formulate a response to both the 
problems of supply and demand reduction. 
 
Diffusion of internationally recognised norms and principles, in this case 
UNCND principles of drug control, into the Sri Lankan context was possible 
through national policy actors attending drug control conferences, workshops, 
seminars and educational tours (epistemic activities) organised and funded by 
the Colombo Plan. According to interview data, this started soon after 1973 and 
places were offered to members of the National Narcotics Advisory Committee, 
civil servants and most individuals recommended by the National Narcotics 
Advisory Committee. Events organised by the Colombo Plan were 
predominantly held in Asian countries such as Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka 
and those organised by the United Nations were held in Geneva, Vienna and 
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the United States. Attendees from Sri Lanka were predominantly from law 
enforcement backgrounds and topics covered on the educational tours included 
regional cooperation on trafficking, police narcotics training and law 
enforcement. As a result, there had been improvements in bi-lateral and multi-
lateral communications across law enforcement agencies and other policy 
actors with the notion of interdependency and the need to harmonise law 
enforcement policies becoming agreeable. However, a decade after becoming 
a signatory to the two UN Conventions and with exposure to new ideas and 
policies, domestic drug policy-making was still not institutionalised. Ideas had 
not been converted into domestic laws and not enforced as routine policy and 
practice.  
 
By 1984 amendments to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance 
of 1929 were already underway. This was a response to the afore mentioned 
pressure exerted by external parties. The UNCND and the Colombo Plan’s 
Drug Advisory Programme had both been persuasive in encouraging the 
existing policy actors representing the National Narcotics Advisory Committee 
to introduce and establish a legal and procedural framework for drug policy-
making. This was planned to bring domestic law in line with UN Conventions 
where the government of Sri Lanka was prompted to consider 
institutionalisation of drug policy-making processes. The outcome was the 
formation of the National Dangerous Drug Control Board in 1984 as per the 
National Dangerous Drug Control Board Act No11: 
 
“At that time, we set up the National Narcotics Advisory Committee 
administratively and then later on you decide if this should be given legal 
recognition and consider the pros and cons of doing that. By giving legal status 
it was then possible to get funds allocated by the Parliament, because the 
Defence Ministry’s budget had to cover the activities of the NDDCB. That’s how 
they were able to have their own premises and employ some staff members. 
That was an important step in policy-making to institutionalise and provide a 
legal framework. I suppose we were encouraged to do so by the UN and 
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Colombo Plan. We received some funding from them to set it up as well” (Civil 
Servant, Interview 09). 
 
At first, and in consideration of international obligations, the priority for the Sri 
Lankan government had been to establish a national institution, responsible for 
the formulation and review of a national policy on drugs. The NDDCB, at its 
inception, primarily focused on law enforcement matters with little emphasis on 
the health and social needs of actual drug users. The membership of the first 
Board, its areas of interests, functions and relationships with other stakeholders 
will be further explored in the following chapters.  
 
The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). 
 
The SAARC was begun in 1985 and consisted of India, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. It was established with the aim of 
regional cooperation for the economic and social development of people in 
south Asia, and in the belief that adoption of common public policies and 
approaches to shared problems in the region would be beneficial and 
advantageous (SAARC Charter, 1985). The exchange of ideas, knowledge, 
experience and technical cooperation between its member states was 
considered fundamental to the goal of promoting collective self-reliance and 
shared benefits (SAARC Bangalore Declaration, 1986). The SAARC also 
sought to adhere to the United Nations Charter and cooperate with international 
and regional organisations with similar aims and aspirations (SAARC Charter, 
1985). For example, in relation to matters concerning drug control, SAARC had 
a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Drug Control 
Programme (UNDCP), later known as UNODC, and the Colombo Plan CPDAP.  
 
From the inauguration of SAARC in 1985, the subject of drugs attracted the 
attention of heads of state in member countries. Concerns were raised on the 
established links between illicit drug trafficking and organised crime and the 
threat they pose to development, stability, security and sovereignty.  Peace and 
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stability were considered as essential prerequisites for the realisation of 
economic and social development (SAARC Dhaka Declaration, 1985) and the 
notion of an increased threat from illicit drugs had been a significant legitimising 
principle for supporting the introduction of a wide array of law enforcement 
policies and programmes. Similar to the Colombo Plan, the SAARC also 
shared the belief that drug use is a major cause of poverty, and an obstacle to 
the eradication of poverty and economic development within its member states. 
As one civil servant stated: 
 
“When SAARC was formed it looked at non-sensitive areas for development 
such as telecommunication, poverty alleviation, agriculture etc. But at the end 
of the first SAARC summit itself, Sri Lanka raised the question of terrorism. 
That was the most controversial area and there were a lot of misgivings. But we 
managed to put it on the agenda because we had a very difficult time due to 
terrorism. Within one year, the SAARC convention on suppression of terrorism 
emerged where it was led by the Sri Lankan delegation. We presented the 
negotiating text on the terrorism convention as we were the host country to 
formulate this convention. It was felt that it is logical to deal with crimes 
connected with terrorism as there was obvious linkage between drug trafficking 
and fund raising for terrorism. We had the political support to introduce or 
amend existing legislation in member states and there were no questions as to 
why we shouldn’t be stringent with the law” (Civil Servant, Interview 12).  
 
After the first summit in 1985, the heads of its member states issued a joint 
press release stating that the SAARC standing committee should set-up two 
study groups, later to be known as technical committees, consisting of experts 
from each member state to examine the problem of terrorism and drug 
trafficking and abuse (Joint press release issued at the conclusion of the first 
SAARC Summit, 1985). This can be seen as a response to how the problem of 
drugs was framed by the Sri Lankan delegation, especially in the milieu of the 
beginnings of a domestic armed conflict in the North and East of Sri Lanka. It 
was perceived and represented as a major security concern and a crisis for the 
Sri Lankan government, including as a threat to its own sovereignty and socio-
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economic development (Civil Servant, Interview 12). To this extent, concerns 
raised by the Sri Lankan delegation were in harmony with the SAARC charter, 
conceivably a driver for gaining consensus across member states on the need 
to understand the problem more fully. 
 
The two technical committees established to examine the problems of terrorism 
and drug trafficking and abuse were largely drawn from legal, law enforcement, 
diplomatic and civil service backgrounds. Some representatives, particularly the 
legal, diplomatic and law enforcement experts who represented Sri Lanka were 
members of both committees. There was growing recognition that terrorism and 
drug trafficking were inter-related problems and any response proposed should 
address the connections. From Sri Lanka, legal experts from the Foreign 
Ministry and Attorney General’s Department, representatives from the NDDCB 
and the Police Narcotic Bureau attended the drug technical committee. This 
committee, which included experts from other member countries, could be said 
to have the essential characteristics of an emerging epistemic community, 
whereby responses on prohibiting the supply and demand of illicit drugs and 
causes of domestic drug use were shared by its members.  Undoubtedly, these 
responses and beliefs may have been influenced by the prevailing political will 
and commitment declared by heads of states at SAARC’s launch. Nonetheless, 
the drug technical committee’s priority had been to develop regional 
cooperation in order to find solutions to the drug trafficking problem and to 
introduce measures derived from UN drug control conventions. Later, the 
committee was provided with a mandate to explore the possibility of formulating 
a regional convention on drug control as a policy response:  
 
“The Heads of State of Government expressed grave concern over the growing 
magnitude and the serious effects of drug abuse, particularly among young 
people, and drug trafficking. They recognised the need for urgent and effective 
measures to eradicate this evil and decided to declare the year 1989 as the 
‘SAARC Year for Combating Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking’. They agreed to 
launch a concerted campaign, as suited to the situation in their respective 
countries, to significantly augment SAARC efforts to eliminate drug abuse and 
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drug trafficking. These included closer cooperation in creating a greater 
awareness of the hazards of drug abuse, exchange of expertise, sharing of 
intelligence information, stringent measures to stop trafficking in drugs and 
introduction of more effective laws. They directed that the technical committee 
concerned should examine the possibility of a Regional Convention on Drug 
Control” (SAARC, Islamabad Declaration, 1988:2).  
 
The above developments were underpinned by the contention that drug 
trafficking and abuse are ‘evil’ activities, a fear that was placed second only to 
terrorism on the international scale of threats to society (Civil Servant, Interview 
12). The aims of total elimination of illicit drugs and robust, active law 
enforcement measures taken against drug traffickers were equally regarded 
and acquired unquestioned political legitimacy. The committee was tasked with 
formulating the regional convention on drug control with both these aims 
included. Initially, their activities brought improvement in diplomatic working 
relations and established a framework through which drug problems existing in 
member states could be more easily identified and discussed. However, again, 
the desired policy response was largely a legal one, involving both legal and 
law enforcement agencies and did not contain involvement from other groups 
such as health and social services. Thus, the initial examination of drug 
problems was solely fixated on law enforcement concerns and any discussions 
of drugs took place in that circumscribed context: 
 
“We were mandated by the SAARC council of Ministers and the standing 
committee of foreign secretaries and as an ad hoc body we negotiated the 
treaty. We had a delegation which was multi-departmental or agency and 
consisted people from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Attorney General’s 
Department, the NDDCB as the lead agency and also the Police Narcotic 
Bureau. SAARC member states also sent their delegation of experts. Once 
again, what we did was prepare the negotiating text for this convention as we 
were the host country. The negotiating text was broadly based on the 1988 UN 
convention. At that time it had just come out. So we wanted to look at it as well 
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as supplementing the universal framework on drug control introduced by the 
UN” (Civil servant, Interview 12).  
 
Sri Lanka was seemingly able to influence the SAARC convention on narcotic 
drugs in 1990. Although it was not ratified by all member states until 1993, the 
convention can be seen as an extended arm of, and complementary to, the UN 
drug control conventions. The need to enact and harmonise stringent 
legislation around drugs in the south Asian region appears to have been 
reinforced by the link established between drug trafficking and fund raising for 
terrorism (Civil Servant, Interview 12). Additionally, the drafting of the United 
Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic and psychotropic substances 
in 1988 was also timely in supporting the SAARC predetermined policy stand 
on prohibition and law enforcement. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
principle of prohibiting the use and trafficking of illicit drugs was regionalised 
and formalised with the introduction of the SAARC convention on narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances (see appendix I). It echoed what the 
UNCND attempted to achieve when the 1961 and 1971 UN drug control 
conventions were introduced. 
 
Based on meeting minutes, the SAARC workings brought representatives from 
legal and law enforcement backgrounds of its member states closer together 
and developed a regional group of experts who appear to have had regular 
meetings in the early 1990s: 
 
 SAARC meeting of drug law enforcement agencies towards making 
exchange of information more effective, 25-27 March 1991, Colombo. 
 6th Meeting of the SAARC technical committee on the prevention of drug 
trafficking and drug abuse, 10-11 June 1991, Colombo. 
 7th Meeting of the SAARC technical committee on the prevention of drug 
trafficking and drug abuse, 15-17 June 1992, Colombo. 
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These led to the establishment of a SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk in 
Colombo in 1992 under the purview of the Sri Lankan Police Narcotics Bureau. 
It was to boost drug law enforcement by sharing intelligence, and the collating, 
analysing and disseminating of information on drug related offences in the 
region. A civil servant went on to say: 
 
“As we took the initiatives on terrorism and narcotic drugs, our proposal to have 
the SAARC monitoring desks for both these areas was accepted. That’s why 
we now see the SAARC monitoring desks for drugs and terrorism being located 
in Colombo. This was done at the height of the conflict and the extra regional 
linkages were crucial aspects we had to address” (Civil Servant, Interview 12). 
 
Policy harmonisation between the SAARC and the UNDCP was further 
strengthened by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
SAARC and the UNDCP on 18th August 1995 to coordinate their endeavours 
in combating drug supply (trafficking) and drug demand (abuse) in the region 
(Arif and Karim, 2015). At the heart of the MOU are the exchange of 
information and technical co-operation for mutual benefit. The SAARC also has 
a MOU with the Colombo Plan with specific reference to promoting and 
encouraging NGOs in SAARC countries involved in drug demand reduction 
activities. 
 
The above developments had unanimous support from Cabinet Ministers. Civil 
servants informed them about the strength of regional cooperation as a 
mechanism to both curb the drug trafficking problem and disrupt terrorist 
activities. This was the backdrop endorsed by elite decision-makers for Sri 
Lanka to participate in these regional activities (Civil Servant, Interview 12).  
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External Influence on Demand Reduction Policies and Programmes 
 
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, international policies on drug 
control emphasised law enforcement as being able to reduce the size of the 
drug market and level of illicit drug use. Prior to the 1961 convention, 
international drug control conventions paid little attention to the reasons for 
demand for drugs, treatment and rehabilitation of drug dependency (Boister, 
2001). This international approach mirrored the national response to the 
problem: emphasis on law enforcement, criminal sanctions and imprisonment, 
coupled with little stress on the nature of drug use and its effects.  
 
As discussed earlier, the external pressure to introduce legislation on drug 
control in the early 1980s gave the impression to domestic policy actors that 
the desired response required in relation to the drug problem was largely a 
legal one. By the mid-1980s, although legislation was amended to reflect the 
UN drug control conventions, Sri Lanka had not introduced any national policy 
document on drug demand reduction and it lacked a co-ordinated national 
approach to drug treatment and rehabilitation.  
 
The term “drug demand reduction” is used more recently to describe policies or 
programmes directed towards reducing the consumer demand for narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances covered by the international drug control 
conventions (UNODC, 1998). Article Thirty Eight of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961 in particular, amended by the 1972 Protocol and under 
Article Twenty of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, states 
that “parties to these conventions are required to take all practicable measures 
for the prevention of abuse of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances and 
for the early identification, treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation and 
social reintegration of the persons involved”.  
 
The 1980s was also a period that witnessed the emergence of divergent views 
among policy makers on the care and treatment of drug users, not only in Sri 
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Lanka, but across the international community. As we have seen, the dominant 
response to managing drug problems in Sri Lanka was located within the 
criminal justice system, and heavily influenced by international and regional 
organisations, documents, and policy actors. These same policy actors appear 
to have influenced national policies and programmes for the care and treatment 
of drug users. This was a period where some national policy-makers continued 
to perceive drug use as an immoral behaviour deviating from the moral 
majority. Such perceptions were undoubtedly an impediment to the adoption of 
more humane policies addressing the needs of this population group 
(Psychiatrist, Interview 4). To a certain extent, the need to shift away from the 
negative perceptions and any prevailing unsupportive responses towards drug 
users also appears to have been influenced by national policy actors’ 
engagement with organisations such as the SAARC and the United Nations: 
 
“The international community was beginning to realise that law enforcement 
alone was not the answer to the problem. The most recent three UN 
conventions addressed this to a certain extent and the UN provided technical 
assistance to countries to look at the roots of the drug problem with a view to 
social and economic development. At the same time, some of our policy 
makers were of the view that drug addicts were bad, useless fellows and 
should be brought into Galle Face7 and shot. But later on, because we were 
party to these UN Narcotic Conventions and our involvement with the SAARC, 
the Policy-makers and the government had to accept that this is a problem that 
needs to be tackled in a different way” (NGO Director, Interview 5).  
 
The change in perception of solutions to the drug problem among international 
policy actors led to the recognition that responses and solutions, at least in 
part, should be considered beyond a solely law enforcement approach which is 
unable to provide a total solution to the problem. It arrived against the backdrop 
of an HIV/AIDS crisis related to injecting drug use in some western countries 
(WHO, 2006). This does not imply that the international system and the 
                                            
7
 Galle Face is a promenade along the coast in the heart of the financial and business district of 
Colombo.  
 119 
 
international epistemic actors advocating a law enforcement response made a 
fundamental shift away from the principle beliefs of prohibition and punishment. 
Rather there was acknowledgement that socio-economic problems are 
prominent causes for the demand for drugs and that provision should be 
available for drug users to access treatment and rehabilitation. The UN 
conference on drug abuse and illicit trafficking convened in Vienna in 1987 
echoed this shift (Police Officer, Interview 10). It was attended by 
representatives from one hundred and thirty eight countries, including 
representatives from the NDDCB (United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988). One of the main 
documents to emerge from this conference was the ‘Comprehensive 
Multidisciplinary Outline (CMO) of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control’. This 
recognised the responsibility of countries to provide resources and equal status 
to address both the supply and demand for illicit drugs (Chatterjee, 1988). 
Although the conference made a major breakthrough, it has been argued that 
this document has not been able to bind countries in a multilateral convention 
to expend precious resources on the socio-economic roots of the drug problem 
(Boister, 2001). However, it appears to have influenced the formulation and 
content of the first ever Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and 
Control of Drug Abuse published in 1994. As one policy-maker who was 
involved in the formulation of the first national policy on drugs stated: 
 
“When the working group was set-up to formulate the national policy (the first 
national policy on drugs), and it was a multi-disciplinary one, we had to look 
into the UN drug control conventions we were party to and the comprehensive 
multi-disciplinary outline to synchronise our response. Our commitment to 
treatment and rehabilitation was spelled out in the national policy and it was 
something supplementary to our existing enforcement strategies” (Policy-
maker, Interview 7).  
 
The application of the recommendations contained in the CMO in the national 
setting also meant wider participation was required from various government 
departments beyond criminal justice and law enforcement, such as the 
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legislative organs, judiciary, public health and education departments, social 
services, economic affairs and non-governmental organisations. Policy makers 
at international level were beginning to see the drug problem in this wider 
context, rather than a narrow criminal law enforcement perspective. The CMO 
was multi-disciplinary in character. According to interview data, the multi-
disciplinary agencies that were brought together by the NDDCB to draft the first 
national policy was set-up soon after the conference in Vienna in 1987, had 
representation from legal, law enforcement, health and social services. Whilst 
some multi-disciplinary thinking around drug problems might have been present 
prior to the publication of the CMO, the need to actively involve multi-agency 
representation in policy-making and implementation became more apparent 
and strengthened after the Vienna conference and the CMO (Policy-maker, 
Interview 8). The dominant voices, shifting agendas and priorities of these 
multi-disciplinary agencies will be fully explored in the next chapter. 
 
The work conducted by the committee, reflecting the CMO and the UN drug 
control conventions Sri Lanka had become a party to, identified the following 
four pillars in the first national policy on drugs: 
 
1. Enforcement 
2. Preventative education and public awareness 
3. Treatment, rehabilitation and after-care 
4. International and regional cooperation 
 
In contrast to the earlier phases of policy development whereby policies were 
largely limited to amending legislation to address supply reduction measures, 
the first national policy on drugs incorporated both supply and demand 
reduction measures. This was the first time that education, public awareness, 
treatment, rehabilitation and after-care had been combined alongside 
enforcement measures. Reflecting the CMO and the external guidelines, the 
first national policy on drugs states: 
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“The short-term and long-term action plans developed will be based on national 
priorities and would be formulated keeping in mind the local needs and suitably 
adapting the strategies which are outlined in the United Nations 
Comprehensive Multi-disciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse 
Control (CMO). The CMO is a compendium of practical action for combating 
drug abuse and illicit trafficking. The UN General Assembly has on several 
occasions urged governments to use the CMO in the formulation of their own 
programmes” (Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of 
Drug Abuse, 1994:2). 
 
The content of the national policy mirrored the four directives outlined in the 
CMO, to address prevention and reduction of illicit demand, control of supply, 
action against illicit trafficking, and treatment and rehabilitation. However, it has 
been argued that at national level, it is for each government to determine which 
of the recommendations of the CMO could be appropriate in light of its 
prevailing economic, social and legislative conditions (Chatterjee, 1989). The 
text of the CMO was carefully drafted and was not designed to be a formal 
legal instrument where it created rights or imposed obligations of an 
international character (Chatterjee, 1989). By the same token, the national 
policy did not formally commit itself to any new proposals, specific programmes 
and resources for drug treatment and rehabilitation initiatives which would have 
meant that action was required. The CMO was adapted in a manner to suit the 
national context, giving due consideration to the availability of resources to 
implement drug demand reduction programmes (Policy-maker, Interview 8). 
 
The inclusion of drug demand reduction interventions as part of a national drug 
policy requires investment in resources and technical expertise. Sri Lanka had 
little experience and expertise in drug demand reduction programmes and this 
was an area which was in its infancy and required attention and development 
after the 1987 Conference. Funding and provision of technical expertise to 
resource poor nations had been on the UNDCP agenda, and the first request 
for funding had been negotiated between NDDCB representatives and the 
UNDCP (Police Officer, Interview 10). These agenda items can be seen as 
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incentives to promote and harness the re-adjusted UN principles on drug 
control. They also occurred against the backdrop of a growing heroin epidemic 
in Sri Lanka, which evidently concerned some national policy-makers due to 
uncertainties around managing the problem. Similar to establishing law 
enforcement policies, programmes and practices in the early 1980s, 
institutionalising structures to implement and monitor treatment and 
rehabilitation programmes were a priority for the UN. Below are some of the 
national projects funded by the UNDCP to institutionalise demand reduction 
programmes, indicating the agencies involved and the immediate objectives: 
 
Table 4: National drug control projects funded by the UNDCP 
Title of project/year Agencies 
involved 
Objectives Budget 
 
Prevention and 
treatment of 
problems related to 
drug abuse in Sri 
Lanka / 1987 
 
Funded by 
UNDCP, 
Executed by 
WHO, 
Implemented by 
NDDCB 
 
To develop and 
institutionalise a 
managerial structure to 
plan and implement a 
comprehensive and 
effective programme for 
the reduction in demand 
for heroin   
 
To contain the actual 
heroin epidemic in a 
measurable manner 
 
US $ 
307,925 
 
Drug abuse 
monitoring system 
(DAMS) / 1987 
 
Funded by 
UNDCP, 
Executed by 
WHO, 
Implemented by 
NDDCB 
 
To establish and 
institutionalise a system 
to monitor trends and 
patterns of drug abuse 
 
To establish and 
institutionalise an early 
warning system for such 
trends in order to permit 
early programme 
responses 
 
US $ 
166,500 
 123 
 
 
Prevention and 
treatment of 
problems 
related to the 
abuse of drugs 
in Sri Lanka / 1991 
 
Funded by 
UNDCP, 
Executed by 
WHO, 
Implemented by 
NDDCB 
 
To strengthen the existing 
managerial structure to 
plan and implement a 
comprehensive and 
effective programme 
 
To promote healthy styles 
of life and initiate a 
measurable reduction in 
the demand for drugs 
 
To consolidate the 
achievements in the 
containment of heroin 
epidemic 
 
US $ 
480,250 
 
Prevention and 
treatment of 
problems 
related to drugs / 
1993 
 
 
Phase 2 of the 
projects 
initiated by the 
UNDCP 
 
To achieve a measurable 
reduction in the use of 
heroin and in drug related 
health and socioeconomic 
problems 
 
To evolve by action 
research, effective and 
locally applicable 
methods of preventive 
education, treatment and 
rehabilitation 
 
To promote healthier 
ways of life and to prevent 
the spread of public 
health problems related to 
drug abuse, in particular 
HIV infection 
 
US $ 
430,000 
 
Source: Terminal evaluation report- AD/SLR/97/C71, UNODC, 2003 
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The involvement of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in matters related to 
drugs in Sri Lanka began in the context of advancing demand reduction 
programmes and offering technical support. The WHO, under the auspices of 
its parent organisation, the UN, worked within the parameters of the UN drug 
control conventions. Its initial remit was to evaluate medical, scientific and 
public health aspects of psychoactive substances in relation to the UN drug 
control conventions and make recommendations to the CND accordingly 
(Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Until the late 1980s, the work of the WHO’s Expert 
Committee on Drug Dependence was limited to making recommendations to 
the UN Secretary General on which narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances should be considered for international control under the existing 
conventions. However, in light of the widened international perception to 
include demand reduction along with supply-side initiatives, the WHO’s 
activities were also extended to address demand reduction strategies. 
 
Referring to the emphasis now being placed by the WHO on the reduction of 
demand for illicit drugs, Dr Hu Ching-Li (former Assistant Director General of 
the WHO) informed the committee (WHO expert committee on drug 
dependence) of recent changes in the organisation’s structure, as a result of 
which a new programme on substance abuse had been established, which 
would focus on prevention and control of alcohol and drug abuse” (WHO Expert 
Committee on Drug Dependence, 27th Report, 1991).  
 
These new developments on the need to formulate demand reduction policies 
and programmes led to changes within the WHO organisational structure as 
well as giving birth to an epistemic community within Sri Lanka, the latter had a 
particular focus on formulating and implementing demand reduction policies 
and programmes. There existed a group of individuals within the NDDCB and 
from the Ministry of Health, Social Services, Education, Attorney General and 
Police Departments interested in demand reduction work. Initially, the WHO 
established contacts and connections with the NDDCB to execute the demand 
reduction programmes funded by the UNDCP. This was directed at the NDDCB 
as opposed to the health sector (Psychiatrist, Interview 4). Policy actors 
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interested in demand reduction within the NDDCB were also connected to 
people outside, mainly representing NGOs or individuals such as psychiatrists 
and priests who had a keen interest in drug treatment and rehabilitation. The 
widening range of people involved in the area of drugs enabled the NDDCB to 
frame the drug problem in a new way, from different perspectives and 
particularly in terms of understanding the needs of drug users. 
 
Abstinence: the ultimate objective of national drug treatment. 
 
Prohibition was firmly embedded within Sri Lankan society so the goal of 
abstinence was acceptable as the main objective of drug treatment. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there had also been local interest groups 
and voices that supported abstinence in the development of drug policies. The 
1980s was a period when abstinence was endorsed by the UN, Colombo Plan 
and SAARC and neatly slotted into the prevailing internationalised prohibitionist 
framework on drug control and their aspirations to achieve a ‘drug-free’ society. 
A further endorsement for abstinence was that any drug use, however 
insignificant it may be, would have an adverse bearing on socio-economic 
development. This was a common causal belief shared among the UN, 
Colombo Plan and SAARC, as a priority had been socio-economic 
development in member states. 
 
By the late 1980s, the Drug Advisory Programme of the Colombo Plan shifted 
its emphasis from supply side initiatives to include demand reduction 
programmes. This was linked to the change in international perception on the 
drug problem, namely the re-adjusted principles outlined in the CMO. There 
was growing acknowledgement within the Colombo Plan that drug problems 
are multifaceted and that interventions should be provided for drug users. A 
psychiatrist, who had contact with the Colombo Plan stated: 
 
“Earlier, they (Colombo Plan) helped us a lot with law enforcement matters. I 
remember in the late 80s there were quite a lot of resources given to the 
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Colombo Plan to help roll-out demand reduction programmes in member 
countries. The US was a major donor for these programmes.  We (Sri Lanka) 
received some of these resources and it was mainly to do with drug education 
programmes, outreach work and rehabilitation. Their support and advice was 
greatly received by us because we didn’t have much knowledge or expertise in 
the field” (Psychiatrist, Interview 4).  
 
The majority of funding for demand reduction programmes and interventions in 
the Colombo Plan came from the United States Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the US Department of State 
(Colombo Plan Secretariat, 2010, Interview data). The US appears to have 
funded drug demand reduction programmes that embraced an abstinent-based 
approach as opposed to harm reduction. Abstinence dominated the policy 
landscape throughout the period under investigation. Consequently, the 
concept of rehabilitation and drug education gained popular momentum within 
the demand reduction sub-committee of the NDDCB as it was seen as a means 
to achieve abstinence and ultimately a drug-free society (Policy-maker, 
Interview 3).  
 
The Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Programme, through the NDDCB, provided 
technical support on scaling up drug demand reduction activities, including 
advice and support on setting up and implementing drug education and 
rehabilitation programmes. The backing also included the funding of study tours 
and awarding scholarships to NGO representatives and those who took a keen 
interest on rehabilitation: 
 
“The Colombo Plan organised a seminar on drug rehabilitation in 1993 for 
government and non-government organisations. They offered me a scholarship 
to go to Singapore for a 10-day practical training programme on rehabilitation in 
1994. Later, I was offered another scholarship to visit New York for a 6-month 
training programme on the therapeutic community model of drug rehabilitation. 
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I came back and introduced the TC model in 1997. It is the model I use in all 
my rehab centres now” (NGO Director, Interview 5).  
 
The Colombo Plan’s credentials on harnessing demand reduction activities 
grew and it was seen as a knowledge broker who could harmonise and 
promote demand reduction policies and programmes in member states. It can 
be argued that Colombo Plan had conducted a significant amount of work on 
capacity building on demand reduction and to the development of a network of 
experts on drug education, treatment and rehabilitation in Sri Lanka. This was 
an endeavour Colombo Plan had been able to achieve with the support of the 
NDDCB and local NGOs: 
 
“The popularity of Colombo Plan in their demand reduction work was at its peak 
in the 90s. They had a drug advisor who conducted very useful programmes. I 
must say they were instrumental in bringing national and international people 
together, co-ordinate training programmes, publish documents or guidelines 
and all sorts of resources to be used. Today, we have a group of experts in 
treatment and rehabilitation- all thanks to the Colombo Plan” (NGO Director, 
Interview 5). 
 
There appears to have been considerable national interest in the rehabilitation 
of drug users from the late 1980s. This ranged from policy actors representing 
the NDDCB to those who had an interest outside the NDDCB. The latter 
included lay people such as Buddhist monks, Christian priests, some 
government Ministries and non-governmental organisations who had a desire 
to help drug users as part of their pre-existing social care provision. According 
to interview data, this was directed at enabling drug users to stop using drugs 
and helping them to restore and repair relationships with families. 
 
During the mid-1990s, there had been some interest and attempts to introduce 
some harm reduction policies and programmes. According to interview data, 
those who had an interest in establishing such programmes within Sri Lanka 
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included a small group of psychiatrists, medical doctors and NGO 
representatives who returned to Sri Lanka following completion of their post-
graduate education in the UK and the USA. Drawing on their experiences 
gained in studying, learning about policy and work experience resulted in the 
diffusion of ideas around harm reduction onto the policy-making environment 
within Sri Lanka. As an NGO director stated: 
 
“I went to the US and studied at John Hopkins and I am a Humphrey fellow as 
well. So, when you study these drug strategies at international level or when 
you’re exposed to this kind of learning environment and experience, you begin 
to question about some of your local policies. I was constantly questioning the 
NDDCB about our policies when I came back and as to why we don’t introduce 
methadone maintenance” (NGO Director, Interview 01).  
 
Apart from these national policy actors who had been exposed to international 
policies and programmes on drug policies and who were subsequently making 
attempts to introduce some harm reduction programmes back in Sri Lanka, the 
UNODC had also made efforts at introducing opioid substitution and needle 
and syringe exchange schemes. National policy actors saw these attempts as 
being related to the interests of the UNAIDS, a sister organisation of the 
UNODC, and their efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS. As one Policy-maker pointed 
out: 
 
“In general the UNODC is happy with our policies and programmes. Who is 
behind promoting harm reduction is the UNAIDS. Their funds are based on 
harm reduction approaches and their main priority is AIDS prevention. So, I 
think although the UNODC initiated conversations about introducing harm 
reduction, who was really behind was the UNAIDS and if you look at our local 
drug scene there was no basis to introduce these programmes because we do 
not have very many injectors” (Civil Servant, Interview 06).  
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There had been tensions between the UNODC and the NDDCB, particularly on 
the subject of introducing a harm reduction approach (Civil Servant, Interview 
6). These tensions existed within the broader context of endeavouring to 
achieve consensus between the UNODC and the NDDCB on national policies 
around supply reduction and policies for the treatment and care of drug users in 
Sri Lanka. This was further complicated as some knowledge experts on drug 
control located within the NDDCB were part of the international epistemic 
community on drug control. Some of the epistemic actors representing the 
NDDCB were also seconded or appointed in an ex-officio capacity to 
organisations such as the CPDAP and SAARC (Police officer, Interview 10). 
Moreover, some UNODC staff members were also part of this network where 
they met with national epistemic actors during workshops and conferences on 
drug control in the south Asian region. Collectively, they believed that 
prohibition of drugs should be the norm in every country and that drugs are a 
threat to national security, poverty alleviation and socio-economic development 
in resource poor countries (Civil Servant, Interview 6).  
 
According to this same Civil Servant, UNODC activities are located in a broader 
context where the interests of UN organisations working in the area of 
HIV/AIDS prevention are interconnected with the work of the UNODC. Policy-
makers, in particular the epistemic community in support of demand reduction 
measures within the NDDCB, saw these external attempts as unacceptable 
due to their cultural inappropriateness and their perception that the drug users 
were largely non-injecting.  Although the group of experts on drug demand 
reduction policies and programmes within the NDDCB agreed and gained 
consensus with the UNODC on a number of core principles and beliefs on drug 
control, it appears this same group held contradictory views in relation to the 
content of an acceptable harm reduction policy. Furthermore, the civil servant 
went on to say: 
 
“We agreed on a number of areas during our dealings with the UNODC. But we 
stood firm against their proposal to introduce harm reduction and this kind of 
international pressure. That doesn’t mean we’re against harm reduction. We 
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are against harm reduction in Sri Lanka. Before you introduce harm reduction 
programmes, you need to conduct a thorough analysis, look at the problem, the 
country and the culture and then only you can make a decision. For example, if 
you want to introduce harm reduction policies in Chennai, Bangladesh or in 
Pakistan, I would say yes, because, there are too many who inject drugs and 
are HIV positive. But don’t come to Sri Lanka, simply because they want to tick 
a box and say that in their region majority of the countries have implemented 
harm reduction” (Civil Servant, Interview 06). 
 
The absence of an injecting drug problem or any crisis related to HIV appears 
to have been the legitimising principle for the Sri Lankan epistemic community 
actors located within the NDDCB to reject harm reduction policies and 
programmes promoted by the UNODC. In doing so, the local drug problem was 
re-framed as being different from other countries where there had been 
problems related to injecting and HIV. As previously mentioned, funding was 
received from the UNDCP in 1993 (see table 4) to prevent the spread of public 
health problems related to drug abuse, in particular HIV infection, without any 
proposals or plans by the NDDCB to introduce needle exchange or 
comprehensive opioid substitution programmes (Police Officer, Interview 10).  
 
Samarasinghe (1995), a former Chair of the NDDCB, also argued that levels of 
drug use which might be considered as being less harmful in richer societies, 
can cause graver harm in resource-poorer nations by the diversion of meagre 
financial resources away from basic-survival needs within poor families. This 
had been another argument put forward to external organisations against the 
adoption of harm reduction policies in Sri Lanka. Although the country 
conformed with the SAARC convention, which held that drug use, even use in 
small quantities or in less harmful ways, would have a negative impact on 
socio-economic development. It is important to note that there had been no 
attempts or any evidence to denote that harm reduction policies were promoted 
by the Colombo Plan or the SAARC, both being dominant epistemic 
communities with due recognition for their expertise in the drugs field. To this 
extent, it appears that the NDDCB acted as a counter epistemic community to 
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the UNODC when attempts were made at introducing harm reduction 
programmes, such as needle exchange and opioid substitution prescribing in 
Sri Lanka.  
 
According to interview data, although these divergent views existed between 
the NDDCB and the UNODC, to a large extent the UNODC had been satisfied 
with the drug control policies adopted by Sri Lanka. This is mostly related to Sri 
Lanka being a signatory to all UN drug control conventions and the annual 
supply of information on all drug control activities to the INCB. This appears to 
be one of the criteria for obtaining economic aid for drug control activities, 
preserving the freedom to retain a national approach to drug treatment. As one 
policy-maker pointed out: 
 
“So, the legislation is in place, people know the rules and Sri Lanka is reporting 
to the UNODC on various different areas. Now, the UNODC is not grumbling on 
us because the obligations have been met etc. The INCB hasn’t faulted us. I 
mean that’s really the whole point of this exercise that is not to be found fault 
with the INCB” (Policy-maker, Interview 8).  
 
External Influences on Compulsory Treatment. 
 
The introduction of compulsory treatment for those addicted to drugs had first 
been discussed in the early 1980s, and again in the last two decades by 
national policy actors who were influenced by sources external to Sri Lanka. As 
discussed previously, the NNAC had previously established links with 
Malaysian experts on drug control through the Colombo Plan in the early 1980s 
and this appears to have continued for two decades since. The Colombo Plan, 
as part of its effort in harmonising drug policies in member states, had 
facilitated study tours for Sri Lankan policy actors to learn from drug treatment 
models adopted in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. An 
NGO Director, who participated in these study tours stated: 
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I think, as far as I know, compulsory treatment came from countries like 
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Most of our drug control board officers and 
some NGO people have been to these countries and looked at their treatment 
programmes. There were study tours arranged to visit these countries and the 
funding came from the Colombo Plan. In Malaysia, that’s where majority of the 
study tours were, drug addicts were sent to detention facilities for a mandatory 
2 year sentence since 1983. These centres were operated by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs where rehabilitation was the focus with strict rules and so on. At 
that time we were given the impression that Malaysia’s efforts decreased the 
number of drug addicts in their country. So, we have been talking about this 
method for a long time” (NGO Director, Interview 5). 
 
Member states of the Colombo Plan, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore had 
made some progress in drug rehabilitation in the 1980s. Their intervention 
models were abstinence-based and situated within their respective criminal 
justice systems whereby a drug user was seen as a criminal requiring 
rehabilitation.  Malaysia defined its drug problem as a national disaster and as 
a security concern during a heroin crisis among its youth (Civil Servant, 
Interview 12). A civil servant who had a close working relationship with the 
Colombo Plan and as someone who visited treatment programmes in Malaysia 
at the time stated: 
 
“President Nixon in the US in the early 1970s called it (drug problem) the 
number one public enemy. This kind of thinking spread across the world and 
then in 1983 Malaysia declared drugs as a national disaster as it was a security 
concern for them. Malaysia and some countries in the SAARC thought that 
drug addicts should be forced into treatment as they saw no other way of 
making their countries drug-free societies. It became kind of like fashionable to 
follow the Malaysian model” (Civil Servant, Interview 9).  
 
The Malaysian definition of drug use being a threat to national security found 
common ground with SAARC member states and influenced the prohibitionist 
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policy stand adopted by Sri Lanka. A belief prevailed within some Colombo 
Plan and SAARC member states that their legal systems should compel drug 
users to enter treatment, as the majority of their drug addicts were seen as not 
being motivated to change. This position also existed within the broader context 
of an internationalised prohibitionist framework supported by the Colombo Plan 
and the SAARC. Drug treatment programmes within Malaysia only provided a 
single treatment regime, which was an institutionalised, regimented 
rehabilitation programme. Very little was done to encourage drug users 
voluntarily into treatment, including a lack of emphasis on any medical 
treatment. The desire to adopt a Sri Lankan policy of compulsory treatment 
located within an institutional framework can be traced back to policy makers’ 
study trips to treatment facilities in Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore8 (Policy-
maker, Interview 2).  
 
Although compulsory treatment had been on the policy agenda, it had not been 
formulated into a policy or become a political priority. This is despite some 
NDDCB officials and NGO staff becoming exposed to, and learning about 
compulsory treatment models that operated outside Sri Lanka. However, it 
quickly became a priority two decades later in 2007 when pressure was exerted 
by the UN on Sri Lanka to give effect to the 1988 UN convention. Although Sri 
Lanka was a signatory, domestic legislation was not in place to give effect to 
the 1988 convention. Of significant importance was the introduction of 
legislation to control precursor chemicals. Although the NDDCB had 
established committees, arranged workshops and attended SAARC and other 
international conferences and workshops on precursor control since 1997, no 
domestic legislation was in place (Handbook of Drug Abuse Information, 2005: 
83-85).   
 
Pressure from the UN to give effect to a number of its conventions occurred 
against the backdrop of human rights allegations being levelled against the Sri 
                                            
8
 Majority of national policy-makers visited and observed abstinence-based compulsory 
treatment systems in countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. These study tours 
were mainly organised and sponsored by the Colombo Plan. 
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Lankan government by the UN at the same time. Additionally, drafting new and 
amending existing legislation to promote human rights and good governance 
became a top priority for the Sri Lankan government as it had to satisfy 
international scrutiny to ensure that Sri Lanka could continue to benefit from 
trade concessions awarded through the GSP9 scheme. As one policy-maker 
who was involved in formulating the Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Act 2007 stated: 
 
“The Minister of Justice understood the political importance of this at 
international level and was able to move things for us fast and the draft Bill on 
psychotropic substances, alongside the draft treatment and rehabilitation Bill 
was finalised. The legal draftsman had to prioritise finalizing these draft Bills 
over others. So, what really happened was, along with these two Bills related to 
our area, the draft Bill on international covenant on civil and political rights was 
tabled in Parliament all at once. The process was fast because the government 
was very keen on obtaining GSP incentives for the country” (Policy-maker, 
Interview 3).  
 
The benefits granted through GSP were economically significant as the EU was 
the largest single market for Sri Lankan exports, valued at US $ 2.8 billion in 
2007 and took 36% of all the country's exports (Centre for Policy Alternatives 
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008). The clothing sector accounted for 40% of 
the total exports and the EU was considered as the country's second largest 
clothing importer (Centre for Policy Alternatives and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2008). From 2006, pressure from the UN, United Kingdom and the United 
States had been mounting for Sri Lanka to conform to a number of international 
human rights instruments and UN conventions. The 1988 UN convention 
against illicit traffic in narcotics was one such convention that Sri Lanka had to 
                                            
9 The European Unions (EU) Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) allows 
developing country exporters to pay less or no duties on their exports to the EU. 
However, it is granted to countries which ratify and implement core international 
conventions relating to human and labour rights, environment and good governance.  
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give effect to in order to continue enjoying the beneficiary status of the GSP 
scheme, which was due for review in 2008 (Policy-maker, Interview 2).  
 
This international climate influenced the content of the updated drug policy in 
2006 although there were other national drivers for its introduction, which will 
be explored later in Chapter Seven. Nonetheless, the updated national policy 
on drugs reflected external concerns regarding the need to enact domestic 
legislation concerning psychotropic substances and stated:  
 
“The government is fully aware of its international obligations, particularly those 
stemming from the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, Conventions on 
Psychotropic Substances 1971, and the United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Trafficking Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 ratified by 
the government” (Updated National Policy for the Prevention and Control of 
Drug Abuse, 2006: 1-3). 
 
“When drafting or modifying legislation, relevant model UN laws and 
UN/SAARC conventions ratified by the government will be given due 
consideration. Under the international drug control conventions, competent 
national authorities are empowered to issue certificates and authorisations for 
the import and export of narcotic drugs, and competent authorities empowered 
to regulate or enforce national controls over precursors and essential chemicals 
in accordance with the provisions of article 12 of the UN Convention against 
Illicit Trafficking Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 will 
satisfy all requirements of conventions effectively” (Updated National Policy for 
the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse, 2006: 1-3).  
 
The international conventions on drug control, as documents, continued to be 
deemed relevant, credible and applicable by national policy actors. Due to 
political pressure being applied by external organisations and countries to 
introduce legislation to give effect to the 1988 UN convention, the outcome was 
to simultaneously draft two separate pieces of legislation: one concerning the 
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illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the other 
concerning the treatment and rehabilitation of drug users. The result was that 
both drafts were tabled and debated in Parliament following Cabinet approval. 
The resultant law concerning treatment and rehabilitation became the Drug 
Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act and was enacted in 
Parliament towards the end of 2007. It includes compulsory treatment of drug 
users within institutional settings. Earlier information and updated knowledge 
about compulsory treatment gained from the study visits by some of the 
national policy actors on treatment models that existed in some Colombo Plan 
member states, particularly in Malaysia, had clearly and significantly influenced 
subsequent policy development in Sri Lanka. A substantial proportion of the 
content of the Malaysian Drug Dependants Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 
1983 is comparable to the Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Act 2007 of Sri Lanka.  
 
Examination of the text in the two Acts reveals that there are a number of 
similarities when comparing compulsory drug treatment between Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka. Both have the same title of Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Act. They both ensure legal provision for police officers to arrest 
suspected drug users, produce them in court and seek a compulsory treatment 
order from a Magistrate. In this regard, the inter-textuality between the Acts are 
as follows: 
 
“An officer may take into custody any person whom he reasonably suspects to 
be a drug dependant.  
 
Where a person who has undergone the tests (drug tests) referred to in Section 
3 or 4 and, in consequence of such tests, is certified by government medical 
officer or a registered medical practitioner to be a drug dependant, the officer 
shall produce him, or cause him to appear before a Magistrate, and the 
Magistrate shall upon the recommendation of a Rehabilitation Officer and after 
giving such person an opportunity to make representations: 
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a) Order such a person to undergo treatment and rehabilitation at a 
Rehabilitation Centre specified in the order for a period of two years and 
thereafter to undergo supervision by an officer at the place specified in 
the order for a period of two years; or 
b) Order such person to undergo supervision by an officer at the place 
specified in the order for a period of not less than two and no more than 
three years”. (Drug Dependants Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 1983 
of Malaysia: 1, 8). 
 
The Sri Lankan legislation on compulsory treatment states: 
 
“Where an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station receives information that any 
person is a habitual user of dangerous drugs and has since become a drug 
dependant person, he shall forthwith take such steps as may be necessary to 
cause such person to be examined by a Government Medical Officer. The 
Government Medical Officer shall thereupon submit a report to the police officer 
who referred the drug dependant person to him or any other officer attached to 
the relevant Police Station, setting out the results of such examination.  
 
A Magistrate before whom a person produced upon the completion of the 
procedure set out in subsections (1) and (2) (1 and 2 refer to arrest and a 
person undergoing a medical examination) shall make order that such person 
be sent for compulsory treatment and rehabilitation at any treatment centre 
designated or licensed under this Act, as may be determined by such 
Magistrate” (Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act No 54 
of 2007: 4-5).  
 
Although a mandatory minimum of a two year sentence to receive drug 
treatment and rehabilitation does not exist within the Drug Dependant Person’s 
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of Sri Lanka, the principles around arbitrary 
arrests of suspected drug users and making legal provision for the police and 
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courts, following a medical examination, to admit a person for compulsory drug 
treatment and rehabilitation are key tenets shared by both Acts. While this 
inter-textuality exists between the two legislations, there were a number of 
differences in the compulsory treatment legislation enacted in Sri Lanka, 
suggesting that the Malaysian legislation had been adapted to suit the Sri 
Lankan context. In addition, the Sri Lankan legislation has also incorporated 
licensing requirements for all drug treatment and rehabilitation centres with 
minimum standards and addresses the shortcomings arising from inhumane 
treatment of those undergoing drug treatment and rehabilitation. These areas 
will be addressed further in the next chapter.  
 
The introduction of compulsory treatment within Sri Lanka has not been without 
opposition from the international community, particularly, the UNODC. Although 
the UNODC did not publicly oppose compulsory treatment programmes that 
previously existed in some Colombo Plan member states, there had been later 
antagonism, particularly in relation to the compulsory treatment provision within 
institutional settings not conforming with human rights’ principles (UNODC, 
2009:2). Within Sri Lanka, the available psychosocial provision in prisons was 
unable to cater for the growing numbers of drug users becoming incarcerated. 
According to the Handbook of Drug Abuse Information (2007), of those who 
were admitted to prison for a narcotic related offence, only 10% entered 
treatment in 2000, 11% in 2004 and 12% in 2006. UNODC officials had raised 
concerns with the NDDCB in regards to this treatment gap, whereby a need for 
alternatives to imprisonment was highlighted and encouraged as the preferred 
policy choice, instead of legislating for compulsory treatment within institutional 
settings. This tension was revealed by a policy-maker who stated that: 
 
“Now, within this Act, what is also included is compulsory treatment for drug 
dependants. The UNODC are particularly not happy with the compulsory 
treatment element. They are arguing about it from a human rights perspective. 
As far as human rights are concerned, they are saying that we cannot force 
someone to have treatment. But we haven’t got any official letter or position on 
this declared by the UNODC. This was raised mainly at personal level when we 
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met UNODC officials at meetings and through phone conversations. I suppose, 
overall, the UNODC is generally happy with our drug control mechanisms. We 
have signed up to all three conventions on drug control and we provide the 
information they require on all drug control activities on an annual basis” 
(Policy-maker, Interview 3). 
 
Although community-based treatment as an alternative to imprisonment is 
encouraged within the international drug control conventions that Sri Lanka is a 
party to, a sanction-orientated treatment approach as opposed to a health-
orientated one had been followed despite informal pressure being applied by 
some UNODC officials. It appears that the compulsory drug treatment 
principles adopted by Malaysia in 1983 were still deemed relevant for policy-
makers in Sri Lanka in 2007. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
International drug control conventions that Sri Lanka had become party to and 
organisations such as the Colombo Plan, SAARC, UNODC and their respective 
epistemic actors have had a significant influence in shaping national drug 
policies so as to conform with UN drug control conventions. These external 
policy actors diffused international drug control principles and norms through 
various forums, offered support to the Sri Lankan government to conform with 
international drug control conventions, funded the setting up of the NDDCB to 
institutionalise the drug policy-making process, and in some cases utilised 
coercive methods to ensure that national legislation was amended to give effect 
to drug control conventions. The dominant response to manage drug problems 
through the criminal justice system was significantly influenced by these 
external policy actors and the UN and the SAARC conventions on drugs. Both 
the threats to national sovereignty and security arising out of the on-going 
armed conflict in the north and east in Sri Lanka and links between this terrorist 
activity and its financial proceeds from drug-trafficking became the overarching 
legitimising influences for collective action and the common thread influencing 
both the national and external policy actors who came into being during the 
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period under investigation. Additionally, both the Colombo Plan and the SAARC 
endorsed the aim of drug prohibition as each had a causal belief that drugs 
were a major obstacle to development and poverty alleviation in its member 
states. 
 
Although criminal justice legislation and drug prohibition were the dominant 
policy responses, there was growing concern within the UNODC and the 
SAARC that law enforcement alone would not be the solution to the drug 
problem. The re-adjustment of international principles around drug control 
influenced Sri Lanka to follow suit and adopt drug demand reduction policies 
and programmes such as drug education, treatment and rehabilitation to exist 
alongside the law enforcement strategies.  
 
External organisations, particularly the Colombo Plan and the UNODC, 
supported the establishment of a national epistemic community on drugs 
located primarily within the NDDCB. Some NGOs also received support from 
these organisations to set-up and implement drug demand reduction 
programmes within Sri Lanka. Some of those personnel who had been 
financially supported to participate in conferences, workshops and study tours 
abroad went on to become national policy entrepreneurs in the field of drugs. 
The introduction of compulsory treatment within Sri Lanka is one example of 
how national policy makers’ exposure to abstinence-based treatment models 
established within the criminal justice system, particularly in Malaysia, 
subsequently became policy in Sri Lanka. 
 
Although policy emulation and learning from external sources largely influenced 
and shaped the drug policy landscape in Sri Lanka, over time with growing 
knowledge and experience, the NDDCB also acted as a counter epistemic 
community in regards to challenging and rejecting harm reduction policies and 
programmes diffused and promoted by the UNODC.  
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Chapter Six: Understanding National Drug Policy-making 
 
Introduction. 
 
The previous chapter discussed how external influences became a precursor to 
contemporary drug policy-making, particularly focusing on how various 
international conventions, standards, documents and guidelines on drug control 
instigated national action. However, these external influences should be viewed 
in the context of the prevailing national concerns and interests and how they 
interacted with each other to lead to the development of new national policies 
and legislation. 
 
While this chapter is connected with the previous chapter, a comprehensive 
empirical account will be provided on the key national actors involved and their 
influence in shaping drug policies and legislation during the period 1984-2008. 
Examination will be directed towards the transformation of national drug 
policies, with amendments to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drug 
Ordinance in 1984, the formulation of the first national policy on drugs in 1994 
and finally the creation of the Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Act in 2007. These developments introduced significant changes 
in the way the criminal justice agencies, the NDDCB, Health and the NGO 
sectors responded to the drug problem. The update made to the first national 
policy on drugs in 2006 will be discussed in the next chapter due to its strong 
links with the politics of policy-making.   
 
The rationale for the development of national policies, their continuities or shifts 
during the period under investigation based upon the unique economic, 
political, social and institutional contexts existing in Sri Lanka will be explored in 
detail. Consensus and contradiction in developing national drug policies 
between professional groups, government and non-government agencies will 
be discussed in terms of how the drug problem was framed and why a punitive 
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response to the drug problem prevailed throughout the period under 
investigation.  
 
The National Policy-Making Environment: 1984-1993. 
 
Between 1980 and 1985, there was a decline in the use of opium in Sri Lanka, 
which coincided with the rapid increase in the number of heroin users in the 
country (Report on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse in Sri Lanka, NDDCB 
1986). This reduction was possibly due to the emerging growth and transit of 
heroin on an international scale originating from countries in the Golden 
Triangle10. The repeal of the long-standing opium licensing system permitting 
its supply to registered users coupled with a reduction in opium availability 
might have forced many habitual opium users to change to heroin. The 
introduction of heroin into the local drug market and growth in young people 
using it was a new phenomenon of concern to drug policy-makers (Civil 
Servant, Interview 9). 
 
The Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drug Ordinance had come into operation 
in 1936 and mainly dealt with opium and ganja.  Any previous knowledge 
gained about the drug problem was limited to an ageing cohort of opium and 
cannabis users. The novelty of a heroin epidemic, introduced by tourists in the 
late 1970s was largely confined to Colombo and some parts of southern Sri 
Lanka (NDDCB, 2000). According to interview data, it also coincided with trade 
liberalisation and the development of an open market-based economy 
introduced by a new right-wing government, who had favoured an increase in 
the growth of both tourism and free trade. Within this context, politicians and 
law enforcement personnel viewed the existing legislation at the time as being 
outdated to manage the emerging new trends of drug use and trafficking. This 
occurred in the context of some NNAC members and politicians already coming 
into contact with epistemic actors, such as the UNCND and the Colombo Plan, 
                                            
10
 The Golden Triangle is an area in Asia located where the borders of Burma, Laos and 
Thailand meet and is known to produce a significant amount of opium and heroin in the world. 
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who introduced the requirement for the government to establish a legal and 
procedural framework to regulate, and criminalise the availability and use of 
drugs in Sri Lanka. 
 
By 1982, Interpol confirmed Sri Lanka’s status as a transit country for the 
movement of heroin from countries in the Golden Triangle into Europe, with 
organised international drug trafficking syndicates operating within Sri Lanka 
(Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, 1982). During this period, 
evidence also emerged of a link between heroin trafficking carried out by the 
LTTE and financial proceeds being used to fund terrorism (Jayasuriya, 1995). 
With the escalation of violence between the majority Sinhalese and the minority 
Tamils, and the demand for a separate Tamil state in the North and East of Sri 
Lanka, drug trafficking was perceived as a major problem and a direct threat to 
the stability of government. The report published in 1986 on illicit drug 
trafficking and drug abuse in Sri Lanka states: 
 
“Sri Lankan Tamils have been arrested for drug trafficking mainly in Italy, 
France, Spain, West Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Investigations have established a definite link between heroin trafficking and 
the Tamil terrorist movement in Sri Lanka. This connection has been 
established both by documentary and other evidence gathered here and 
abroad during investigations, and on admission made by those arrested” 
(Report on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse in Sri Lanka, NDDCB, 
1986:7).  
 
A drug policy-maker who was interviewed, endorsing the above, stated: 
 
“I must mention that in the 1980s and in the 90s as well, narco-terrorists relied 
on cash proceeds to procure military arms through drugs smuggling. The LTTE 
was responsible for large consignments of drugs being trafficked via Sri Lanka 
to the west and this was a threat to our security and independence” (Policy-
maker, Interview 11).   
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By the early 1980s, a discourse was emerging around drugs being an 
existential threat to national security. Although this idea was first suggested by 
external policy actors such as the USA, UNCND and the Colombo Plan, Sri 
Lankan policy actors soon began to share this belief due to dual concerns 
around a growing terrorist threat and links with drug trafficking (Policy-maker, 
Interview 8). In this regard, the national policy actors were able to find common 
ground with the principles endorsed by actors who supported international drug 
control conventions, as they agreed with emerging national security concerns. 
‘Narco-terrorism’ was a term commonly used by policy actors representing law 
enforcement agencies and in documents published by the NDDCB. Policy 
makers feared that narco-terrorists, primarily the LTTE, could challenge the 
security of the state. It is argued that narco-terrorism as a concept asserts that 
guerrilla movements finance their operations largely through drug trafficking 
and the principals in the drug industry employ extreme violence (Campbell, 
1992) The ‘threat discourse’ increased the perceived dangerousness of the 
availability of drugs so that the institutionalisation of drug policies to negate 
these threats became more urgent, acceptable, legitimate and significant. 
These developments strengthened the principle belief in an absolute prohibition 
of drugs. This was the backdrop in the early 1980s which led to the 
amendments to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. 
 
Amending National Legislation on Drug Control in 1984: actors and 
interests 
 
Chapter Four discussed the establishment of the ad-hoc NNAC, with the 
instruction from the Colombo Plan coinciding with a UN mission visiting Sri 
Lanka in 1973. Government departments represented on the NNAC committee 
came from the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Health, Education and 
the Departments of Police, Customs and Excise, and the Attorney General. 
Some committee members who represented these departments in the NNAC 
continued to be involved in drug policy formulation, which has remained under 
the purview of the Ministry of Defence for the entire period from 1973 to 2016. 
Although there were representatives from government departments, this 
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committee had no legal mandate nor was considered as a statutory authority. 
Its activities were largely influenced by senior law enforcement officers and 
their work was monitored by the Deputy Minister of Defence, who was also its 
Chair. A senior police officer, who founded the Police Narcotic Bureau, became 
the first secretary of the NNAC (Police Officer, Interview 10). He was seen as 
being instrumental in introducing amendments to the Poisons, Opium and 
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. As a policy entrepreneur and knowledge expert, 
he had the support from the Deputy Minister of Defence and the President. As 
one Policy-maker stated: 
 
“In 1973, the Narcotics Advisory Committee was formed to advise the 
government on drug related matters. Deputy Inspector General Mr 
Sundaralingam was the secretary of this ad hoc committee and I functioned 
unofficially as Sunda’s (a shortened form for the name Sundaralingam) 
assistant secretary. This was the policymaking body at that time. Sunda led on 
making the amendments to the dangerous drugs ordinance with my support 
and with the assistance of the Attorney General’s (AG) department. I met with a 
senior civil servant who used to work for the AG department and he asked me if 
he should amend the law to strengthen our hands so we can keep certain 
people in custody for up to three months” (Police officer, Interview 10).  
 
Law enforcement personnel representatives within the NNAC had a significant 
influence in the review and development of drug control policies and were able 
to spearhead changes to existing legislation. They worked closely and in 
partnership with the Deputy Minister of Defence and the Attorney General’s 
Department. According to interview data, these policy entrepreneurs had 
support from the Deputy Defence Minister and from the President. Some senior 
police officers also had direct access to the President in regards to matters 
concerning drug control (Police Officer, Interview 10). The President was keen 
to introduce amendments to legislation so as to be on a par with drug 
legislation adopted in some Asian countries. Policy actors who were involved in 
bringing changes to legislation believed that the prohibition of drugs and use of 
law enforcement were the most important components to address the drug 
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problem and deter drug use. Initially, members of the NNAC proposed the 
introduction of new drug legislation to come into line with UN conventions. 
However, this proposal was withdrawn on the advice of the Attorney General as 
he was of the opinion that amendments to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous 
Drugs Ordinance were more appropriate as it was a tried and tested law in the 
statute book (Hansard, March 22, 1984). Amendments were to strengthen the 
role and remit of law enforcement agencies and at the time any new proposals 
on stringent law enforcement on matters related to illicit drugs would carry 
unquestioned political legitimacy (Police Officer, Interview 10). This legitimacy 
was underpinned by the co-operation of three powerful government 
departments: the Executive, Defence Ministry and the Attorney General. All 
were highly influential in the area of legislative change, their representatives led 
the development of the drug policy amendments and all three departments 
shared the principal belief of drug prohibition and law enforcement as the aim. 
 
Draft amendments to legislation were tabled in Cabinet meetings where there 
was unanimous support for it to be tabled in Parliament for approval and 
enactment (Civil Servant, Interview 6). The Poisons, Opium and Dangerous 
Drugs (Amendment) Bill was debated in Parliament on 22 March 1984. During 
the debate, the need for national legislation to be in harmony with neighbouring 
countries in the region was constantly highlighted, including a tough law 
enforcement response to deal with emerging drug trends. The Minister of 
Parliamentary Affairs and Sport, the chief government whip stated that: 
 
“Amendments to several provisions of the existing law have become necessary 
as the present legislation formulated many years ago was not meant to cater 
either to the magnitude or nature of the present drug problems. Its penalty 
structure which provides for a maximum fine of Rs 1,000 and/or 12 months 
imprisonment following conviction after summary trial, and a fine of Rs 1,000 
and/or 10 years imprisonment following indictment in the Supreme Court, is 
totally inadequate. These are about the most lenient in the region” (Hon. M. 
Vincent Perera, Hansard, 22 March 1984: 631). 
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The Amendment Bill also introduced the death sentence for drug related 
offences. It made provision to either sentence a person to death or to life 
imprisonment, for offences related to the manufacture of heroin, cocaine and 
morphine, opium; and/or the trafficking, possession, import or export of a 
minimum amount of five hundred grams of opium, or three grams of morphine, 
or two grams of cocaine or two grams of heroin (Handbook of Drug Abuse 
Information, 2007). Less severe offences warranted short prison sentences or 
fines. The Bill also made provision for a drug user found in possession of a 
small quantity of drugs for their personal use to be sentenced to death. The 
then President, Mr J.R Jayawardena exerted significant influence to introduce 
the death penalty for punishment of both drug suppliers and individual drug 
users (Police Officer, Interview 10). He held executive power and was able to 
obtain unilateral agreement from not only Cabinet colleagues to back the 
Amendment Bill, but also the support for the death sentence from Members of 
Parliament. Although consensus among Sri Lankan politicians from the various 
political parties is rare, it was significant that there was uniform consensus to 
support the Bill and no-one disagreed with the introduction of the use of the 
death penalty. Although consensus was reached at the political level, some 
policy-makers from the Drug Control Board did not support the use of the death 
penalty. Hence, it was entirely a political decision. One policy-maker who was 
involved in formulating the 1984 Amendment Bill stated: 
 
“Our President at the time, Mr J.R Jayawardena, wanted to introduce the death 
sentence. He was keen to show the whole of Asia that we are quite serious 
about law enforcement when it comes to illegal drugs. He wanted to go even 
harder than Singapore. I think it was partly because he started the open 
economy and free trade under the capitalism banner. I was not keen on the 
idea because we were not going to implement the death penalty. If you really 
look at it, for something small like 2 grams of heroin, someone can be 
sentenced to death. I passed on my views to the President via our Deputy 
Minister of Defence at the time. But it became law in the end” (Police officer, 
Interview 10).  
 
 148 
 
Policy-makers who represented the NNAC were not in total agreement with the 
President’s proposal to introduce the death penalty for all drug related offences. 
The introduction of a death penalty could be viewed as mere rhetoric and 
symbolic, considering that, although a judge could sentence someone to death, 
it might not be carried out. Its introduction signalled a tough law enforcement 
and zero tolerance approach in an attempt to deter drug use and dealing. A 
psychiatrist who represented the drug control board stated: 
 
“The death sentence was copied from Malaysia and Singapore without knowing 
much about drug control and how it works in practice. The President just copied 
it without knowing how it works at ground level. You can’t just catch the fellows, 
sentence them to death and think the problem will go away” (Psychiatrist, 
Interview 4).  
 
The President was influenced by other south east Asian countries, in particular 
Singapore and Malaysia. These were both similar economically, capitalist 
countries with legislation to use the death penalty for people convicted of drug 
related offences. Sri Lankan elite decision-makers at the time were inspired by 
these countries’ economic growth, indicating a desire to follow their path to 
development (Civil Servant, Interview 9). There is no evidence to denote that 
knowledge experts on drug control or any external policy actor advocated the 
introduction of the death sentence to form part of a national response 
(Psychiatrist, Interview 4). 
 
During the Parliamentary debate on the Amendment Bill, the Sri Lankan 
Minister of Education endorsed the President’s proposal on the death 
sentence:   
 
“Some may think that the death penalty is too harsh a penalty. I do not think so. 
Many countries have come to the stage where they accept the death penalty” 
(Hon. Ranil Wickremasinghe, Hansard, 22 March 1984:643). 
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According to interview data, law enforcement personnel and some medical 
professionals involved in drug policy making also had widely differing views 
about the introduction of the death sentence which was in stark contrast to 
politicians who supported its introduction. The President’s executive power and 
his influence on government ministers to introduce the death sentence are 
remarkable. As the most powerful politician, the Executive President had 
endorsed the introduction of the death sentence and his government ministers 
followed suit and all debated the case for it in Parliament. Successive 
Presidents’ influence and their interest in drug policies and drug policy rhetoric 
in relation to tough law enforcement approaches will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter, ‘The politics of drug policy-making’. 
 
There had been consensus between Members of Parliament representing both 
the government and the opposition over the belief that drugs are a ‘menace’, a 
threat to the social fabric and the political system in Sri Lanka. Harmonising 
legislation in line with other countries in the region and adoption of a tough law 
enforcement response had political support. In response to a claim from 
opposition Parliamentarian Sarath Muttetuwegama stating that drug trafficking 
in recent years had increased due to the introduction of a liberal economic 
policy, the Minister of Education stated: 
 
“We should not think of drugs as a problem of an open economy or a closed 
economy. It took some time for this menace to come to Sri Lanka. In fact the 
use of drugs can always become a threat to the political system, to the social 
system of our country. There are some countries, as my good friend the Hon 
member for Kotmale pointed out, in places like South America where drugs 
have played an important role in politics, in making governments and in 
bringing down governments. It is not merely a question of the health of the 
nation being threatened, but both the political system and the social system as 
a result of the use of drugs in society” (Hon. Ranil Wickremasinghe, Hansard, 
22 March 1984:641).  
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Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament were both stakeholders in the 
policy-making process, and as legislators, placed great emphasis on the 
subject of drugs and had been interested in amending existing legislation on 
drugs.  During the early 1980s, drugs were seen as a major political issue with 
much of the debate focused on law enforcement: legal and penal aspects of 
control. The response to the drug problem was conceptualised to be punitive 
rather than humane. Legislators placed political stability and the security of the 
nation at the highest level and these overshadowed any health needs of those 
individuals who used drugs. There was no provision in the Amendment Bill for 
drug treatment and rehabilitation, as the focus and debate had been on law 
enforcement to reduce the availability of drugs in the local market. The 
ownership of addiction was left in the hands of law enforcement agencies and 
was perceived as the correct course of action by the country’s highest level 
policy-making system, the Parliament.  
 
Defining the Drug problem: penal versus health opinions. 
 
The treatment of heroin use was almost unknown by practising medical doctors 
during the early 1980s until some heroin users came to general hospitals due 
to experiencing the effects of arsenic poisoning in contaminated heroin. Some 
heroin users had died due to arsenic added to heroin imported from India 
(Psychiatrist, Interview 4). Doctors had also seen heroin users in some general 
hospitals when the heroin supply in the local drug market had been scarce. 
Inability to obtain heroin had prompted drug users to access medical facilities 
seeking help to alleviate withdrawal symptoms. Overall, there was little 
expertise in the treatment and management of drug misuse within the medical 
profession. 
 
The new development of a heroin epidemic, a lack of expertise within the 
health sector to manage this and its definition being put outside the health 
system encouraged groups independent of the health service to become more 
involved in the subject of drugs. There had been support from powerful 
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positions of authority in government to keep the drug problem outside the 
health system during the early 1980s. The most senior politician in the health 
service, the Minister of Health, during the Parliamentary debate on the Poisons, 
Opium and Dangerous Drug Ordinance Amendment Bill stated that: 
 
“We are willing to give whatever assistance we can, but since we are at the 
moment not fully geared to tackle the medical aspect of this problem, all co-
operation extended to us would be welcome. So, on this occasion, I would like 
to call upon particularly the non-governmental organisations to think seriously 
about establishing drug rehabilitation centres” (Hon. Dr. Ranjith Atapattu, 
Hansard, 22 March 1984:650).  
 
This statement conveyed the message that the Health Ministry was not 
accepting much or any responsibility to play any part in the management or 
treatment of the medical aspects of drug misuse. The statement could be taken 
at face value with the medical sector lacking clinical experience and knowledge 
to treat this new health problem. However it might also be viewed as the Health 
Ministry adopting the position of not welcoming the challenge posed by an 
emerging and growing drug misuse problem, not being forthright in stating this 
and shifting any responsibility and interest in addressing it onto other agencies. 
Not only does this endorse the lack of a medical or health conceptualisation to 
the official response to deal with drug misuse, it leaves other agencies with a 
clear opportunity to become involved, take over and impose their belief system 
in defining the problem and developing policies and solutions. 
 
The ministerial will was, therefore, supportive of a punitive response and 
excluded a multi-disciplinary approach involving medical treatment or 
prevention. There was little opportunity or support for civil servants to develop a 
multi-faceted approach for debate. Civil servants in the Ministry of Health 
supported the Health Minister's view. There were other competing financial 
priorities in terms of public health problems. Any responsibility towards the drug 
problem was left outside the health service. The Health Minister's statement 
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also signalled a message that interventions should primarily stem from groups 
independent of the health sector and that the ‘drug problem’ does not require a 
health response. Although, a policy-maker who was a practising psychiatrist at 
the time made attempts to assert that the drug problem was a health issue, it 
appears that the Minister of Health and the Secretary to the Ministry of Health 
left it as a matter outside the health system: 
 
“Now I remember having a number of arguments with the Ministry of Health. I 
said that alcohol and drugs are essentially a health issue. But the Ministry 
Secretary, a very senior civil servant at the time, did not want to accept it as a 
health issue. His answer was that he had enough of issues to deal with and 
that he had to prioritise tackling malaria, TB, cholera and so on” (Policy-maker 
and Psychiatrist, Interview 4). 
 
Tackling the problems of malaria, tuberculosis and cholera were public health 
priorities the Health Ministry should address but they appeared to overshadow 
the health needs of drug users. This further suggests that the country’s drug 
problem was not a priority area for intervention from the Ministry of Health. The 
posts of Minister of Health and the Secretary to the Ministry of Health are 
powerful positions of authority in government office. Not only did their views 
reduce any responsibility for the drug problem, they influenced groups outside 
the health sector to be more involved in tackling the drug problem.  
 
Whilst detoxification or management of drug withdrawal can be viewed as 
requiring a medical response, the opting-out policy response by the health 
ministry would have left many drug misusers with few options. The 'cold turkey' 
method of drug withdrawal with no use of substitute or symptomatic medication 
needed no response from doctors and remains when there is no other available 
option to alleviate withdrawal symptoms. Although not government policy or 
forming part of any comprehensive treatment programme, the practice of 
symptomatic prescribing was undertaken by some doctors and psychiatrists, 
but, limited to the general hospital in Colombo and the psychiatric hospitals in 
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Mulleriya and Angoda. In this context, the range of approaches and services 
needed to form a comprehensive and official  policy response for drug misuse 
in the areas of education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation was left to 
services outside the health sector. 
 
Against this backdrop, official interest in matters related to drug control within 
the Police Department was further amplified with the amendment of the 
Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance in 1984. As law enforcement 
became the means of drug control within the amended ordinance, increasingly 
more drug users were being arrested as a result. As previously stated, there 
were only 8 heroin-related arrests in 1981. This had increased to 6,650 by 1990 
(Handbook of Drug Abuse Information, 2008). Police officers, as a professional 
group, came into contact with significant numbers of drug users by virtue of 
their new role of stringent law enforcement against drug users and traffickers. 
Enforcement action was largely concentrated in the Colombo district where 
heroin use was more prevalent than in other districts of the country (Police 
Officer, Interview 14). 
 
The Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance Amendment Act No11 of 
1984 also led to the establishment of the National Dangerous Drug Control 
Board as a statutory institution. Its role and remit included the formulation and 
review of a national policy on drugs. Additionally, coordination of prevention, 
treatment and rehabilitation, enforcement, education, research and other 
activities related to drug control also formed part of the remit of the NDDCB. 
The establishment of the NDDCB can be seen as an attempt to depart from ad 
hoc policy-making and formalising the implementation of strategies and 
interventions to control the demand and supply of drugs. Its structural 
positioning was again outside the health system as the NDDCB was set-up as 
an institution under the Ministry of Defence. Although not formally appointed, 
some doctors and senior officials from customs and police initially took part in 
board proceedings (Police officer, Interview 10).  
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A senior police officer, who was a member of the NNAC, was appointed as the 
Chairman of the first NDDCB. This was a dual role whereby the Chairman had 
to lead on activities at the PNB, as well as the NDDCB. The appointment was 
made by the President of Sri Lanka and can be seen as a political act. It 
signified the continued presence of law enforcement personnel infiltrating the 
newly formed drug policy-making body, the NDDCB. The first Chairman, as a 
policy entrepreneur, had a keen interest in drug control activities and can be 
regarded as someone instrumental in understanding the emerging heroin 
epidemic and in shaping subsequent drug policies. Previously, he had set-up 
systems within the PNB to collect information on arrested drug users. For 
example, demographic information of drug users, type of drug(s) used, how it 
was used and the quantity consumed. The rationale for collection of such 
information was mainly related to the need to understand the nature and 
magnitude of the emerging heroin problem (Police Officer, Interview 10). Law 
enforcement personnel now had first-hand information and were in an ideal 
position to accurately describe the emerging heroin problem. 
 
Doctors’ Divergent Views on Defining the Drug Problem. 
 
With growing intelligence on drugs, the PNB was in a position of authority to 
claim that opium use was declining and that heroin use among young Sri 
Lankans was increasing (Report on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse in 
Sri Lanka, NDDCB, 1986). The police also claimed that heroin use was 
concentrated within the Colombo district but with slow spread to other cities in 
Sri Lanka. According to the PNB, the typical heroin user at the time was male, 
young, from a lower socio-economic background and funded their habit through 
petty crime. With a growing knowledge on the heroin problem, perhaps limited 
to the PNB in the early 1980s, new facts began to emerge about the heroin 
problem.  
 
Although drug use was criminalised and the drug user was seen as a criminal, 
there was acknowledgement within the PNB that a punitive response by itself 
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was inadequate. This perception spread from the PNB into the newly 
established NDDCB, as a result of appointing a Chairman who had a 
background in the PNB. The new Chairman during his tenure at the PNB had 
instructed local police stations to escort drug users to the general hospital in 
Colombo for treatment (Police Officer, Interview 10). There were no formal 
arrangements or legislation to divert drug users into treatment at the time. 
However, the idea of ‘including treatment’ as opposed to 'only punishment’ 
began to emerge among policy-makers during this time. 
 
Coincidentally, within the first two years of inception of the NDDCB, the idea 
emerged that drug users also require treatment and rehabilitation and that the 
problem cannot be tackled solely through law enforcement. This invited people 
and organizations outside the penal system to add their views on the drug 
problem, particularly the medical profession. There appears to have been 
divergent opinions within the medical profession on how the drug problem was 
defined and conceptualised, as well as a lack of interest in the subject of drug 
treatment. In general, doctors were unaware of the growing heroin problem in 
the early 1980s. A senior police officer stated: 
 
“Doctors said that heroin use has not come to their notice anyway. Then I said 
look, this is an emerging problem and I showed my statistics around referring 
these individuals to health authorities. Then their eyebrows went up. We took 
the lead on enforcement and attained credibility for what we did. And then we 
approached others and said that we can’t do this on our own and that they also 
need to join hands” (Police officer, Interview 10). 
 
Although there was no formal arrangement or instruction from the Health 
Ministry issued to medical staff to be more involved in the treatment of drug 
use, there was a group of doctors who showed interest in the area of treatment 
for drug addiction. One of these doctors informally represented the NDDCB at 
the request of the Chairman. It was within this context a workshop was held 
and led by the new NDDCB Chairman on 31st March 1985 to explore the 
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‘medical aspects of drug abuse’. Prominent physicians, surgeons, psychiatrists 
and the President of the Sri Lanka Medical Association, similar to the British 
Medical Association in the UK, attended this workshop. According to 
documentary data, the primary objective of this workshop was to recommend 
appropriate guidelines for services utilising pre-existing health resources, so as 
to begin to establish some treatment for drug users. In a landmark move, the 
workshop defined drug abuse as a health problem and emphasised the 
following: 
1. The expansion of current health facilities for detoxification. 
2. The training of doctors regarding the signs and symptoms of use of 
dangerous drugs such as heroin, cocaine, dexamphetamine, LSD; and 
the treatment and management of drug dependant persons. 
3. The evaluation of the medical use of methadone in opiate detoxification 
procedures. 
4. The inclusion of general practitioners and other doctors, in addition to 
psychiatrists, to augment the medical expertise available when 
developing treatment and rehabilitation programmes in the country.  
5. Undertake research into the causal relationships in drug addiction in Sri 
Lanka. 
6. Institute programmes to increase the motivation of drug addicts to 
receive voluntary treatment and rehabilitation. 
(Extract/compilation from the transcript of the workshop on medical aspects of 
drug abuse, NDDCB, 1985). 
 
The workshop also recommended the expansion of representation on the 
NDDCB to include ex-officio, the Principal Collector of Customs, Director-
General of Health Services and the Secretary to the Ministry of Education. 
Correspondingly, the Sri Lanka Medical Association asked that they be given 
an opportunity to be involved with the NDDCB activities, particularly in relation 
to drug treatment. The need for a multi-agency and a partnership approach to 
managing the drug problem was beginning to emerge. Consequently, the 
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NDDCB Amendment Act No 41 of 1986 expanded the membership of the 
NDDCB and made it a statutory responsibility to appoint the following 
representatives: Secretary to the Ministry of the Minister in charge of the 
subject of Education, Inspector-General of Police, the Director-General of 
Health Services, the Principal Collector of Customs, the Government Analyst, 
and the Commissioner for Ayurveda. The new, expanded membership of the 
NDDCB now consisted of representation from more government departments 
as per the NDDCB amendment act No 41 of 1986 and had the potential to 
respond to the drug problem from a wide variety of perspectives. 
 
Although the medical workshop in 1985 concluded that drug abuse was a 
health problem and members were periodically appointed from the Ministry of 
Health to represent the NDDCB, any suggestions made by doctors concerning 
the treatment of drug dependency stopped short of implementation. There were 
a number of inter-related factors that continued to leave treatment for drug 
addiction excluded from provision by the health service.  
 
Successive Chairs appointed to the NDDCB were either medical doctors or 
personnel who had previously represented legal or criminal justice agencies. 
According to interview data, they were usually appointed by the President, 
which signified the importance of this position. This presidential influence 
extends to appointing some other members of the Board as well. In general, 
the doctors who were appointed either as Chair or membership of the NDDCB 
had divergent views on the official response to the drug problem. A psychiatrist 
reflecting on this period stated:  
 
“From the very beginning, there were ideological differences. Some of the 
doctors supported the disease concept and said that drug addicts should 
receive treatment. They were mainly a group of compassionate doctors. But, 
others were more behaviourally orientated and said that drug addiction had no 
biological basis and that drug users were useless fellows and that this is a 
pattern of life style they have learned and got used to. Some of these doctors 
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believed that drug addicts shouldn’t receive any medical treatment and said 
that drug addiction had nothing to do with medicine and had no biological 
basis” (Psychiatrist, Interview 4).   
 
The majority of doctors who were interested in the treatment of addiction were 
not central to drug policy-making. Interview data suggests that while some 
doctors who represented the NDDCB favoured a medical response others had 
mixed views on the response to the drug problem. In general, there had been a 
lack of interest in, and conceptualisation of, addiction among the doctors who 
were members of the NDDCB. Addiction was viewed as a bad habit and a form 
of indulgence and not as an illness requiring medical attention. There were 
strong moral influences with some doctors framing drug addiction as a deviant 
activity and the display of any untoward behaviour did not warrant the attention 
of the medical profession. The same psychiatrist, endorsing this general 
perception of drug users held by doctors stated: 
 
“Most doctors who got to the top of policy-making forums felt that drug addicts 
are bad people and that they should be rehabilitated. They didn’t look at the 
holistic picture and the role medical professionals can play. Historically, the 
person who held the post of Chairman in the drug control board didn’t have any 
clinical experience. They were not looking after patients although they were 
doctors. So they had this ‘good and bad idea’. They supported rehabilitation, 
drug education and prevention, but, no medical treatment as such. That is why 
I used to call them humbugs” (Psychiatrist, Interview 4).   
 
Within the context of the overall unwillingness among the medical profession to 
define the drug problem as a health issue, doctors who supported treatment for 
addiction were in favour of introducing Methadone and Clonidine as medication 
in the treatment for withdrawal of opiate dependency. A large majority of this 
group of doctors had undertaken both post-graduate medical training and 
National Health Service work experience in Britain, where they gained 
knowledge of drug treatment models and where substitute prescribing for 
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opiate dependency was more prevalent. However, as previously discussed, 
doctors who actively supported a medical response to the drug problem and 
drug treatment were occupying less influential positions within policy-making 
and their views were not heard or acknowledged by decision makers in the 
NDDCB and the Ministry of Health. The opinions held by doctors about drug 
problems existed at a time when a prohibitionist policy towards drugs 
dominated following the enactment of the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drug 
Amendment Act No 13 of 1984. 
 
Moral Hygiene, NGOs and the Growth of Drug Rehabilitation. 
 
The late 1980s marked the arrival of NGOs into drugs work. The majority of 
their attention focused on drug education, prevention and rehabilitation, the 
latter largely being Buddhist and Christian faith-based, and supported by the 
government and the NDDCB. 1987 is significant for the development of the 
following national schemes within Sri Lanka: 
 
 The setting up of an Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC11) by 
the International Organisation of Good Templars (IOGT12, an 
international NGO).  
 NDDCB commencing a 3-year joint project with the UN on prevention 
and treatment for problems related to drug abuse. 
 The setting up of the Federation of Non-Government Organisations 
Against Drug Abuse (FONGOADA) as an umbrella organisation to 
represent NGOs working in the field of drug abuse. 
                                            
11
 ADIC was established in 1987 as a charitable organization in Sri Lanka. It is involved in drug 
and alcohol demand reduction, is a resource centre and participates in international networks 
such as the Global Alcohol Policy Alliance (GAPA), the Framework convention Alliance on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), the International Federation of Non-Governmental Organization 
(IFNGO) and IOGT International. 
12 
IOGT is a worldwide community of non-governmental organisations that promotes people 
around the world  towards a lifestyle free from alcohol and other intoxicating drugs. 
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 The NDDCB, UN Development Programme and the WHO developing a 
drug abuse monitoring system to collect data. 
 The launch of the first residential drug rehabilitation facility, popularly 
known as “Navadiganthaya” (New Horizons) by the “Sumithrayo”, a local 
NGO part of Befrienders13. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, external influences from organisations 
such as the UN, Colombo Plan and the SAARC changed the emphasis from 
following a prohibitionist-only approach to include the introduction of drug 
education, treatment and rehabilitation, in addition to the supply-reduction 
programmes in its member states. The schemes developed in 1987 coincided 
with the publication of the ‘Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline (CMO) of 
Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control’ that originated from a 1987 UN 
conference on drug abuse and illicit trafficking held in Vienna. This document 
recognised the responsibility of countries to provide resources and equal status 
to address both the supply and demand for illicit drugs in member states 
(United Nations, 1988).  
 
Initially, financial support was provided by the NDDCB through FONGOADA to 
the NGOs engaging in drugs work. In the late 1980s, the Chair for the NDDCB 
had been a Commissioner of Prisons. Financial support from this Chair was 
given to a prominent Buddhist monk to establish a residential drug rehabilitation 
centre. This monk had previous experience in rehabilitating young offenders 
through a work partnership with the Ministry of Justice on a prison diversion 
scheme wherein rehabilitation was allowed in the community, as opposed to a 
prison sentence (Policy-maker, Interview 7). After receiving support to develop 
residential drug rehabilitation schemes he established the “Mithuru Mithuro 
Movement”, an NGO renowned for drug rehabilitation with eight residential 
rehabilitation centres across the country. In the late 1990s, this monk was 
appointed as a member of the NDDCB, where he advised and became a 
                                            
13
 Befrienders is a charity that helps people worldwide who feel suicidal. 
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knowledge expert on matters related to drug treatment and rehabilitation for 
over a decade (Psychiatrist, Interview 4).  
 
The NDDCB expanded its position of developing national policies to include the 
provision of drug treatment and rehabilitation, with the establishment of a 
residential rehabilitation facility known as “Meth Sevana” in Kandy in 1990. In 
1991, two more treatment facilities were established in Galle and Colombo 
districts. The NDDCB took over “Navadiganthaya” that had been set up by the 
local branch of Befrienders in 1993 (Report on Recent Developments in 
Treatment, NDDCB, 1999). The impetus for the provision of rehabilitation in the 
country was largely due to the demand by some sections of the public for the 
provision of help for drug users and some NDDCB board members having 
experience and knowledge of setting up ’10-day community-based treatment 
camps’ for drug users. These had been established in the mid-1980s, with local 
communities involved in providing drug education, life-skills training, 
counselling and practical support for those who used heroin. The treatment 
camp approach had been jointly pioneered by a Buddhist monk, a professor of 
forensic medicine at the Colombo University and a university lecturer in social 
services (Report on Recent Developments in Treatment, NDDCB, 1999). While 
the professor subsequently became a NDDCB Chair, the lecturer became an 
Executive Director of the NDDCB. These developments led to the emergence 
of a small national epistemic community that advocated for the rehabilitation of 
drug users. While some of these epistemic community actors were located 
within the NDDCB, others represented academic institutions, government 
departments and faith-based organisations that operated outside the workings 
of the NDDCB.  
 
The growth of rehabilitation prevailed within the context of a drug problem not 
being defined as a health issue and the lack of medical treatment facilities. 
Although the majority of residential rehabilitation centres offered the ‘cold 
turkey’ method, some offered drug-withdrawal programmes consisting of 
symptomatic prescribing using non-opiate based drugs to alleviate withdrawal 
symptoms coupled with physical exercise, meditation and spiritual healing. 
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Symptomatic prescribing was provided by private doctors on a medical-session 
basis. According to the Handbook of Drug Abuse Information published by the 
NDDCB on treatment and rehabilitation, policy-makers held the view that drug 
treatment essentially meant 'rehabilitation' as the two terms ‘treatment’ and 
‘rehabilitation’ were regarded as one and the same by policy makers and in 
policy terminology. As a result, the majority of the funding provided by 
international organisations for drug 'treatment' was directed to the development 
of rehabilitation facilities.  
 
The rationale for the growth of rehabilitation was twofold: 
 
Firstly, there existed a belief among policy-makers and politicians that a drug-
free society is absolutely required for the socio-economic development of the 
country, particularly as young people were considered as the wealth of the 
nation. Hence young drug users had to become abstinent so as to be 
productive and contribute towards socio-economic development. Secondly, 
‘rehabilitation’ was seen as a means to instil lost or deteriorated morals of 
behaviour in those who used drugs (NGO Director, Interview 5). The official 
support given to rehabilitation became regarded as almost a panacea to the 
drug problem. The integration of drug users back into society as “good citizens” 
through residential rehabilitation programmes became the populist policy (NGO 
Director, Interview 5). There was no shift in these two views during the period 
studied. A policy-maker who represented the NDDCB stated: 
 
“Our goal was to make drug users good citizens and help them go back to their 
community after giving up their chosen lifestyle (drug use). Drug use is an 
illegal activity and an indication of the breakdown of our cultural values. It ruins 
our families and has a knock on effect on our welfare and our development. It is 
also against Buddhism and this is a majority Buddhist country. So, it was not 
difficult at all to gain support for our rehabilitation programmes. In fact it was 
welcomed and as far as I can remember majority supported this kind of drug 
treatment. It’s the case even now” (Policy maker, Interview 2).  
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 Buddhism identifies five precepts as part of its moral code and as the path to 
liberation. They include: abstinence from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, 
false speech and use of intoxicants. The dangers of intoxicant use are 
enumerated in a number of the Lord Buddha's sermons, the most famous being 
the Sigalovada Sutta, known as the layperson’s code of discipline, which states 
that intoxicant use causes economic downfall (Dahlke et al, 2008). The parable 
of Mahadhanasetthi tells of a man who spent a vast fortune by drinking alcohol 
with evil friends and was reduced to beggary in his old age. It is a popular 
example of a human being whose life was ruined by alcohol. The religious-
moral model of drug rehabilitation had to have support from policy actors 
across government and non-government organizations, and was in congruence 
with abstinence as the only goal of treatment and prohibition as the dominant 
policy.  
 
There had been continuous support from successive Chairs appointed to the 
NDDCB to continue providing rehabilitation despite their various professional 
backgrounds. However, some doctors who led the Board took a keen interest in 
revising the accepted rehabilitation philosophy and reduced both the duration of 
the rehabilitation programme from 18 to 6 months and diluted the militaristic 
style of the physical exercises, meditation and spiritualistic aspects of the 
regime. Those who supported rehabilitation were also staunch supporters of 
the temperance movement at the time and were strong Buddhist followers 
(NGO Director, Interview 1). Buddhism and its influence on drug policy-making 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter as Buddhism had strong 
links to governance and political welfare. 
 
The First National Policy on Drugs (1994) and the 90s Policy Landscape.  
 
The progress towards a national policy concerning a response to illicit drugs 
can be traced back to the late 1980s. Although legislation was amended and 
the NDDCB was created in 1984 to coordinate all activities related to drug 
control, the need for the formulation of a national policy on drugs was raised by 
both national and international policy actors. As discussed in the previous 
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chapter, the impetus for its development was largely driven by the United 
Nations who wished to see a cohesive single policy document, one that 
outlined a national stand on illicit drugs (Civil Servant, Interview 11). The first 
national policy on drugs also states that “the UN General Assembly had also on 
several occasions urged governments to use the Comprehensive Multi-
disciplinary Outline (CMO) in the formulation of their own policies and 
programmes” (Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of 
Drug Abuse, 1994: 3). As the CMO was multi-disciplinary in outline, its 
application in Sri Lanka invited broadening the involvement of existing 
stakeholders from law enforcement departments to include other government 
and non-government agencies. These external developments also influenced 
the involvement of multi-disciplinary personnel in the creation of the first 
national policy on drugs.  
 
By the late 1980s the NDDCB was perceived by the public as the principal 
institution for coordination of all drug control activities within the country and it 
was within the remit of the NDDCB to develop a national policy on drugs. The 
NDDCB had established its status as a national epistemic community in the 
area of drug control, due to gaining more experience in the area and exposure 
to the influences of international organisations such as the UN, SAARC and 
Colombo Plan.  These helped drug policy-making to become institutionalised 
within the NDDCB. Prior to this NDDCB policy lead, and as discussed before, 
divergent views existed among government departments and professional 
groups on the drug problem and the implementation of drug control activities. 
This resulted in the drug problem continuing to be viewed and framed within 
different disciplinary perspectives. A civil servant, who was involved in drug 
policy-making at the time, succinctly described these conflicting views as: 
 
“At that time only the law in relation to drugs was intact. There was no national 
policy as such. People had different views when it came to operations. The 
government had to articulate its commitment and its strategy to deal with the 
drug problem despite these different views. They all saw it from a different light 
and gave priority to their own area. Even the judiciary had different views about 
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drug control. The Foreign Ministry representatives were keen on international 
corporation to accede to the 1971 and 1988 UN conventions. The Police and 
the Ministry of Defence were saying that it’s a matter to do with security and 
were keen to focus on supply reduction programmes. Some doctors said that 
the drug problem is a medical problem, social services representatives said 
that it’s a social problem, customs said that they have a huge role in 
interdictions and border protection and so on. So, the board (NDDCB) felt that 
there should be a national policy so you can reduce different opinions. But I 
must say that people really focused on law enforcement and strict controls in 
the end as it was the easy thing to do” (Civil Servant, Interview 9).  
 
The NDDCB saw the involvement of stakeholders as an opportunity to unify 
these multi-disciplinary views, although it happened within the context of a 
dominant penal approach to managing the problem. There was also recognition 
that drug problems are multifaceted and cannot be tackled by one single 
agency and required responses from a range of government departments. 
However, it is noteworthy that although non-governmental organisations 
ventured into the area of drugs work, they were not formally involved in the 
formulation of the first national policy on drugs (Civil Servant, Interview 6).  
 
The security discourse, the idea that drug trafficking is a threat to security, 
sovereignty and development intensified during the drafting of the policy as 
fighting increased between the armed forces and the LTTE. There was 
disruption to civic life and public services as a result of regular bombings in the 
Colombo district and elsewhere. During the early 1990s, the idea that the LTTE 
were funding their armed struggle through drug trafficking gained more 
credence among politicians and civil servants working in government Ministries 
such as Defence, Justice, Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General Department 
(Member of Parliament, Interview 13). Their focus here was on border control 
and the disruption of international syndicates as the LTTE used Sri Lanka as a 
trans-shipment point for illicit drugs to be moved to Europe. It was within this 
context that a past Chair of the NDDCB led the development of the first national 
policy on drugs with the afore mentioned government ministries and 
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departments such as Attorney General, Police, Customs, and Health (Policy-
maker, Interview 7). Once more, stringent law enforcement as a policy option 
carried unquestioned legitimacy due to the continuing perception of drugs as a 
threat to national security and sovereignty. 
 
The political will for the creation of the first national policy on drugs cannot be 
ignored as the Executive President, the person who was also holding the 
portfolio of Minister of Defence at the time, was a driving force to ensure the 
development of a national policy. There appears to have been close 
coordination between the NDDCB and the President’s office. As the Chairman 
who led the development of the national policy stated: 
 
“We developed the national policy during his excellency Mr. Premadasa’s 
(President) time. He was the person in-charge of the subject and was very 
much interested in having a national policy. He wanted to make sure that we 
are tough on enforcement and that our policy was in harmony with international 
conventions. In fact, there was a consultant at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, who 
was asked by the President to oversee this policy development. He was a very 
senior diplomat at the time. We at the NDDCB drafted the policy and this 
consultant went over it and hashed it as such- I mean some areas so the policy 
fully complies with international drug control conventions. Mr…… (Consultant to 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry) escorted me to one of the Cabinet meetings and 
he himself presented the policy. Because the President had a lot of trust and 
confidence in Mr….. (Consultant to the Foreign Affairs Ministry), it was ratified 
at Cabinet level without any problems” (Policy-maker, Interview 7). 
 
The Introduction of Demand Reduction Approaches. 
 
The first Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug 
Abuse published in 1994 acknowledged the growing use of cannabis and 
heroin among the local population and identified four responses: enforcement; 
preventative education and public awareness; treatment and rehabilitation and 
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international and regional co-operation. Although supply reduction outweighed 
demand reduction measures, the government, for the first time articulated its 
commitment to demand reduction through the publication of this policy 
document. Abstinence from illicit drugs continued to remain the ultimate goal 
and received support from civil servants and the government despite this not 
been clearly stated in the policy document. Efforts to reduce demand for illicit 
drugs through primary prevention involved the mass media and school 
education; both had unanimous support from all concerned government 
departments and ministries (Civil Servant, Interview 6). As the first national 
policy on drugs states: 
 
“Accepting that prevention is more efficient and cost-effective than either 
enforcement or and treatment, the Government will facilitate better use of all 
preventative educational opportunities. Focus will be on formed curricula, 
informal and non-formal education activities and the use of mass media” (Sri 
Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse, 1994: 3). 
 
The medical and legal professions’ support for primary prevention was 
significant as they believed that discouraging the initiation of drug use, 
especially among adolescents and young adults was pivotal in containing the 
drug problem. It also found common ground with the casual belief of drug use 
being an obstacle to socio-economic development (Policy-maker, Interview 3). 
According to the national policy, a clearly defined role for preventative 
education was placed outside the spheres of the health system. The 
implementation agencies identified for preventative education and public 
awareness were: Ministries of Defence, Education, Cultural Affairs, Labour and 
Social Services, Public Administration and Home Affairs, Youth Affairs and 
Sport, the Department of Information and NGOs (Sri Lankan National Policy for 
the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse, 1994). 
 
The policy also states that “in order that the process of treatment be complete, 
the phase of treatment and detoxification must be integrated with the phases of 
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rehabilitation and after-care” (Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and 
Control of Drug Abuse, 1994: 4). This was the first time the role of the health 
sector had been formally identified in regards to treatment in a national policy 
document. The policy further states that: 
 
“In view of the large number of persons voluntarily seeking treatment, a short 
term action plan will be drawn up by the Ministry of Health to deal with the 
immediate problem. On a long term basis the Department of Health will be 
responsible for co-ordinating and giving guidance to the development and 
maintenance of a comprehensive national treatment programme for drug 
dependants” (Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug 
Abuse, 1994: 5). 
 
The NDDCB failed to undertake sufficient consultation with the Ministry of 
Health to ensure that the treatment arm of the national policy was clearly 
articulated with clear milestones and measurements. Rehabilitation was the 
central focus of the NDDCB and was perceived to be sufficient to address the 
problem from the point of demand reduction. The lack in conceptualisation of 
the drug problem as a health issue but inclining more towards defining it as a 
social issue by the NDDCB meant that a limited role was awarded to the health 
sector for its management. As the Chair who led the development of the first 
drug policy stated: 
 
“It was recognised that this (drug problem) was not an exclusive field and that 
this could be tackled by one agency- it was not purely a medical problem. 
These people (drug users) required counselling and social work to get out of 
the habit and remain out of the habit. Even if they relapsed, they were required 
to come back to counselling and rehabilitation. I felt the subject was better 
placed with the Ministry of Defence rather than Health because if it was with 
health, the drug problem would have been heavily medicalised- it shouldn’t be 
as it is mainly a social problem” (Policy-maker, Interview 7). 
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Similarly, a lack in commitment from the Health Ministry to deal with the 
medical aspects of the drug problem meant that two decades later, a 
comprehensive national treatment programme was still overdue (Psychiatrist, 
Interview 4). The doctors who argued the case for treatment were not heard 
and their agenda was not articulated at political level as vigorously as some of 
the security and control measures during policy development.  
 
Treatment and the Prison System. 
 
The number of people imprisoned for narcotic related offences in the 1990s 
increased in line with law enforcement becoming the populist policy and 
becoming firmly embedded within the responsibility of the criminal justice 
system. Considering the entire prison population, ‘narcotic related prison 
admissions’ as a single category stood at 32.6% in 1995 (NDDCB, 2000), 
41.3% in 1996 (NDDCB, 2000), 44.6% in 2000 (NDDCB, 2002) and 40.7% in 
2005 (NDDCB, 2007). These figures suggest that just under half the entire 
prison population were admitted due to narcotic related offences. The growing 
number of prisoners with drug problems was of concern to the Ministry of 
Justice and prison officials due to prison overcrowding, and their belief that 
drug users had the potential to become ‘harder criminals’ when associating with 
prisoners who are part of organised gangs, have committed murder and other 
types of violent offences (Policy-maker, Interview 7). The treatment of drug 
users in prison had also been discussed during the development of the first 
national policy on drugs. Although there had been no reference to the 
development of drug treatment within prisons, alternatives to imprisonment 
such as treatment and rehabilitation did become a feature of the first national 
policy on drugs. Some policy-makers within the NDDCB acknowledged that 
drug users should be dealt outside the prison system. This was largely due to 
the drug problem continuing to be defined as a social issue. A policy-maker 
stated: 
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“As you know, my background is prisons. With that experience, I came to 
realise that drug addiction is more rather a social problem. It is to do with 
relationships; your family, friends and so on. There can be alternatives than 
ending up in prison, which results in plenty of negative effects on that 
individual. I think traffickers should be dealt within the prison but not drug 
addicts” (Policy-maker, Interview 7). 
 
However, these views were not necessarily shared by the majority of politicians 
and senior civil servants who both preferred to apply a stringent law 
enforcement approach and to continue implementing a penal approach to 
managing the problem due to its political and public appeal. By now, a penal 
approach to managing the drug problem was strongly accepted as an 
institutional norm, particularly within the NDDCB. As one civil servant stated: 
 
“The easiest thing to do is to convict someone and send that person to prison 
because the public at large thinks that the problem is solved when drug addicts 
are punished. So, our politicians wanted to please this type of public mind-set. 
Our institutions also adopted this type of thinking because it was an expectation 
as the NDDCB comes under the government” (Civil Servant, Interview 9). 
  
Against this backdrop in the mid-1990s, the NDDCB expanded its treatment 
and rehabilitation programmes from out in the community to include some 
remand and open prisons with funding support from the UNODC. Existing 
community treatment staff of the NDDCB helped set-up and implement drug 
education and rehabilitation programmes in some remand and open prisons. 
Predominantly, a psychosocial approach was inherent in these programmes 
and did not consist of any medical interventions such as opioid substitute 
prescribing or opioid detoxification programmes. Although these interventions 
were available within the prison environment, the prison drug intervention 
became popularly known as the ‘prisoner diversion scheme’ (NGO Director, 
Interview 5). Total abstinence from drugs and the reintegration of prisoners 
back into society were the ultimate goals. Prison drug interventions were 
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introduced virtually without any research evidence on the nature and extent of 
the drug problem in prisons apart from some offender data on the distribution of 
prison admissions by type of drug. This, on average between 1998 and 2004, 
stood at 88% for heroin, 11% for cannabis and the remainder for other types of 
drugs (NDDCB, 2005). Interventions for prisoners with drug problems also took 
place in the absence of a publicised policy or strategy on prison drug treatment. 
 
Drug Dependant Persons Treatment & Rehabilitation Act 2007. 
 
The Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act No 54 of 2007 
aimed to regulate drug treatment centres, including the introduction of a legal 
licensing requirement to establish private treatment centres for the purpose of 
drug treatment and rehabilitation. It also provided powers to the police and the 
courts, following a medical examination, to admit a person to a designated14 or 
licensed15 treatment centre for compulsory treatment and rehabilitation.  
 
The committee which formulated the drug treatment and rehabilitation Act was 
led by the Government Legal Draftsman and included representation from the 
NDDCB, Prisons, Ministry of Social Services, Attorney General's Department, 
Department of Police and the Ministry of Health. During the drafting period, the 
NDDCB took a leading role in articulating the required standards for private 
treatment and rehabilitation centres. The minimum standards included 
describing the range and content of facilities and services for those undergoing 
treatment, the qualifications of the staff running the treatment programmes and 
management arrangements for the centres. Additionally, a regulatory and an 
inspection role, which issues licenses and monitors the implementation of 
standards in private treatment centres, was awarded to the NDDCB through 
                                            
14
 President Mahinda Rajapakse, on the recommendation of the NDDCB, designated Pallekele, 
Wataraka, Taldena, Weeravila, Anuradhapura, Pallensena, Kandhawatta and Meethirigala 
prisons as treatment and rehabilitation centers of the government as per No1653/19, 12
th
 May 
2010 extraordinary gazette notification. 
15
 Private or non-government treatment parties have to obtain a license from the NDDCB to 
establish a drug treatment and rehabilitation centre. 
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this Act. There had been unanimous support from all parties involved in drafting 
this Bill for inclusion of such provision due to the professional reputation of the 
NDDCB, its knowledge and expertise on the subject matter and it being 
government-led (Policy-maker, Interview 3). 
 
Compulsory Treatment and Human Rights. 
 
Although the Act was introduced in 2007, the idea of compulsory treatment had 
been suggested at the SAARC much earlier. Legislation and the provision of 
facilities for compulsory treatment were first identified in the first national policy 
on drugs in 1994. While these were highly significant policy markers which later 
acted as drivers for the introduction of this Act, policy-makers at the NDDCB 
had mixed views about the success of community drug treatment and 
rehabilitation programmes, due to high drop out and relapse rates. These 
factors, along with external influences as discussed in the previous chapter, 
influenced the NDDCB to explore treatment and rehabilitation in prisons 
(Policy-maker, Interview 2).  
 
Over the last two decades, the number of community drug treatment and 
rehabilitation centres initiated by the NDDCB and the NGO sector grew 
significantly. Similarly, the number of prisoners receiving drug treatment and 
rehabilitation as part of the prisoner diversion scheme also expanded. 
However, the number of available treatment spaces, in view of the increasing 
number of imprisoned drug users, was not considered to be sufficient. 
According to the Handbook of Drug Abuse Information (2007), of those who 
were admitted to prison for a narcotic related offence, only 10% entered 
treatment in 2000, 11% in 2004 and 12% in 2006. This treatment gap, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, was of concern to UNODC officials and 
some senior civil servants working in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Justice.  It occurred in a wider context of human rights allegations being 
levelled against the government by the UN. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Sri Lankan government at that time attached greater importance 
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on the drafting of legislation in order to comply and give effect to the 1988 
convention on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 
Moreover, drafting new and amending existing legislation to promote human 
rights and good governance was on the government’s agenda and received 
high priority in order to satisfy an international audience to ensure that Sri 
Lanka continued to benefit from trade concessions awarded through the GSP16 
scheme.  
 
The need to regulate private treatment and rehabilitation centres was 
periodically raised by government and non-government agencies due to 
alleged human rights violations committed by organisations in the name of 
‘treating’ drug users for their addiction (NGO Director, Interview 1). Some of 
these allegations include: beatings, tying to trees, forced labour, denial of food, 
restrictions on the means to contact friends or family, and isolation (NGO 
Director, Interview 1). Although the government’s priority was to draft legislation 
giving effect to the 1988 UN Convention, the NDDCB thought it was opportune 
to include legislation regarding drug treatment and rehabilitation, to ensure that 
the overall numbers in treatment would increase through compulsory prison 
treatment. This was based on the belief that better outcomes can be produced 
when drug users can be contained within a closed environment for a longer 
period with few opportunities to drop out of treatment (Policy-maker, Interview 
2). The NDDCB’s agenda regarding the regulation of private treatment centres, 
including making it an offence to physically or verbally abuse those in treatment 
was combined into the same 2007 Act, due to major delays experienced 
generally in drafting and enacting legislation at the time (Policy-maker, 
Interview 2). Although compulsory treatment had been on the NDDCB policy 
agenda for a number of years, it had received little political support or priority. 
However, due to political pressure being applied by the UN to introduce 
legislation to give effect to the 1988 UN convention, the outcome was to 
concurrently draft two separate pieces of legislation: one concerning the illicit 
                                            
16
 The European Unions (EU) Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) allows developing 
country exporters to pay less or no duties on their exports to the EU. However, it is granted to 
countries which ratify and implement core international conventions relating to human and 
labour rights, environment and good governance. 
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traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the other for the 
treatment and rehabilitation of drug users. The upshot was tabling and debating 
both legislative drafts in Parliament following Cabinet approval. As one policy-
maker who was involved in formulating the compulsory treatment Act stated: 
 
“The Minister of Justice understood the political importance of this at 
international level and was able to move things for us fast and the draft Bill on 
psychotropic substances, alongside the draft treatment and rehabilitation Bill 
was finalised. The legal draftsman had to prioritise finalizing these draft Bills 
over others. So, what really happened was, along with these two Bills related to 
our area, the draft Bill on international covenant on civil and political rights was 
tabled in Parliament all at once. The process was fast because the government 
was very keen on obtaining GSP incentives for the country” (Policy-maker, 
Interview 3).  
 
Part two of the Act that looked at voluntary admission to a treatment centre 
states: 
 
“Upon admission, such person may continue as an inmate of a treatment 
centre, until the assessment panel17 and the medical officer in charge of the 
treatment centre are of the opinion that he may be discharged as he has 
successfully completed the course of treatment undertaken. Conditions for 
discharge shall be determined by the rules of each treatment centre” (Drug 
Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act No 54 of 2007:4). 
 
Within this background, a drug user could voluntarily seek treatment in the 
community but their discharge from treatment is dependent on the outcome of 
                                            
17
 The Minister in charge of the subject appoints persons to assessment panels. The function 
of the assessment panel consist of biopsychosocial assessments of people seeking admission 
to treatment centers either designated or licensed, their level of motivation to become 
abstinent, progress made whilst in treatment and the recommendation to the NDDCB on the 
discharge of inmates.  
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a decision of an assessment panel. A human rights violation exists when forced 
treatment takes place following a voluntary admission to a treatment centre, as 
it can infringe on a person’s movement or the deprivation of their liberty without 
a lawful conviction or following a due court procedure (NGO Director, Interview 
1). Although NGOs were not consulted during the drafting of this act, an NGO 
Director who was involved in drug education and prevention work, opposing 
compulsory treatment stated: 
 
“We were not consulted as such on drafting this act. It was the NDDCB that 
was very much involved in the whole process. Many people have bought 
compulsory treatment because of the criminality attached to drug use and this 
government is tough on drugs or at least they are seen to be tough on drugs. 
This is mainly because we have continued to follow a deterrent approach in Sri 
Lanka. But, I am of the view that compulsory treatment doesn’t work. Its a 
decision the drug user has to take. The moment you bring in this kind of 
compulsory treatment, and I think that is probably why we have hardly had any 
referrals in the last few months, people don’t come forward seeking help. They 
may be frightened to disclose their drug use because of compulsory treatment. 
So, what’s going to happen is they will further go underground” (NGO Director, 
Interview 1).  
 
The majority of Chairs of the NDDCB supported compulsory treatment despite 
their various professional backgrounds and experiences. It was partly due to 
the belief of it being able to benefit a large number of people with drug 
addiction, which would subsequently control drug abuse and addiction and 
would benefit society as a whole. The criminal justice system was viewed as 
the method to bring drug users into treatment, so as to safeguard and promote 
the interests and well-being of the community at large (Policy-maker, Interview 
3). There had also been a belief that drug users should be integrated back into 
society and make them economically active through rehabilitation programmes. 
The ideal of rehabilitation was seen as a means to instil lost or deteriorated 
morals of behaviour in those who used drugs and it had prevailed for over two 
decades since its introduction in the late 1980s. It continued to be regarded by 
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the majority of policy-makers and politicians as the panacea to the drug 
problem. With the introduction of the 2007 Act the police, prisons and courts 
were awarded a formal role in the rehabilitation of drug users. 
 
The widening of police powers to arrest suspected ‘habitual’ drug users for 
examination by a government medical officer before being produced before a 
magistrate is a key tenet of this Act. As a policy-maker involved in the 
formulation and implementation of this Act stated: 
 
“When you take for example a drug dependant, in the past police could not 
arrest them unless they possessed heroin or some other illegal drug. Now with 
this act, the police can arrest a person whom they suspect of using drugs. 
That’s the first step. Once the arrest has been made, the police can refer the 
individual to a doctor. We have informed all doctors in the country with a 
circular to submit their reports when a request is made by the police. Second 
step includes obtaining that medical certificate to say if that person is a drug 
dependant or not. With that report, the drug dependant will be produced in front 
of a magistrate. Finally, the magistrate can decide on the punishment. The drug 
dependant then can be sent to treatment for 6 months 1 year and so on. This is 
the act in a nutshell” (Policy-maker, Interview 2).  
 
The magistrate can sanction that person to receive compulsory treatment and 
rehabilitation at any treatment centre designated or licensed under the Act. The 
Act would appear to be flawed with an infringement of human rights arising out 
of the police having the power to arrest people suspected of using drugs 
irrespective of whether a criminal offence had been committed. The police were 
also given the power to apprehend anyone absconding from a programme and 
return them to the treatment centre (Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Act No 54, 2007). 
 
The Act's unintended consequences may result in compulsory treatment being 
applied to a person not based solely on them having a drug problem, but upon 
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an infringement of another drug law relating to e.g. possession. It is also likely 
to deny an individual the opportunity to cease or modify their treatment plan or 
to review their need for treatment (Psychiatrist, Interview 4). There could be 
further limitation in that compulsory intervention will not be provided for longer 
than required. The majority of drug users are also likely to exist outside the 
treatment system due to the fear of being locked away following disclosure of 
drug use. A psychiatrist pointed out that: 
 
“This Act has strengthened the police and court system. By doing that, they 
have further made the drug addict look like a demon and a criminal. People will 
fear coming forward looking for treatment. We don’t know if there will be 
arbitrary arrest and if drug addicts will be kept in prison for periods 
unnecessary. The NDDCB also widened their wings a bit more by formally 
going into prison treatment and again the health sector had been left out of the 
equation” (Psychiatrist, Interview 4).  
 
Rejection of a Medical Model of Treatment. 
 
There had been some discussion on the use of substitute medication in the 
treatment of drug use in prisons, which would have given a role to the medical 
profession. It was suggested by the Ministry of Justice representative who took 
part in the committee that looked at implementation of the Act.  As per the 
minutes held by the NDDCB Secretariat: 
 
“When the committee was considering the topics of programme, the Chairman 
suggested to eliminate the pharmacological model and multi-disciplinary model 
out of the sub topic 1. As reasons for that he noted, if drugs will be given to the 
patients, prohibited drugs also will come into the scene. Though Mrs…… 
(Ministry of Justice Representative) noted the importance of the 
pharmacological model other members disagreed to use the drugs at the 
treatment centres. Mr….. stated that, some precursor chemicals are included 
both in the permitted drugs and prohibited drugs. Though we use only 
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permitted drugs the addiction can be continued because of that reason. 
Therefore it was decided that, it is not good to use drugs for treatment. Mr….. 
suggested that, the patients should be put to work in full and then they can 
abstain from drug dependence” (NDDCB Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Drug 
Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act No 54 of 2007, held on 
6th August 2008 at 10.30am).  
 
The majority of these committee members maintained a belief in total 
abstinence as the overall treatment goal. This was the standard response to 
any emergent opinion for a medical model to be included which could involve 
substitute or symptomatic prescribing of drugs. Fear was expressed that illicit 
drugs could become available to drug users if medical prescribing was 
permitted.  
 
During the Parliamentary debate on the draft Bill, a Member of Parliament 
identified the need to establish drug treatment within the health sector: 
 
“While it is laudable about the government’s intention to treat and rehabilitate 
drug addicts for the betterment and development of our country, the focus 
should have also been on building the infrastructure and having a proper 
system within identified hospitals to cater towards the treatment needs of drug 
addicts. We should create a system where a drug addict can go into a hospital 
and receive treatment from a doctor. Unfortunately this does not happen in our 
country. This gap should be tackled within our health service and we should 
take steps towards developing the necessary policies and systems” (Hon. R. M 
Pathma Udayashantha Gunasekera, Hansard, 10th October 2007: 1035).  
 
The medical role continued to be marginalised as the management and 
treatment of drug problems became more embedded within the criminal justice 
system. At an organisational level, the role of doctors in the management of the 
drug problem continued to have less significance as policy-makers within the 
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NDDCB defined the drug problem as a social issue within the responsibility of 
an established legal punitive framework.  
 
Conclusion. 
 
The discourse which emerged in the early 1980s regarding drugs as an 
existential threat to national security and sovereignty gradually intensified due 
to the effects of terrorism and its links to drug trafficking, which in turn 
strengthened the principle belief in an absolute prohibition on drugs. The 
NDDCB, together with law enforcement agencies and politicians, had a 
significant influence in shaping the national policy landscape. Policy-making 
inside this milieu became institutionalized within the NDDCB where its 
expertise on matters related to drug control incrementally grew and was 
regarded as a national epistemic community by both national and international 
policy actors.  
 
Strong moral influences prevailed whereby drug use was criminalised and the 
drug user was demonised and these views continued to exist both within and 
outside the NDDCB. These influences existed within a broad Buddhist cultural 
framework where abstinence from drugs was the desired outcome. The 
rehabilitation ideal gained momentum throughout the period under investigation 
as it had the support from politicians, prominent Buddhist monks and the 
NDDCB. Rehabilitation was regarded as a means to instil lost or deteriorated 
morals of behaviour in those who used drugs and was in congruence with 
those who advocated abstinence. 
 
Attempts to define the drug problem as a matter for the health sector were 
endlessly defeated by stakeholders who believed that the drug problem is a 
‘social issue’. Stakeholders predominantly endorsed psychosocial interventions 
as treatment responses located within the criminal justice system. The NDDCB, 
who strongly believed in this approach, widened its remit from policy 
development to include the provision of drug treatment and rehabilitation. The 
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Ministry of Health’s lack of interest in drug treatment and their covert support 
for a punitive response to the drug problem stood in the way of defining the 
problem as a concern for the health sector. The Executive President’s interest 
and involvement in matters related to drug policy and legislation had also been 
a significant driver for the continuity of a penal approach to managing the drug 
problem. 
 
The regulation of drug treatment centres and the introduction of compulsory 
treatment which had been on the policy agenda for a considerable period 
became a policy reality when the government prioritized enacting legislation to 
give effect to the 1988 UN conventions that Sri Lanka was a party to. As trade 
concessions were attached to nations in compliance with the UN drug control, 
enacting legislation to give effect to these conventions gained immediate 
political and policy action as the economic benefits were considered as 
enormous.  
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Chapter Seven: Politics of Drug Policy-Making 
 
Introduction. 
 
This chapter describes the political climate in which drug policies evolved 
during the period under discussion. Consideration is given to the ideologies, 
interests and influence of stakeholders operating at the political level. Particular 
attention will be paid towards the power structures and their association with 
stakeholders who had a keen interest in shaping drug policies. The President’s 
influence on policy-making, particularly to deter drug-related crime, and the 
political rhetoric involved in drug policy-making will be explored.  
 
The relationship between prohibition and the moral underpinning to policy-
making discussed in Chapter Six will be explored from the point of the political 
perspective. It is argued that the legitimisation and continuation of a penal 
approach to managing the drug problem was endorsed by powerful politicians 
and elite stakeholders and was inextricably linked to the need to maintain a 
moral and secure society. However, the role of political groups active in the 
area of drug policy and service provision require examination so as to 
understand their ideological positions and power to influence governmental 
decision-making. Of particular importance is the examination of prominent 
Buddhist monks who have significantly influenced the development of drug 
policies.  
 
The identification and involvement of tobacco and alcohol lobby groups, their 
interests and ideologies in policy development is worthy of study as they set the 
scene for drug policies developed after 2004. It is discussed how and why 
alcohol, tobacco and drugs became political tools in contemporary drug policy-
making. In addition to previous discussions on why a medical conceptualisation 
to the drug problem did not exist, this chapter will explore why a public health 
approach to managing the drug problem did not receive any support and 
describes the factors which allowed elite stakeholders and politicians to 
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maintain the penal approach. Finally, this chapter will conclude by discussing 
how the use of evidence and information was utilised to maintain the policy 
status quo.   
 
Ideological Views held by Elite Stakeholders and Presidents. 
 
The previous chapter described the co-operation and consensus achieved by 
senior staff working in the government: the Executive, Ministries of Defence 
and Justice and the Attorney General resulting in legislative changes to drug 
laws including the introduction of the death penalty for drug-related offences. 
President J.R Jayawardena was the significant force behind the introduction of 
the death penalty for drug-offences in 1984. President Ranasinghe Premadasa 
was instrumental in formulating the first national policy on drugs beginning in 
1994 and maintaining a tough law enforcement approach. Similarly, President 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and President Ranasinghe Premadasa 
had also been keen or seen to be keen on stringent law enforcement. The fact 
that the President, the most powerful politician in the country, had a keen 
interest in, and control over drug policy, is indicative of its importance to the 
core of economic, political and social decision-making. The President was not 
alone in developing drug policies or making executive decisions. In addition, 
the ideologies of the stakeholders, such as civil servants, who came into 
contact with the President had a significant influence in establishing the drug 
policy-making environment and in determining law enforcement as the 
dominant approach to managing the problem.    
 
Following on from the enactment of the national constitution in 1978, the offices 
of President and the Ministry of Defence were established. Law enforcement as 
the method to tackle drug problems became the preferred policy option shared 
by all successive Presidents, although, some intensified enforcement activities 
more than others (Member of Parliament, Interview 13). The NDDCB was 
located within the Ministry of Defence along with the three armed forces (Army, 
Navy and Air Force), Department of Civil Defence, National Cadet Corps, 
Veteran’s Welfare Authority, Sri Lanka Coast Guard, Department for 
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Registration of Persons, State Intelligence Service and the Defence academia. 
During the period under investigation, as per the Sri Lanka Gazette 
Notifications on Ministries and Functions, the portfolio of Minister of Defence 
was held by the President, except on a couple of occasions and for a brief 
period when a Cabinet Minister held this portfolio. Overall, drug policies have 
evolved within a Defence Ministry where national security was the core 
principle. The President was in charge of the NDDCB and Defence Ministry, 
hence drug problems viewed as a significant threat to national security, 
sovereignty and socio-economic development was not surprising as drug 
supply was considered to be part of fund-raising activities by the LTTE. Initially, 
the development of drug policies had been initiated by external stakeholders 
but their continuation became a security concern at national level, by 
association with the ongoing war in the north and east with the LTTE from 
1983. The view that drugs were of concern for national security was 
strengthened and solidified by civil servants who worked closely with the 
President. A civil servant who had been advising one of the Presidents stated: 
 
“As an advisor to the President, we play various roles and it is not just limited to 
the subject of drugs although previously I was appointed as a member of the 
drug control board when I was functioning as the Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defence and therefore had knowledge on the subject matter. Not only this, I 
used to represent Sri Lanka at UN meetings on drug control. So, I was very 
much in tune with the legal requirements. My advice to the President has been 
mainly around law enforcement to combat the drug menace. I believe that we 
should keep the NDDCB within the Ministry of Defence because of narco-
terrorism and the threat we had from the LTTE. It means the President can 
keep a close eye on enforcement. Also, narcotics in general had a huge impact 
on our poverty alleviation programmes” (Civil Servant, Interview 11).  
 
The civil servants working within the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Foreign 
Affairs and the Attorney General's Department influenced the amendments to 
the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance during the early 1980s 
and in the creation of the first national policy on drugs in 1994. They had been 
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influential in establishing the ideology of prohibition in government 
departments, including the office of the President. This significantly helped the 
senior police officer who initiated the amendments later made in the Ordinance. 
 
According to interview data and annual reports produced by the CND following 
meetings with member states, the majority of these civil servants came into 
contact with epistemic drug policy actors representing the Colombo Plan, 
UNODC, US and SAARC when attending CND and Colombo Plan meetings on 
drug control. These international actors, as discussed in Chapter Four, had an 
influence in channelling aid to Sri Lanka. They held the principal belief of 
adopting prohibition and punishment for dealing with drug-related offences. The 
senior civil servants were also aware of some of the pre-conditions for 
obtaining foreign aid to fund development projects, which also became a 
priority for the President in office. Applying a punitive paradigm towards 
managing the drug problem had been beneficial for both external policy actors 
as well as governments when considering the need for funding poverty-
alleviating projects.  This was conveyed by a civil servant as: 
 
“I suppose we needed to check the mood of potential international donors when 
we went to UN and other meetings and this is something we clearly 
communicated to the President as we had a lot of projects and ideas for 
poverty alleviation that needed funding. These donors were mainly interested in 
member states signing up to the UN drug control conventions and 
implementing them locally” (Civil servant, Interview 12).  
 
According to interview data, civil servants holding the senior post of Secretary 
at the Ministry of Defence had close contact with the President when the 
Defence responsibility was included within the office of the President. This was 
particularly the case when the President had also been the Minister of Defence. 
Advice on drug law enforcement had been given to the President by these civil 
servants. Some of them subsequently became presidential advisers, a formal 
position within the Office of the President. Overall, civil servants adhered to the 
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principle belief in prohibition as the goal and the causal view that drug use was 
a barrier to the alleviation of poverty. This belief prevailed throughout all the 
branches of the government departments and the President's Office (Member 
of Parliament, Interview 13). The concurrent war in the north and east with its 
links to terrorism and drug supply can be seen as significant reasons for the 
Ministry of Defence to retain responsibility for the NDDCB from its 
establishment in 1984 as it could continue to be closely monitored from the 
President's office. Furthermore, there were no interest groups or voices that 
lobbied the President about an alternate approach or about shifting the NDDCB 
under a different Ministry. 
 
The Moral Framing of the Drug Issue. 
 
A common view amongst those advising the President on drug policy during 
the period under consideration was their concern with morality, about good 
citizenship and socially accepted behaviours. Consequently there was a moral 
underpinning to the policy-making and political concerns at the time. Their 
moral ideology regarded drugs as dangerous, threatening to cultural values and 
as evil substances that compromise the values in Sri Lankan culture. State 
intervention and tough law enforcement were seen as legitimate responses to 
foster moral and upright behaviour. These presidential advisers believed that 
state intervention was legitimate to protect Sri Lankan culture and national 
progress. Public opinion had also been supportive of this approach as drug 
addiction and dealing were considered to be behaviours compromising the 
moral values of Sri Lankans. Some of the newspaper articles published on the 
topic of drug addiction undoubtedly perpetuated these moral crusades. For 
example, some titles of articles appearing in national newspapers included; 
 
“The scourge of illicit drugs and the insidious socio-economic impacts of drug 
trafficking” Wickremasinghe (2003) The Island Newspaper, Tuesday 4th 
November, 2003.  
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“The twin menace of drug addiction and trafficking” Jayasinghe (2003) Sunday 
Observer, Sunday 22nd June 2003. 
 
“War on drug menace heightened” Jayasinghe (2005) Sunday Observer, 
Sunday 4th December, 2005. 
 
Some newspaper articles were written by retired senior civil servants and lay 
people of prominent standing in Sri Lankan society. The articles used words 
such as ‘dangerous’, ‘scourge’, ‘evil’, ‘pest’, ‘menace’ to describe the drug 
problem. Often, the risks associated with drug use were dramatized in the 
media, how it damages families and familial economy. The suffering in civil 
society due to drug related crime and moral decay had been blamed for many 
unhappy conditions and events in Sri Lanka. Significant hostility towards drug 
dealing and addiction was shown by the morally righteous community who 
described drug problems as the public enemy. A majority of newspaper articles 
justified and supported state intervention to eradicate the drug problem against 
this background.  
 
Presidential Response to Drug-related Crime. 
 
According to the annually published Handbooks of Drug Abuse Information 
from the NDDCB during the period 1995-2007, a steady growth is seen in the 
number of people imprisoned for drug-related offences (See table 5).  
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Table 5: Drug-related prison admissions (Data not available for the year 
1999)   
 
 
When considering the entire prison population, those admitted for drug- related 
offences is the largest single category, averaging 38.6% for the years shown. 
They included both the remand and sentenced population. Although most of 
the enforcement action initially focused on heroin, there was an eightfold 
increase in those admitted for cannabis-related offences.  
 
Enforcement action against cannabis had been incremental and strengthened 
over time, which indicates that equal importance had been given to the arrest 
and processing of cannabis users and dealers as of heroin users and dealers. 
However, there had been calls to be even more stringent on drug law 
enforcement and to exercise capital punishment as a deterrent. Although the 
death sentence for drug-related offences was introduced by President J.R 
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Jayawardena in 1984 as part of legislative amendments made towards the 
Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, its application was symbolic 
as there have been no executions of drug users or traffickers from 1984 to 
2008. However there have been many death sentences passed for drug users 
and for traffickers during the same period (Gallahue and Lines, 2015). When a 
death sentence is issued, the presiding judge states that the person should be 
imprisoned and executed at a time nominated by the President. However, none 
of the Presidents in office have implemented the order, which in effect 
suspends the death sentence effectively to one of life imprisonment. In keeping 
with the line of a tough law enforcement approach, some civil servants have 
petitioned the President that the death penalty should be implemented for drug 
traffickers:  
 
“In line with the law of the land judges sentenced people to death. But it has 
never been implemented since 1976. I also advised (The President) that the 
death penalty should be restored for drug traffickers. I mean they are the big 
guys who corrupt our society and without going for the big guys you can’t cut 
the supply of drugs coming into the market. I think that’s why we haven’t been 
able to wipe out this evil” (Civil Servant, Interview 11). 
 
Advice provided by civil servants to President Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga18 concerning the implementation of the death sentence for drug 
trafficking took place within the broader context of a rising number of drug-
related crimes, violent offences, murder, child abuse and rape within the 
country (Sri Lanka Police, 2005; Jayasundara, 2004). Mainstream political 
parties, the media and some Buddhist clergy also lobbied for tough laws to curb 
the rise of crime and the implementation of the death sentence (Member of 
Parliament, Interview 13).  
 
                                            
18
 President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga served as the fifth President of Sri Lanka 
from 12
th
 November 1994 to 19
th
 November 2005. 
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There had been unanimous support in Parliament for President Kumaratunga 
to pass a resolution in 1995 to implement capital punishment. In 1999, 
President Kumaratunga did implement it by issuing a Presidential 
Proclamation, so it would become a deterrent to organised and serious 
criminals in the country. However, in the face of strong opposition from national 
and international human rights groups, the death sentences have been 
automatically commuted to life imprisonment (Interview data; Asian Centre for 
Human Rights, 2004). In January 2001, the government revoked this decision 
to automatically commute the capital punishment sentence to one of life 
imprisonment.  
 
Implementing the death penalty was raised again following the assassination of 
a prominent High Court Judge Sarath Ambepitiya and his bodyguard on 19th 
November 2004. The deaths were suspected of being an order from a major 
drug trafficker. Justice Ambepitiya had a reputation for his tough verdicts and 
had given a life sentence to a woman who had trafficked drugs on the day of 
his assassination (Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2004). A judge being 
assassinated for the first time in Sri Lanka and the link to a drug trafficker was a 
major political concern due to the implications for state security and the 
independence of the judiciary (Member of Parliament, Interview 13). Afterwards 
President Kumaratunga seized the opportunity to again try to implement the 
death penalty for the crimes of murder, rape and drug trafficking (Asian Centre 
for Human Rights, 2004). Capital punishment for convicted drug traffickers had 
been a politically charged issue and appears to have been associated with 
politicians' perceptions of the will of the electorate. 
 
Political Lobbying. 
 
Drug prohibition was one of the few subjects on which all the major political 
parties in Sri Lanka could all agree as non-partisan government policy. Cabinet 
Ministers and the majority of Members of Parliament both in government and 
opposition agreed on all the major legislative changes enacted by Parliament 
concerning drugs. Although a well-established political party system should 
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encourage debate on proposed drug policies, there were no strong voices or 
opposition within or outside government to follow any course other than 
prohibition. Rather, the President, Cabinet and the Parliament have all 
concurred to maintain or expand tough law enforcement policies. While the 
legitimisation of prohibition was inextricably linked to the need to maintain a 
more moral and secure society, prohibition also served the agenda of politically 
active groups and the electorate (Civil Servant, Interview 11). As mentioned 
before, there were economic imperatives to maintaining strict sanctions against 
drug trafficking and drug use, and attempts to frame the issues in medical 
terms had little success.  
 
The Public as a Stakeholder. 
 
The public, as a stakeholder in the policy-making process, cannot be 
overlooked as their demands to take action to curb the drug problem had 
influenced politicians. Although there is no linear relationship between public 
opinion and drug policy, politicians had been acutely aware of their 
constituents’ attitudes towards drugs. There had been substantial popular 
support in the prohibition of drugs whereby the public had exerted influence on 
the President and some Members of Parliament in maintaining tough law 
enforcement approaches to manage the drug problem. These electoral 
requests had been put forward by Buddhist and Christian priests, professional 
groups and business entrepreneurs whose communities were affected by 
heroin use and dealing (Member of Parliament, Interview 13). They 
emphasised that the activities of organised gangs with links to violent crime and 
drug supply were vices disrupting their local communities. Public requests often 
carried moral overtones and included social and economic concerns. The 
rhetoric of law and order occupied a major position within the political agenda 
due to public requests and might have been used for electoral advantage by 
politicians. Targeting law enforcement in affected electorates had been the 
outcome of some of these public requests. A senior civil servant, describing the 
public demands made on the President stated: 
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“Now I remember there had been a number of requests from people in 
electorates when the President visited them. They were really affected by 
heroin because there was a lot of crime committed by drug addicts. People 
couldn’t even keep their plants or clothes to dry out in their gardens because 
drug addicts stole them to buy heroin or whatever. Those who sold drugs were 
part of the underworld and are violent criminals and they made sure that their 
business was not affected. The President was concerned about her own 
electorate and I remember after a long discussion she instructed the Police to 
conduct raids in her own electorate” (Civil servant, Interview 12).  
 
Similarly, religious leaders had also requested politicians to intervene and curb 
the drug problem. Ananda Dassanayake, Member of Parliament, during the 
Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance Amendment Bill, referring to 
the views held by the clergy stated: 
 
“Deputy speaker, the Davasa Newspaper on 22nd March 1984 alludes to the 
views held by Valpola Rahula, Madagama Vajiragnya and Maduluwey Sobitha, 
Buddhist priests and Father Oswald Gomes on the drug problem. Our clergy 
says that we need to save our children from this dangerous menace” (Ananda 
Dassanayake, Hansard, 22 March 1984: 637).  
 
A Member of Parliament who was interviewed also mentioned a more recent 
request made by some Buddhist monks: 
 
“I remember some Buddhist monks in my electorate coming to see me on my 
public day to talk about the heroin problem. They were helping some families 
affected by heroin through their temples. The breadwinners of these families 
started using heroin and there was no way the families could survive as a 
result. The family home was no longer a safe place for these people to bring up 
their children and the entire village was affected by drugs. I brought what these 
Buddhist monks said to the attention of the local police station” (Member of 
Parliament, Interview 13).  
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Buddhist Monks as Stakeholders. 
 
Buddhist monks have maintained close ties with lay people in Sri Lankan 
society and similarly the state had also kept close ties with the Buddhist monks. 
Presidents and Members of Parliament had listened to popular public requests 
as they have the power to reject failed policies by making their voices heard at 
the polls. Public attitudes towards the drug problem had been utilised by 
elected officials to legitimise government action on prohibition and strengthen 
law enforcement from time to time.  
 
In Sri Lanka, some 70% of the population follow the Buddhist faith and the rest 
are comprised of Hindus, Muslims, and Christians respectively (World Fact 
Book, 2012). Buddhism and prominent Buddhist monks had often played a 
significant role in the political affairs of Sri Lanka as political actors employed 
them to pursue power. As the majority religion, Buddhism had often become a 
powerful symbol for the Sinhala (ethnic) Buddhist (religious) politicians (Imtiyaz, 
2014). Sinhala-Buddhist politicians are divided between the two main political 
parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party 
(UNP). Analysing the behaviours of these two parties suggest that Buddhism 
and prominent Buddhist monks had been used by these two parties in their 
quest for power (Imtiyaz, 2014). In the same way, the role of Buddhist monks, 
particularly those who were involved in active politics, cannot be overlooked in 
contemporary drug policy analysis in Sri Lanka.  
 
Buddhist monks’ active involvement in electoral politics began as early as 1943 
when Migettuvattee Jinananda stood for Colombo Municipality Council election 
(Deegalle, 2004). It had not however been common for Buddhist monks to be 
involved in local or national politics, but they had contested some local as well 
as Parliamentary elections from time to time with little success until 2004. The 
most radical development in monastic involvement in Sri Lankan politics took 
place in 2004 when the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), often approximated in 
English as the National Sinhala Heritage Party, fielded over 200 Buddhist 
monks to contest the Parliamentary elections. Deegalle (2004) states that this 
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was a historic event in south and south east Asia whereby a political party led 
by Buddhist monks were contesting Parliamentary seats. The JHU secured 9 
out of the 225 seats in Parliament, or 6% of the vote. The JHU monks became 
a symbol of Sinhala Buddhist strength within Parliament, gaining an official 
stake in the making of policies and legislations to address contemporary socio-
economic problems.   
 
Although the intention here is not to provide a detailed account on why the 
Buddhist monks entered politics, the main objectives of the JHU require brief 
examination before any perspectives on the role of the JHU in contemporary 
drug policy can be understood. The establishment of a Buddhist state in the 
context of rising crime and moral decay resulting from breaking the five 
precepts of Buddhism was the JHU's prime objective (Deegalle, 2004). Peace 
negotiations with the LTTE at the time were also failing and the JHU was 
unhappy with party politics of the SLFP and the UNP as both parties were 
accused of utilising the ethnic conflict for their political advantage in the south 
of the country. The JHU launched its political manifesto in 2004 in the hope of 
improving the weakened status of Buddhism, which had strong foundations in 
Sinhalese nationalism. The JHU utilised the idealised concept of the 
dharmarajya (a righteous state) which had existed in the ancient Buddhist 
polities of Sri Lanka to their own political advantage (Deegalle, 2004). The 
righteous society was pledged to be built on the five precepts of Buddhism and 
as discussed in previous chapters it included abstinence from the use of 
intoxicants.  
 
Athuraliye Rathana and Dr. Omalpe Sobitha were Buddhist monks who both 
became firm advocates for the JHU and were elected to Parliament in 2004. 
They were staunch activists in propagating the righteous society concept. With 
support from the JHU party members, they strongly believed that intoxicating 
substances such as drugs, alcohol and tobacco resulted in moral decay, which 
was an obstacle to achieving the righteous society (NGO Director, Interview 5). 
The JHU included tobacco due to its resultant health harms, and saw both 
alcohol and tobacco as gateway drugs for young people progressing to use 
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drugs such as heroin and cannabis (NGO Director, Interview 5). The JHU 
commenced a national public campaign highlighting the physical, social and 
spiritual harms caused by drugs, tobacco and alcohol. They were able to attract 
the support of organisations such as the Swarna Hansa Foundation19 and 
Dharmavijaya Foundation20, both supportive of temperance and the righteous 
society ideology. Within this context, the JHU urged the government to take 
legislative action to regulate both the tobacco and alcohol industries, and to 
eradicate illicit drugs from Sri Lankan society. This latter point was a prominent 
part of the JHU’s political rhetoric and attracted public appeal.  
 
Lobbying by Alcohol and Tobacco Policy Stakeholders. 
 
Alcohol and tobacco policy development during the 1980s and 1990s involved 
some individual stakeholders and organisations who were also influential in the 
development of drug policies. These stakeholders who came into contact with 
the President occupied prominent positions within Sri Lankan society and were 
influential in government decision-making processes. The intention here is not 
to provide a detailed account on the nature of alcohol and tobacco policy 
development. However, an awareness of the alcohol and tobacco policy-
making landscape, the ideologies of stakeholders who had a keen interest in 
alcohol and tobacco policies is likely to add meaning and perspective in 
understanding the contemporary drug policy decisions, endorsed or rejected, 
by the President’s office.  
 
During the early 1990s, some temperance supporters believed that the 
activities of the Temperance Movement were happening too slowly to achieve 
their goal of abstinence. Consequently, an appeal was made to President 
                                            
19
 Swarna Hansa Foundation was established in 1979 with the aim of safeguarding the national 
culture while helping people in a discerned development process. It rejected the use of tobacco 
and alcohol as they were seen as obstacles for development.  
20
 The Dharmavijaya Foundation was incorporated by an Act of Parliament in 1979 with the 
objective of total development of man, namely, moral, health, education and economic, in 
accordance with Buddhist principles. 
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Premadasa, requesting a revival of the Temperance Movement (Nanayakkara 
et al., 2013). In response, the President established a special committee to 
inquire into the need for prevention of alcohol and tobacco use in 1992. 
However, the work of this committee came to an abrupt end when the 
President Premadasa was assassinated by the LTTE on 1st May 1993 
(Nanayakkara et al., 2013). Later, in 1997, President Kumaratunga appointed a 
new committee to draft a national policy on tobacco and alcohol. According to 
interview data, this committee consisted of a chair of the NDDCB, some 
medical doctors who had a keen interest in the development of alcohol policies, 
and representatives from the Excise Department, PNB, Police, Ministries of 
Justice, Health, and Education. Its focus was the regulation of the alcohol and 
tobacco industries due to increases in cardiovascular and coronary heart 
disease. The committee's report had approval from the Cabinet and 
concentrated on the elimination of tobacco and alcohol related harm primarily 
by the banning of alcohol and tobacco in advertising and banning obtaining 
sponsorship from the industries for social events and the restriction of supply to 
children and young people under the age of twenty one.  
 
The report produced by the committee pronounced tobacco and alcohol to be 
major public health problems. It recommended the regulation of the alcohol and 
tobacco industries through legislative changes as the solution to eliminating 
alcohol and tobacco related harm. There had been little debate over the care 
and treatment of those who misused alcohol to form part of any coherent 
government policy. Although the prevention of illicit drugs was within the remit 
of this committee, the report stopped short of any different recommendations to 
address the drug problem. As a policy-maker stated: 
 
“I know that Dr…… was a member of the committee (Committed appointed by 
the President on alcohol and tobacco) because he had a lot of interest in the 
alcohol field. At that time he was also the Chairman of the drug control board. 
As far as I can remember doctors fully supported having a national alcohol 
policy because of all the health problems associated with it. I don’t think 
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anything came out from that committee for us here at the drug control board” 
(Policy-maker, Interview, 03).  
 
Although an Act was drafted to enforce the policy directives outlined in the 
committee report towards the late 1990s, there had been a lack in interest and 
priority given to the area of alcohol and tobacco regulation due to interference 
and manipulation by the tobacco and alcohol industries (Nanayakkara, 2013). 
However, it became topical and a policy priority after the JHU lobbied for 
tobacco and alcohol regulation in 2004 as part of their wider political campaign 
to establish a righteous society. It was within this context that the JHU's 
Buddhist monk Dr. Omalpe Sobita tabled a private member’s Bill in Parliament 
in 2005 (National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol Bill, 2005) addressing the 
tobacco and alcohol policy directives outlined in the report produced in 1997. 
He was backed by the same medical doctors who had assertively campaigned 
for both tobacco and alcohol regulation in the late 1990s and the two 
foundations supportive of the Temperance Movement (Policy-maker, Interview 
3). These developments led to the passing of the National Authority on 
Tobacco and Alcohol Act No 27 of 2006 addressing the policy directives 
previously mentioned. It also paved the way for the establishment of the 
National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol (NATA) under the Ministry of 
Health. These developments in the tobacco and alcohol fields and the policy 
actors involved set the scene for drug policies developed after 2005. 
 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Drugs becoming Politicised Tools. 
 
Lobbying had been encouraged by the various professional groups such as 
doctors and lawyers to ensure that their opinions were heard and action could 
be taken to effect introduction or change in public policy in many areas. The 
lobbying was mainly aimed at the President who held the power within the 
Presidency to effect policy change.  Political lobbying reached significant levels 
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during President Mahinda Rajapakse’s21 tenure and there had been demands 
to additionally enact legislation to control tobacco and alcohol. Consequently, 
alcohol, tobacco and drugs continued in the political focus during 2004-2008. 
They had begun to become a political priority primarily due to the JHU’s 
interests in the control and regulation of these substances. The substances 
were regarded as ‘intoxicants’, all under this one heading.  Politicians argued 
that use of intoxicants resulted in the compromise of moral values in Sri Lankan 
society. It was a popular political response by President Mahinda Rajapakse, in 
both addressing the demands of the JHU and the public to respond with 
stringent controls. It is considered that political involvement led to ‘intoxicants’ 
becoming an important topic and to a paradigm shift. Drugs, tobacco and 
alcohol were under the political spotlight, forming part of the presidential 
election manifesto (Mahinda Chinthana, 2005) promising to control  them, an 
approach that had not been rigorously articulated previously by politicians with 
the electorate.    
 
By 2005, the righteous society ideology had gained momentum and was 
perceived by the political elites as having a significant impact on the voting 
public. It had the support of the JHU, prominent Buddhist monks, and 
supporters of the Temperance Movement and the senior medical doctors who 
had been part of the committee established by President Kumaratunga to draft 
the national policy on tobacco and alcohol in 1997. Some of these policy actors 
also represented the NDDCB, Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC) and 
FONGOADA. 
 
President Mahinda Rajapakse formed a coalition with a number of political 
parties and civil society movements to successfully contest the presidential 
election in 2005. The JHU was one of these coalition parties who strengthened 
the righteous society ideology within the political structures in Sri Lanka. 
Rajapakse had addressed the interests of these coalition parties and utilized 
their support in attracting the Sinhala Buddhist vote (Member of Parliament, 
                                            
21
 President Mahinda Rajapakse served as the sixth President of Sri Lanka from 19
th
 November 
2005 to 9
th
 January 2015. 
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Interview 13). This significantly helped him to be elected. The JHU influenced 
his election manifesto, also known as ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ (Mahinda’s vision), 
which addressed the establishment of a righteous society and the interests of 
Sinhala nationalists. Accordingly, ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ placed a substantial 
level of importance on establishing a nation free of illicit drugs. Furthermore, 
areas such as tobacco and alcohol control also gained importance in Mahinda 
Chinthana. As the election manifesto states: 
 
“I will be dedicated to the task of totally eradicating the drug menace presently 
experienced in Sri Lanka. I will do so within a period of three years through a 
co-ordinated effort covering the implementation of laws, the actions of police 
and other social institutions.  
Financial assistance will be extended by the Government to intensify 
educational and awareness programs against the use of drugs. 
Steps will be taken to prohibit consumption of alcohol and cigarettes in 
common public places. 
Government assistance will be accorded to voluntary organisations operating 
counselling centres to rescue and rehabilitate those addicted to alcohol, drugs 
and smoking. Towards this aim model rehabilitation centres will be set up by 
the government covering the entire island” (Mahinda Chinthana, 2005: 4).  
 
This text appeared in the first chapter of Mahinda Chinthana under the title 
‘Towards a Disciplined Society’ whereby the ‘physical and spiritual’ 
development of a person was addressed. ‘Putting an end to the drug menace’ 
formed part of the righteous society ideology, which signifies the political 
importance placed on addressing the drug problem within the country. In his 
election manifesto, President Rajapakse had reiterated the importance of 
having a moral society where rehabilitation was emphasised as a means to 
instil lost or deteriorated morals of behaviour in those who not only used drugs 
but also alcohol and tobacco. The rationale for this blanket approach being 
applied to all these substances is inextricably linked to them being seen as 
‘intoxicants’ which weaken the morals of Sri Lankans and are contrary to the 
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Buddhist precepts (Psychiatrist, Interview 4). The goal of total abstinence from 
‘intoxicants’, was a part of the righteous society ideology. It was politically 
motivated and strengthened by the JHU. As a Member of Parliament explained: 
 
“Athuraliye Rathana’s ideas were behind the development of President 
Mahinda Rajapakse’s election manifesto. He was advising the President on the 
drug issue and he was also behind the ‘Mathata Thitha’ (full stop to intoxicants) 
concept. These are just political slogans as they wanted to win the votes of 
women in villages who were affected by their spouses’ alcohol or drug 
addiction” (Member of Parliament, Interview 13).  
 
‘Mathata Thitha’ became a popular political slogan used by the United People’s 
Freedom Alliance (UPFA), the coalition led by President Rajapakse. It became 
a mantra repeated in the workings of his government, public political meetings 
and messages transmitted to the public by the President’s office, the Ministry of 
Defence, NDDCB and NATA (Member of Parliament, Interview 13). While it 
addressed the concerns of Sinhala female voters in the south, it was also 
aimed at Tamil female voters in the country's midlands. Both groups were 
adversely affected by the influence of the illicit alcohol industry although drugs 
were also perceived as having a greater role to play in the disruption and 
income of families. Accordingly, state intervention for the control of drugs and 
alcohol had public support, particularly from women in rural communities. The 
Mahinda Chinthana (2005) election manifesto promoted the ideology of 
abstinence from tobacco and alcohol use and not just from drugs. Government 
Ministers, the NDDCB and institutions referred to this manifesto message and 
the slogan of ‘Mathata Thitha’. Both had governmental support to be widely 
regarded as official policy and became the means by which the status quo 
could be maintained on one hand and on the other, accepted as having 
populist support. 
 
However, the integrity of the ‘Mathata Thitha’ policy was questioned as 
President Mahinda Rajapakse’s government and preceding ones relied upon 
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the legal alcohol industry as a source of additional revenue for the government 
when there was a shortfall in state financing (Dayaratne, 2011). Similarly 
governments had raised a significant amount of income through the taxation of 
tobacco products. Any action that would significantly reduce government 
income from the legal alcohol and tobacco industries was a major problem 
which compromised the efficacy of the Mathata Thitha slogan. The continued 
issuing of liquor licenses or permits for the sale of alcohol had also questioned 
the sincerity of the government to support its ‘Mathata Thitha’ slogan (Member 
of Parliament, Interview 13). Total abstinence from alcohol, tobacco and drugs 
was merely a political slogan devoid of commitment or action and was merely 
political rhetoric to attract votes and support. However, the Mahinda Chinthana 
election manifesto and the ‘Mathata Thitha’ slogan became the drivers for the 
introduction of many policies. For example, the Tobacco and Alcohol 
Regulation Act 2006 and the creation of NATA, the Drug Dependant Persons 
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 2007, and the update of the First National 
Policy on Drugs in 2006.  
 
The Updated National Policy on Drugs 2006. 
 
The updated national policy on drugs was not in stark contrast with the earlier 
policy published in 1994. It continued to be based on the four pillars; 
enforcement; preventative education and public awareness; treatment, 
rehabilitation and after-care; and international coordination. Although these four 
pillars were slightly different in the updated policy as control over precursor 
chemicals was inserted due to the external influences. While government 
ministers and politicians publicly campaigned for the ‘Mathata Thitha’ slogan 
whereby eradication of drugs in Sri Lankan society became a political mantra, 
the revised national drug policy also stated the following: 
 
“The overall goal of the government in relation to the drug problem is to reduce 
the drug supply and drug use to the barest minimum possibly by 2010” 
(Revised Sri Lanka National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug 
Abuse, 2006:1).  
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This drive to reduce illicit drug use had public appeal and was policy at the 
political level. The inclusion of the above statement in the revised national 
policy on drugs gives some indication of the political will inherent in the 
‘Mahinda Chinthana’ manifesto to be translated into the national policy 
document specific to drugs. It is an indication of creating a society nearly drug-
free, which again has a political focus in keeping with the promise to the voting 
public. These factors further strengthened the continuation of law enforcement 
strategies to control the drug problem and the discourse on abstinence. 
 
The policy update in 2006 can be considered as a hurried response to the 
prevailing political ideologies concerning drugs, alcohol and tobacco. It reflects 
the ideologies of doctors and prominent Buddhist monks and the JHU concerns 
around the establishment of a ‘righteous society’. Applying the blanket 
approach to intoxicants discussed previously, and identifying alcohol as a drug, 
the updated policy states: 
 
“Licit drug use (licit tobacco products, licit alcohol products) should be 
discouraged at all levels. Relevant ministries/local government institutions or 
relevant authorities should discourage licit drug use in public buildings and 
public places. All forms of drug promotion will be discouraged” (Revised Sri 
Lanka National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse, 2006:3). 
 
The policy update was led by the NDDCB and had been influenced by the 
same stakeholders who developed the first national policy on drugs. 
Additionally, although not formally engaged in policy-making, the views of 
prominent doctors who lobbied for tobacco and alcohol control legislations and 
those representing the Temperance Movement influenced the content of the 
updated policy. Once more, the NGO sector involved in drug prevention, 
education and rehabilitation work had not been involved or had a role with 
regards to updating the policy.  
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In addition to political concerns, the updated policy addressed some of the 
short-falls related to sentencing procedures for those who are in remand for a 
drug-related offence. As one civil servant stated: 
 
“The only expert evidence that leads to establish the quantity and that it is a 
narcotic substance is the evidence of the Government Analyst. There is only a 
handful of Government Analysts. You will be surprised to hear that sometimes 
cases are delayed for more than two to three years because the report of the 
Government Analyst is not available. So, the offender is sometimes in custody 
until the report is made available” (Civil Servant, Interview 9).  
 
This had been raised on a number of occasions by the legal profession and by 
middle class families whose relatives had been held on remand for a significant 
period due to delays encountered in preparing drug analysis reports to the 
court by the Department for the Government Analyst (Policy-maker, Interview 
7). The NDDCB believed it was opportune to address this in the updated policy 
in the hope of instigating action by criminal justice agencies to resolve the 
problem.  
 
Public Health Approach. 
 
The means to manage the drug problem had been firmly embedded within the 
criminal justice system since legislation was amended in 1984 and there was 
no shift in later policy during the period under investigation. Any paradigm shift 
away from the criminal justice approach had not been discussed or advocated 
by politicians or the NDDCB who had been influential and had a role in drug 
policy-making, in particular by those directly involved in the treatment and 
rehabilitation of drug users. There are a number of restraining factors which 
stood in the way of framing the drug problem as a public health issue, and in 
balancing public health and national security in order to create healthier and 
safer communities which is a measure of the success of drug policies on drug 
use and on the public’s health. The focus of this next section will be on the 
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prevailing factors for adopting or rejecting a public health approach to 
managing the drug problem. Accordingly, the prevailing ideologies, rationale 
and the role of government and non-government stakeholders who had a keen 
interest in drug demand reduction is worth exploration.  
 
The previous chapters discussed how external policy actors, government 
ministries and departments and the NDDCB supported policies and 
programmes that were managed by the criminal justice system, with abstinence 
as the only goal of drug treatment. Similarly, the FONGOADA, which 
represents a significant number of NGOs involved in the area of demand 
reduction also advocated abstinence. The NGOs falling under the remit of 
FONGOADA are predominantly involved in prevention, drug education and 
rehabilitation programmes. According to interview data, the FONGOADA since 
its inception in 1987 was partly funded and endorsed by the NDDCB and had 
been recognised by the government as the organisation that represents NGOs 
working in the field of drugs. The NDDCB periodically consulted and attained 
support from FONGOADA to implement national drug policies and programmes 
already endorsed by the NDDCB.  
 
The FONGOADA was led by influential people of prominent social standing in 
Sri Lanka who had close relationships with elite stakeholders involved in drugs, 
tobacco and alcohol policy-making. On its executive committee were epistemic 
community members of the NDDCB who functioned as ex-officio members, 
including Buddhist monks involved in delivering drug rehabilitation (Policy-
maker, Interview 8). The FONGOADA had a principle belief in the prohibition of 
drugs and a causal belief that drug use is an obstacle to individual development 
and poverty alleviation. As discussed earlier, these beliefs were initially diffused 
by external policy actors such as the Colombo Plan, SAARC and the UN and 
later accepted by the NDDCB. The Colombo Plan funded study tours and 
awarded scholarships to some members of FONGOADA to learn about drug 
rehabilitation models in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the USA (Interview 
data). This led to the development of a network of NGO representatives who 
later supported the rehabilitation of drug users and the goal of abstinence. 
 204 
 
The idea that drug use is a social problem was widely supported by the NGOs 
falling under the remit of FONGOADA where the prevention of drug use and 
rehabilitation of drug addicts became the main policy responses. This 
concurred and helped the government in maintaining the status quo and the 
continuation of a penal approach to managing the drug problem for over two 
decades since legislation was enacted in 1984 whilst also supporting 
abstinence as the only treatment outcome.  
 
There had been little support and endorsement by the FONGOADA for the 
introduction of harm reduction policies and programmes which supported a 
public health approach. Any NGO supporting the adoption of harm reduction 
policies and programmes had difficulty in obtaining membership of the 
FONGOADA as a gate-keeping role had been adopted to ensure that harm 
reduction was kept off the agenda due to ideological differences. As an NGO 
Director stated: 
 
“In fact quite a number of people asked why we have not been consulted on a 
number of policies. Although they say that FONGOADA represents NGOs quite 
a number of NGOs are excluded. So, this is not inclusive policy-making as 
there has not been a robust consultative approach taken. FONGOADA 
basically wants to follow the government line of approach, not upset anyone in 
the drug control board and not include anyone who believes in harm reduction. 
It is biased towards certain institutions and engages in institutional politics” 
(NGO Director, Interview 1).  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, some of the NGO representatives who diffused 
and advocated for the adoption of harm reduction policies and programmes 
had observed or worked in methadone prescribing clinics and needle exchange 
programmes existing in the UK and USA. They later attempted to introduce 
these practices within the context of a lack of any medical conceptualisation of 
the drug problem in Sri Lanka and the country's medical profession rejection of 
the inclusion of addiction treatment as part of its health service. Their voices 
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were not heard as they were located on the margins of policy-making. In 
general, those who advocated for a harm reduction approach believed that 
drug addiction is a relapsing condition and eradication of drugs in Sri Lanka 
was an unrealistic goal. They believed in applying a more humane criminal 
justice policy which looked at the needs of the drug user: 
 
“We know that with so much of law enforcement over so many decades in 
many different countries, none of the countries have been able to wipe out the 
availability of drugs. Every year in Sri Lanka we have more drugs being seized, 
more drug related prison admissions and more drug addicts reported despite all 
our efforts. So, we have to be realistic with what we can do with the drug 
problem, help drug addicts who are really the victims here and their addiction 
rather than just locking them up in prison or in rehab and think the problem will 
go away” (NGO Director, Interview 1). 
 
The proponents of a drug-free society stated that a harm reduction approach 
would help a drug user retain their addiction through opioid substitute 
prescribing and would send a contradictory message against the prevailing 
prohibitionist policy and goal of total abstinence (Civil Servant, Interview 6). It 
would also conflict with the causal belief that drug use, even in smaller 
quantities, would have a detrimental effect on development and poverty 
alleviation. The official view was that a tough law enforcement approach would 
both reduce the size of the drug market and amount of illicit drug use. In this 
context, the NDDCB and FONGOADA as authoritative groups in drug policy-
making and implementation, united to reduce the influence of interest groups 
who advocated a different drug policy response which would potentially 
threaten the abstinence ideology and status quo. It minimised the opportunities 
for interest groups who advocated on harm reduction to enter the existing 
power and decision-making structures of drug policy-making.  
 
The political and religious environments in which drug policies emerged and 
intensified during President Rajapakse’s tenure, appear to have limited the 
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debate about a harm reduction approach. Of particular importance are the 
policies of the JHU and the coalition government led by President Rajapakse, 
where a righteous society was propagated based on abstinence from all 
intoxicants and how this would conflict with the principles of harm reduction. 
Some policy-makers believed that any proposal on harm reduction in this 
context would result in immediate rejection by the political leadership as it 
would be contrary to the revised national policy on drugs and the ‘Mahinda 
Chinthana’ manifesto: 
 
“I don’t think it would have been possible to introduce things like needle 
exchange schemes or even methadone prescribing in Sri Lanka in this very 
sterile religious environment. I can imagine hissy fits thrown by some of our 
clergy involved in politics taking their protests to the streets for something like 
this. This will immediately get the backs up of our politicians. Also, harm 
reduction would be totally against what’s said in the election manifesto and the 
recently revised national policy” (Psychiatrist, Interview 2). 
  
Less harmful ways of drug use were regarded as promoting evil, illegal and 
immoral activities. Any message against abstinence and an introduction of 
harm reduction policies and programmes would be routinely rejected in 
particular by powerful Buddhist monks who were staunch supporters of 
abstinence. The principles inherent within a public health approach to 
managing the drug problem were not compatible with the prevailing moral, 
political and religious ideologies that were endorsed by the coalition 
government. Additionally, there was no significant, legitimate and sufficiently 
strong opposition able to enter into the existing power structures to advocate on 
an alternative approach such as harm reduction.  
 
Politics of Evidence and Information on the Drug Problem. 
 
There is little robust scientific evidence regarding the extent and nature of the 
drug problem and policies in Sri Lanka. Hence, this makes it difficult to report 
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on the use of valid data which would inform the development of drug policy. 
However, official use is made of what data is collected and it is argued that this 
paucity serves to sustain the existing policy and practices. Of particular 
significance is how the evidence and information published in national 
documents such as the annual Handbook of Drug Abuse Information 
(Handbook) and national HIV/AIDS Strategy documents frame the drug 
problem and how this changes or endorses the continuation of prevailing 
policies.  
 
The Handbook has been published annually by the NDDCB since 1991. 
Significant data it collects and publishes includes: 
 Prevalence of drug use  
 Figures of the legal consumption of opium and cannabis by Ayurveda 
Drug Corporation; 
 Drug related arrests;  
 The amount of drug seizures, price and purity; 
 Drug related prison admissions; 
 Numbers of admissions to rehabilitation centres; 
 Reported cases of HIV and AIDS.  
 
Additionally, the Appendix of each Handbook contains: 
 Basic socio-economic details of Sri Lanka; 
 Up-to-date national drug policy; 
 A summary of legislation pertaining to drugs;  
 The role of government agencies involved in drug control; 
 The international drug control conventions Sri Lanka had signed; 
 A list of the drug reports submitted to the INCB or CND by the NDDCB 
on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis.  
 208 
 
Although the Handbook contains some information on the characteristics of 
those who underwent rehabilitation, it lacks comprehensive information on the 
outcomes of rehabilitation, any adverse consequences related to drug use such 
as overdoses, drug related deaths, hepatitis C and the sharing of needles and 
syringes. 
 
The Handbook functions as the main source of information related to the 
subject of drugs that is endorsed by the government and available to the public. 
It has a wide circulation; a copy is distributed by the NDDCB to government 
departments and ministries (Policy-maker, Interview 3). On application to the 
NDDCB, copies are also sent to NGOs working in the field of drugs. 
Considering the limited amount of information published on the drug problem 
by parties outside of the NDDCB, the public regarded the Handbook as a 
credible source of information that accurately describes the country’s drug 
problem, particularly as it is published by the government (NGO Director, 
Interview 1). However, there has been contention with regards to some of the 
information published in the Handbook particularly concerning the prevalence 
of drug use within Sri Lanka.  
 
Disagreement over the number of drug users existed within professional groups 
who represented penal and medical agencies and had a keen interest in drug 
control, some having represented the NDDCB in an ex-officio capacity 
(Psychiatrist, Interview 4). As discussed previously, a Colombo Plan expert 
from Malaysia estimated 133,060 to 164,940 people using cannabis in 1980 
(Spender and Navarathnam, 1981). At that time heroin had not entered the 
local drug market to a level that concerned policy-makers. Later, the PNB 
estimated there were 100,000 heroin and 200,000 cannabis users in 1999 
(Xinhua News Agency, 1999). An outreach study conducted jointly between the 
NDDCB and UNDCP estimated 40,000-50,000 heroin users in 2001 (UNDCP, 
2001). It is believed that the number of cannabis users in the country far 
exceeds the figure quoted by the government (Police officer, Interview 14). 
There had been no attempts to estimate the number of cocaine and other 
stimulant users in the country as this was considered to be small and not 
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requiring a response (Policy-maker, Interview 3). Analysing the data contained 
in the Handbook from 1996 until 2004, a figure of 40,000 heroin and 200,000 
cannabis users has been maintained as a constant figure. A psychiatrist who 
disagreed with the government's endorsed recurring figures on prevalence 
estimates stated that: 
 
“For so many years the Handbook of drugs has been saying that there are only 
40,000 heroin users and 200,000 cannabis users in the country. We have been 
challenging that there’s more drug users in the country. I think the police 
narcotics bureau claims a much higher figure. That is based on the number of 
arrests and drugs being confiscated. But neither the PNB nor the NDDCB have 
an idea about epidemiology. If you really add up all the people who are in 
treatment centres, and then all the people who are in prison, because they say 
half the prison population are drug addicts, I think the figure will be much 
higher. Then, how about drug addicts who don’t come into prison or treatment 
or those who don’t get arrested? There must be a formula that can be used to 
do this in a more scientific way. I think the drug using population is much higher 
than the figure quoted. The drug control board has always downplayed this 
aspect may be because they didn’t want to send a bad signal to the UN and 
foreign organisations who are thinking of investing in Sri Lanka” (Psychiatrist, 
Interview 4).  
 
Similarly, there had been discrepancies in the prevalence of injecting drug use. 
The World Bank estimated that 2% of drug users injected drugs in Sri Lanka 
(World Bank, 2000). The Handbook had always maintained that less than 1% 
inject drugs and that there are no HIV cases related to injecting drug use. The 
medical profession working in HIV and AIDS and the national HIV/AIDS policy-
makers both believed that HIV arising from injecting drug use is a non-existent 
phenomenon due to a low prevalence of injecting (National STD/AIDS Control 
Program, 2001; Interview data). Later in 2007, the National HIV/AIDS Strategic 
Plan stated that 4% of drug users inject drugs (National HIV/AIDS Strategic 
Plan 2007), which is double the WHO estimate and four times more than what 
had been estimated by the NDDCB. Overall, the conclusion arrived at by the 
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NDDCB on the prevalence of injecting drug use and HIV had been based on 
anecdotal evidence and from investigating the patterns of drug use among 
those admitted to drug rehabilitation centres. A police officer who disagreed 
with the above stated: 
 
“They (NDDCB) have been saying that there’s only 1% of the drug using 
population who inject drugs for the last 15 odd years. How can it be 1% when 
there has been an increase in the number of drug addicts and fluctuating prices 
of a gram of heroin? Figures from rehab centres are not representative of all 
drug users. I don’t think there are a lot of people who inject drugs in Sri Lanka 
like in India or Pakistan. But, surely you can’t keep saying it’s less than 1% for 
many years?” (Police officer, Interview 14).  
 
A study conducted about heroin users in the early 1990s, which included drug 
users not attending treatment centres, found that the prevalence of injecting 
drug use had increased from 1% in 1988 to 13% in 1992 (Kandiah, 1994). The 
same study revealed that injecting drug users were having unprotected sex 
with multiple partners, had high rates of needle and syringe sharing and used 
multiple drugs, such as benzodiazepines and alcohol. The conclusion of this 
study was that injecting drug users were at high risk of contracting HIV. 
Although this study was supported by the NDDCB, it did not feature in the 
Handbook or receive any public response. Policy-makers continued to believe 
that injecting practice in the drug using population was an insignificant number 
during the period under investigation.  
 
In addition to discrepancies in the prevalence data, drug usage was described 
in the Handbook as a relatively small and reasonably well-contained problem 
compared to most other countries in the south Asian region. There were no 
other credible or legitimate documents or research produced by agencies 
outside of the NDDCB to dispute this picture. Concerns were voiced by some 
professionals such as doctors but did not attract significant attention 
(Psychiatrist, Interview 4). The perceived absence of any crisis or any growth in 
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the number of opioid users, coupled with an absence of many injecting drug 
users were factors which refuted the need to introduce opioid substitute 
prescribing and needle and syringe exchange programmes: 
 
“The heroin problem in the country is not a major issue as we have a small 
number of heroin addicts and a very tiny group of injecting drug addicts. 
Therefore, we are not interested in introducing methadone or syringe 
exchanges here. But in the future if we are faced with an injecting heroin 
problem, then we may have to consider these. The current problem can be 
addressed by rehabilitation and counselling programmes” (Civil Servant, 
Interview 6).  
 
Hence it was believed that the existing policies were sufficient and a radical 
shift in policy was not required. Framing the drug problem in this light at 
national level had also helped relations with external parties such as the INCB. 
A policy-maker who had an interesting view on measuring the success of 
existing drug policies stated: 
 
“As required we have produced our country reports to the INCB on a regular 
basis. Once the legislation is in place they are concerned about looking at our 
arrest figures, drug seizure figures, number of people in prison and in treatment 
and so on. We collated all these stats and sent them to the INCB using the 
standard templates we use for reporting. It was important to show that we had 
a handle on this through our reporting. The INCB is pleased with our progress. 
So to that extent, the current drug policy is working” (Policy-maker, Interview 8). 
It had been important for national policy actors to describe the drug problem as 
being both well contained and managed so as to satisfy external organisations. 
This success was chiefly based upon information reported by drug law 
enforcement agencies (Interview data). The success of drug treatment 
outcomes had been limited to reporting on the number of drug users entering 
treatment, without any inclusion of information on those successfully 
completing treatment, follow up studies and relapse rates. 
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The content of the Handbook had helped maintain the continuation of existing 
policy and the ideological view of the NDDCB and the influential policy actors. 
Similarly, information submitted to the INCB, in describing the drug problem as 
a well-managed one also helped maintain the status quo, as a reported drug 
epidemic could potentially attract pressure on Sri Lanka to respond accordingly. 
Maintaining this position was favourable for attracting foreign funds for the 
country’s developmental work and so as not to deter investment. It was 
believed that any uncontrolled drug problem would have an enormous negative 
impact on development and poverty alleviation funding programmes (Civil 
Servant, Interview 9). Statistics and information used on the nature of the drug 
problem helped the NDDCB and the government to maintain the prevailing 
drug policies at national level without any denunciation from external policy 
actors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Civil servants, prominent Buddhist monks, alcohol and tobacco lobby groups 
and the public are identified as key stakeholders in drug policy. Their influence 
with the President and the legislature has been significant in determining the 
nature and course of drug policies which emerged during the study period. 
Stakeholders framed the drug problem within security, economic and moral 
perspectives. Drugs were an important subject for both the national interest and 
the elite decision-makers, and by implication both determined the course and 
outcome of policies. The divergent interests of stakeholders and their advice 
provided to elite decision-makers on the management of the drug problem were 
contextualised within a normative framework whereby drugs were seen as a 
threat to national security, socio-economic development and morality. The 
proximity of stakeholders to elite decision-makers and their political interests 
had a significant impact on determining policy outcomes.   
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
Introduction. 
 
Sri Lankan drugs policy has adopted a punitive approach based on a criminal 
justice response model as opposed to treatment, social welfare or a public 
health orientated model. The approach to managing the drug problem shifted 
from a laissez-faire system that existed prior to the study start date to one that 
is based on stringent law enforcement. This policy response resulted in a large 
number of drug users and traffickers being incarcerated in prison and has 
largely been consistent over the period studied. Attempts have been made to 
challenge the criminal justice model with limited success. A number of 
economic, political and social factors have combined to sustain the criminal 
justice model and ward off attempts to introduce a system with a stronger focus 
on treatment and public health.  
 
This final chapter will synthesise and analyse the findings and key issues 
discussed previously with a particular focus on drug policy origin and 
development, the key stakeholders and the role of international organisations 
and epistemic communities. Some of the themes discussed overlap due to their 
inter-connectedness and the presence of cross-themes. The usefulness of the 
conceptual framework applied to explore drug policy development will be 
revisited, particularly in regard to the integration of epistemic community theory 
with stakeholder analysis in order to understand the dynamics of decision-
making and policy transfer. Documents become actors in the policy-making 
process and the researcher explains how they influenced policy change and 
have helped to maintain a penal approach. The chapter then discusses the 
study limitations, contributions of this research, policy developments 
subsequent to the study period and future directions for drug policy and 
research in Sri Lanka. 
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Stability in Policy Approaches. 
 
The stability in policy approaches and a lack of innovation underpinned the 
continuation of the criminal justice model. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
drug policies were developed by a small group of policy actors who had 
simultaneous responsibility for defence, economic, health, foreign, criminal 
justice, tobacco and alcohol policies. Generally these actors have been from 
elite groups and individuals linked to the political arena and to international 
networks. They established effective working relationships with the Presidents, 
were influential in framing and defining the drug problem, and legitimising 
policies and practices for its management. Membership of this group has 
generally remained stable throughout the period of this study. This, coupled 
with their high level of interest in the subject of drugs and their connections with 
international epistemic communities, explains the development of their 
consensual knowledge-base over time, despite members also moving between 
government offices and occupying many roles. This consensual knowledge-
base was not limited to actors occupying positions within the NDDCB. As 
stated by Haas (1992:10), epistemic actors are located across different 
organisations and this is based on ‘where they stand’ as opposed to ‘where 
they sit’; in other words, their beliefs and knowledge of the drug problem 
mattered more than any organisational position they occupied. Their working 
was dominated by a penal agenda focusing on legal and penal reforms relating 
to drug control and with a health sector displaying limited interest and accepting 
little responsibility to help manage the drug problem.  
 
According to Haas (1992), epistemic communities are networks of 
professionals or expert individuals with shared analytical and normative beliefs 
about a particular issue. Its application to the study of drug policy in Sri Lanka 
helps to explain how consensual knowledge can influence policy during 
uncertain times. As discussed in Chapter Five, the advent of narco-terrorism 
and a new heroin epidemic raised uncertainties. The decision-makers turned to 
experts for help to deal with the drug problem. The experts were a 
knowledgeable group of professionals, initially instigated by international 
 215 
 
epistemic communities. The national experts later went on to become a part of 
an international epistemic undertaking that had a principle belief in prohibition 
and shared consensual knowledge on drugs being a threat to national security 
and socio-economic development. This shared knowledge was imperative for 
providing the rationale for the subsequent development of policy, creating and 
maintaining a normative framework for policies to emerge, particularly the 
decisions on drug policies which needed the support of the Presidents and 
other major decision-makers.  
 
The stability in the approaches to drug treatment also supported the 
maintenance of the criminal justice model. Rehabilitation had popular support 
as it did not conflict with the principle belief in prohibition or the causal belief 
that drug use was an obstacle to socio-economic development and a drug-free 
society. Any opportunity for the development of alternative treatment models 
and the growth of a variety of treatment providers was limited. Drug demand 
reduction programmes were limited to drug education and rehabilitation. The 
collective power of the NDDCB and the NGO sector through coalition and 
consensus building ensured the continuation of this whole approach. Chapter 
Seven argued how the NDDCB and FONGODA were mutually supportive in the 
maintenance of the established normative framework and rejected any other 
drug treatment policies emerging.    
 
Chapter Six discussed that any national stakeholders who confronted the 
existing abstinence-based treatment model had little success in introducing a 
public health approach. Similarly, Chapter Five discussed that international 
epistemic communities’ influence to introduce harm reduction programmes 
were also rejected. Primarily, both groups of stakeholders believed in 
prohibition and drugs becoming an obstacle to socio-economic development. 
Although a general world-view of the drug problem was shared, divergent views 
existed between the national and international epistemic communities 
concerning drug control. The activities of the national epistemic community 
occurred within a circumscribed context as prohibition was the core belief and 
any challenges to it resulted in non-policy transfer. In these circumstances the 
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country’s drug problem was often re-framed as being well contained, as not 
reaching crisis levels and it did not have a significant number of injecting users 
in comparison to neighbouring countries. This representation of national 
consensus mitigated against external influences on harm reduction and their 
policy transfer. 
 
Policy Actors and their Dynamics. 
 
The thesis argued that individuals and groups involved in the policy and 
decision-making processes, the development of institutional structures and the 
dynamics between national and international policy actors also served to 
sustain the penal approach and status quo. The individuals, who formed the 
first national committee on drugs in 1973, adopted a common policy enterprise. 
The majority of individuals from this group continued to engage in drug policy 
making throughout the study period, although legal and law enforcement 
professionals dominated the policy-making landscape. Existing legislation 
needed amendment in order to add penal sanctions and ensure that the long-
standing lenient system that resulted in a high acquittal rate for drug related 
offences ended. As previously discussed, the focus of international epistemic 
communities had been to establish international co-operation to curb the illicit 
trade in narcotic drugs and cannabis and encourage Sri Lanka to adopt UN 
drug control conventions, in agreement with other countries. The continued 
involvement of legal and law enforcement professionals in policy-making is 
inextricably linked to the problem being framed by national and international 
epistemic actors within the responsibility of the criminal justice system with 
requirement for an enforcement response and changes to legislation.  
 
Haas (2001) argued that new ideas and knowledge in addressing social 
problems can provide new systems for the understanding and interpretation of 
policy, which then can create new institutional processes and frameworks. 
Amendments made to the Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 
1929 in 1984, marks the political legitimisation of the UN drug control 
conventions Sri Lanka had agreed to. Subsequently, law enforcement 
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professionals were placed at the forefront of implementing drug legislation as 
they met many drug users by virtue of their new role. This significantly 
enhanced their professional competence and authoritative claim to define the 
drug problem and acquire policy-relevant knowledge particularly with the arrival 
of the new heroin epidemic in the 1980s. The links and proximity of law 
enforcement elites to the Presidents determined their level of influence in 
decision-making processes and partly explains the continuation of the criminal 
justice model.  
 
The establishment of the NDDCB in 1984 marks the attempt to depart from ad 
hoc policy-making and place it within a focal organisation as this was 
imperative for epistemic communities and the Sri Lankan government. The 
Board’s initial responses to the drug problem largely consisted of some legal 
and penal reforms. Although their remit included policy formulation and co-
ordination of all drug control activities, their scope was extended to include drug 
treatment and rehabilitation in community and prisons and the regulation and 
inspection of drug treatment facilities. The continued legitimacy of the NDDCB 
and expansion of its scope is associated with it becoming the ‘expert national 
organisation’ concerning drug control. The inclusion of multi-agency 
representation on the Board acknowledged that law enforcement alone was 
unable to provide a total solution to the drug problem and underlined the need 
to work in partnership. 
 
The reputation of the NDDCB was high as it was usually led by lawyers, 
reputed personnel from law enforcement backgrounds or doctors, all highly 
regarded. They had access to elite decision-makers as well as the political 
system to legitimise and authorise their activities. Additionally, social and 
political support given to the NDDCB was closely linked to the idea that their 
activities would enhance human welfare rather than any sectional interest. With 
growing expertise, the NDDCB was accepted as having authority by national 
and external organisations, due to the liaison role the NDDCB had with external 
stakeholders in ensuring conformity of drug control activities with other 
countries. The official role awarded to the NDDCB from its publication of 
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various national and international drug reports meant that knowledge about the 
problem and possible solutions clustered around this focal organisation. It 
existed within the context of limited information and research being published 
by parties outside the NDDCB and the lack of any sufficiently strong and 
legitimate organisation to challenge its authority. 
 
Another important area is the Presidents’ keen interest and control over drug 
policies as discussed in Chapter Seven. This indicates the importance drugs 
had in the heart of the political, social and economic decision-making. Drug 
policies also emerged when national interests such as security, socio-economic 
development and political welfare were involved, and by implication again 
became a concern for the Presidency. Civil servants and legal and law 
enforcement personnel who worked closely with the Presidents endorsed the 
ideology of drugs being a threat to national security, socio-economic 
development and moral hygiene. They also acted as conduits between the 
Presidents, government and other nations' governments on matters related to 
drugs, foreign and defence policies, including the workings of SAARC. Their 
importance and proximity to the President determined their influence on drug 
policy. 
 
The normative framework presented by the national epistemic community 
legitimised Presidential involvement and state intervention to adopt a tough law 
enforcement approach to the drug problem. Whilst this was largely in 
congruence with international interests and addressed national concerns, drugs 
were also used as a political tool in balancing the political power structures. 
Prohibition served the agenda of politically active groups and the electorate 
thus maintaining keen interest from the Presidents. This can be argued as a 
political exercise in pursuit of power. The politicisation of drugs peaked during 
President Rajapakse’s tenure as political stakeholders propagated the 
‘righteous society’ concept which re-endorsed the criminal justice approach. 
The centre of power lies with the Presidency so the effect of public policy 
change has largely been important in sustaining the penal approach.  
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Consensus Policy. 
 
Overall there had been strong consensus among Presidents, political parties, 
government ministries and departments, the NDDCB, and prominent Buddhist 
monks on the responses of drug prohibition and stringent law enforcement. The 
prohibition ideology was strong where it had been used in arguments over the 
implications for national security, socio-economic development and moral 
hygiene. Consensus policy-making is partly grounded in the truth tests or 
consensual knowledge epistemic communities diffused in framing the drug 
problem and in the establishment of the normative framework for policies to 
emerge. This knowledge became accepted belief among the majority of 
stakeholders, extending beyond the small group of drug policy experts and elite 
decision-makers. 
 
Consensus in drug policy approaches was also reinforced by Buddhist 
precepts.  Abstention from intoxicants was key to policy stakeholders who 
advocated on the path to a righteous and developed society. Moral values 
drawn from Buddhism strongly influenced this consensus formation. This was 
also noted in the history of drug policy-making, especially during the British 
colonial period when national stakeholders lobbied against the government’s 
policy on opium in a predominantly Buddhist society. Similar sentiments 
peaked towards the 2008 period due to political coalitions and consensus 
formed between prominent Buddhist monks, those in government office and 
political parties. The religious-moral model of drug policy-making was further 
solidified during this period and had consensus across government and non-
government organisations. This was also partly influenced by policy-makers 
who coincidentally happened to be staunch Buddhist devotees who occupied 
influential and insider positions in policy-making. Furthermore, the temperance 
ideologies were promoted by the same stakeholders who influenced 
consensual formulation of contemporary drug policies.  
 
While gaining consensus inside the country, the national epistemic community 
additionally built strong agreement with external stakeholders based on the 
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interpretation of the prohibition aspects of the UN drug control conventions. At 
south Asian level, the principle belief in prohibition and the causal belief in 
drugs becoming an obstacle to socio-economic development underpinned this 
consensus formed with SAARC. It occurred against the background of securing 
funds for the country’s developmental work from external organisations or their 
affiliates. The economic, political and social context was important not just for 
Sri Lanka but for SAARC membership countries in their development of drug 
policies. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, one significant legitimising factor for countries in 
the SAARC region to endorse prohibition and the SAARC convention on drugs 
was narco-terrorism and the threat it posed to nations. The Sri Lankan 
delegation to SAARC successfully framed the drug trafficking problem as a 
threat to national security based upon its experience with narco-terrorism. As 
Haas (1992:23) argued ‘epistemic communities focus on reaching consensus 
within a given domain of expertise and through which the consensual 
knowledge is diffused to and carried forward by other actors’. This partly shows 
the social construction of the drug problem in Sri Lanka had an influence on 
SAARC member countries with the diffusion of consensual knowledge. It 
demonstrates the political influence that an epistemic community can have on 
collective policy-making, in this instance, in the SAARC region. The consensus 
emerging from new knowledge ensured cooperation among member states to 
deal with the trafficking problem as efforts at policy coordination were 
successful. However, it is argued that the exposure of national stakeholders to 
this regional consensus through the workings of epistemic communities, helped 
the SAARC to retain the criminal justice model in Sri Lanka through the 
influences of collective policy-making. 
 
External Influences. 
 
The thesis argues that external influence has played a significant role in the 
development of drug policies in Sri Lanka. Chapter Four described the 
historical external influences and use of knowledge experts to legitimise and 
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support policy decisions taken by colonial administrators to regulate opium and 
cannabis. The resultant policy decisions were the outcome of the interaction 
between the external influences and the moral, economic, social, cultural and 
political debates which prevailed in framing the drug problem and its solutions 
within Sri Lanka.  
 
The development of contemporary drug policy has not been dissimilar as 
governments have used universal norms and principles on drug control to 
address national concerns and legitimise policy decisions. However, ideas 
diffused by international epistemic communities were not rapidly embraced to 
become national policy. International epistemic networks propelled the problem 
of controlling drugs onto the national political and policy agenda, eventually 
influencing the development of subsequent policies and their outcomes 
throughout this study period. Delays in enacting legislation to give effect to the 
UN drug control conventions Sri Lanka was a signatory to is an example of a 
cumulative impact following external pressure. External practices were 
translated into national policy only when the ‘conditions were right’ and 
legitimised with national interests and primacies.   
 
In their study of external influences of national drug policies in four European 
countries, Beccaria et al., (2015) stated that their examples were unable to 
prove direct imposition of policy or legislation by external stakeholders. In 
contrast, analysis of Sri Lankan drug policy provides evidence of external 
pressure and coercion applied to enact UN drug control conventions. The 
amendments to the Poison, Opium and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance of 1929 in 
1984 and the introduction of the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act No 1 of 2008 were, undoubtedly, the 
outcomes of external pressure and coercion. This highlights that different 
dynamics might apply in non-western settings as financial and other resources 
granted to a developing country can be made subject to the implementation of 
a number of UN conventions. 
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In this context, the criminal justice approach to managing drug problems was 
partly determined by external pressures. Epistemic communities help define 
national interests with a particular focus on security and development. This 
became relevant and acceptable only as a result of evidence emerging on the 
link between ‘narco-terrorism’ and its threat to national security and 
sovereignty. The continued acceptance of this threat discourse due to the long- 
standing civil war solidified and strengthened the continuity of drug policies 
primarily located within the criminal justice system.  
 
As discussed before, the epistemic community theory attempts to explain the 
role played by knowledge experts in articulating the cause and effect 
relationships of uncertainties and complex problems. It helps governments 
identify their interests, frame the issues for collective action, recommend 
specific policies and ideas for negotiation to advance human welfare. The 
uncertainty-reducing role that is distinctive to an epistemic community was 
executed by the UNCND and Colombo Plan as evidence emerged over the link 
between drug trafficking and terrorism, and the growing heroin epidemic as a 
result of leakage into the local drug market. Against this background, the 
international epistemic community diffused the idea that drugs are a global 
problem and that international cooperation is a more effective decision to deal 
with the trafficking problem, particularly considering Sri Lanka’s strategic 
geographical location. Drug trafficking as a threat to national security had been 
propagated as a causal idea arising from the lack of sufficient controls. 
Epistemic actors helped engage and achieve consensus with the Sri Lankan 
government in order to address a number of areas identified in UN drug control 
conventions, although national stakeholders initially believed that the ownership 
of the drug trafficking problem should belong to opium producing nations.  
 
Exposure to international epistemic communities helped civil servants, legal 
and law enforcement professionals agree that the management of a new heroin 
threat needed more enforcement and international cooperation. As part of this 
exposure and learning, consensual knowledge about the drug problem 
developed. Similarly, the Colombo Plan's well-established role in helping 
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member-states with socio-economic development was crucial in diffusing the 
idea that drug use is an obstacle to socio-economic development. 
Acknowledging the benefits of this learning, Cabinet Ministers and Members of 
Parliament who had been working closely with civil servants claimed in 
Parliament that drugs were a threat to security, sovereignty and socio-
economic development. This led to stringent law enforcement having 
unquestioned political legitimacy.  
 
The recent shift to include treatment and rehabilitation, which is somewhat 
more inclusive of health issues can also be attributed to external influences. It 
arose out of national policy actors’ interaction with international epistemic 
communities. This prompted the development of drug treatment and 
rehabilitation policies and programmes when there had been internal and moral 
debates on the care and treatment of drug users. The responses emerged 
within an established dominant penal framework and in the absence of any 
binding international instrument to guarantee the nature and type of drug 
treatment service provision. Thus, the country kept its freedom to adopt its own 
approach to treatment and rehabilitation. As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
main criteria to obtain foreign aid was only restricted to giving effect to the UN 
conventions on drug control, particularly enforcement aspects and reporting of 
data on supply-reduction initiatives to the INCB. Only recently did the 
implementation of human rights conventions and the establishment of good 
governance frameworks become additional pre-conditions for grant aid.   
 
The CPDAP’s authority was further approved with its provision of help to 
develop drug demand-reduction policies and programmes in addition to the 
usual supply reduction initiatives. Their knowledge brokering role and support 
with organising and funding study tours, conferences and workshops on drug 
control for national policy stakeholders significantly contributed towards the 
development of a group of informed national experts on drug treatment and 
rehabilitation. However, the continuing development of only abstinence-based 
drug treatment systems in Sri Lanka, including compulsory treatment, is partly 
explained by CPDAP exercising a conservative approach, exposing and 
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socialising national stakeholders to abstinence-based treatment systems as 
opposed to other treatment models. This gate-keeping and knowledge-filtering 
role demonstrates the dependency and drawback of a prohibitionist-only 
framework. 
 
There has been a less significant role for external knowledge experts or 
epistemic communities in shaping drug control policies towards the latter part of 
the chosen study period. This was linked to the view that the drug problem was 
reasonably controlled, prevailing policies were able to address the drug 
problem, and the absence of any crisis warranting the involvement of external 
experts. By this time, a small group of national knowledge experts in drug 
control policies existed and represented legal, penal, medical and non-
governmental organisations. In other words, the level of uncertainty in 
managing the drug problem was significantly reduced due to the growth and 
presence of a national epistemic community when compared to the early 1980s 
when heroin was new to the Sri Lankan drug market and drug trafficking was 
extensive. National experts involved in contemporary drug policies believed 
that stringent law enforcement and the rehabilitation of drug users should be 
the main policy responses.  
 
Although the role for external epistemic communities was less significant 
around the 2008 period, external influence on national drug policies continued. 
Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, drug policies were influenced and co-located with 
a number of international instruments that Sri Lanka had been party to, namely 
human rights and good governance conventions. Granting of foreign aid and 
trade concessions on exports to the European Union had been subjected to the 
implementation of the recently internationalised human rights and good 
governance frameworks at local level. Coercive methods of policy transfer took 
place, particularly when the beneficiary status of the GSP tax concession 
scheme was subjected to the ratification and implementation of core 
international conventions related to human and labour rights and good 
governance. The 1988 United Nations Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs, which had not been implemented by the Sri Lankan government, was 
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co-located with the above mentioned non-drug specific international 
conventions. During this time, economic debates prevailed at national level 
whereby the GSP scheme was considered a significant contributor towards Sri 
Lanka’s economy, by increasing exports to the EU market. These economic 
concerns had implications both for the national economy and formed part of the 
international relations agenda. They combined and significantly influenced 
coercive forms of policy transfer, distinct from the negotiated forms of policy 
transfer that took place in earlier phases of drug policy development. 
 
Documents as Actors. 
 
References had frequently been made to international drug control conventions 
by the legislature, NDDCB and other government departments and ministries, 
which suggest that they formed part of governmental social life. As discussed in 
Chapter Three on research methodology, Prior (2008) argued that documents 
extend beyond being only a source of data and can be viewed as actors 
becoming part of organised activities instigating further action. The thesis 
argues that international documents on drug control performed a quasi-actor 
role alongside the epistemic workings of human policy actors and instigated 
national action to determine the direction of drug policy. International drug 
control documents linked people together and promoted policy coordination. 
New relationships were created within and between national and international 
policy actors where conformity to UN drug control documents became one of 
the founding principles. 
 
The UN and the SAARC conventions on drug control had often been referred to 
in Hansard as instruments that the country has an obligation to comply with. 
Similarly, when considering inter-textuality between drug policy documents, the 
first national policy on drugs in 1994 followed by the updated policy in 2006 
refer to the UN conventions and the CMO in a manner that demonstrate the 
need for national action to ensure compliance with international norms. Another 
example is the inter-textuality between the Drug Dependants (Treatment and 
Rehabilitation) Act 1983 of Malaysia and the Drug Dependant Persons 
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Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 2007 in Sri Lanka, which contains legislative 
provision for compulsory treatment. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
it was the influence from the human actors, Malaysian documentation or a 
combination of both which was prominent in the development of Sri Lankan 
drug policy. This difficulty applies to the contents of UN documents studied. 
However, it was clear that international drug control documents did play a role 
and influenced the direction of drug policy in Sri Lanka.  
 
This inter-textuality of documents as discussed by Atkinson and Coffey (2004) 
has been proven when analysing the content meaning and role of national and 
international documents selected for study in this thesis. Documents and 
epistemic actors cannot be separated when analysing the development of drug 
policy in Sri Lanka. The degree to which international drug control conventions 
(as documents) represent the principles, causal beliefs and consensual 
knowledge shared by epistemic actors requires further research. The inter-
textuality and study of national and international documents demonstrates 
some consensus on the prohibition paradigm and unity in establishing the 
previously discussed normative frameworks for drug policies to emerge. 
Further research is also required, and would be interesting, to explore in depth 
the role of documents as either part of epistemic activity or as epistemic actors.  
 
Epistemic Communities, Stakeholder Analysis and Policy Transfer. 
 
The epistemic community theory coined by Haas (1992) has been useful in 
terms of studying external and internal influences on Sri Lankan drug policies 
and the role it plays in the transfer of global drug policy to a non-western 
setting. As discussed before, of particular use has been its application to 
identifying the principle beliefs and consensual knowledge in framing the drug 
problem and in setting the national policy agenda. However, the explanatory 
power of the epistemic community theory is limited to setting the policy agenda. 
While the theory is able to explain how drug problems become recognised by 
decision-makers, it stops short of explaining the dynamics of epistemic activity 
and decision-making in order to understand policy outcomes. In other words, 
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the theory is unable to establish a causal link between consensual knowledge 
and actual policy change. 
 
Unlike the majority of previous research, this study demonstrates that the 
actions of the international epistemic community can help to develop a national 
epistemic community, which shares similar principle and causal beliefs and a 
common policy enterprise that has been previously adopted by an international 
epistemic community. Some members of the international epistemic community 
overlap when national epistemic actors functioned in an ex-officio capacity or 
when they were later appointed as members of the CPDAP and SAARC 
technical committees on drug control. Over time, national epistemic actors 
became part of an international epistemic undertaking as they were held 
together by the various national and international workshops, seminars and 
study tours on drug control.  
 
This thesis argued that although members of an international epistemic 
community on drugs have a general world view of the drug problem and a 
common policy enterprise to address it, some members may have divergent 
views when innovative ideas are contested. This study was unable to 
demonstrate all innovative ideas becoming part of the consensual knowledge of 
the national epistemic community.  Hadii et al., (2011) also argued that the 
global tobacco control epistemic community’s innovative ideas were sometimes 
contested by the tobacco control epistemic actors or eventually became part of 
the consensual knowledge. In the case of Sri Lanka, the national epistemic 
community re-framed the drug problem as being different from other countries 
to justify the rejection of harm reduction ideas forming part of the consensual 
knowledge of the national epistemic community. However, the adoption of a 
stakeholder analysis explains that stakeholder interests on socio-economic 
development, a drug-free and righteous society concepts were more influential 
and legitimate interests over harm reduction policies and programmes.  
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Furthermore, in a similar comparison to Balch (2009), one of the main 
drawbacks in applying the epistemic community theory into the study of drug 
policy in Sri Lanka was the difficulty in separating the role of ideas from 
interests. For example, national security, sovereignty and socio-economic 
development were all at the heart of elite decision-making in Sri Lanka. 
Separating them from consensual knowledge on drugs diffused by epistemic 
communities from the interests of decision-makers is challenging in terms of 
providing an account on the motivation for policy change. However, when the 
theory is integrated with stakeholder analysis where an interest-based 
approach to drug policy analysis is combined, stakeholder interests reveals the 
impact of consensual knowledge on national interests.  
 
The apolitical nature of the epistemic community theory as stated by Haas 
(1992) can be challenged at national and international levels. At national level, 
drug-knowledgeable government officials moved between government 
departments and ministries and continued to be involved in generating 
consensual knowledge on drug control. They were consulted by elite decision-
makers in times of uncertainty for advice on how to manage the drug problem. 
For example, some epistemic actors who occupied a marginal position in 
decision-making structures were located later at the core of government 
decision-making systems. They were significantly influential when they 
functioned as Presidential advisers, senior Presidential advisers and senior civil 
servants. The President sought advice from these epistemic actors when the 
drug trafficking problem was rife and when drug market activities disrupted 
local communities. The examples provided in Chapter Seven on advice given 
by civil servants in regards to stringent law enforcement were closely related to 
political interests and suggest that epistemic actors have access to the political 
agenda. Although epistemic community theory is unable to explain the 
dynamics and intricacies between knowledge and political interests, political 
stakeholder analysis reveals that electoral interests and balancing the power 
structures were influential drivers for acting on epistemic advice. They operated 
behind and in congruence with consensual knowledge of epistemic actors.  
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The Chairs to the NDDCB were appointed by the President and in the majority 
of cases they formed part of the national epistemic community. Although 
lawyers, senior police officers and doctors occupied this position they were 
political appointees and to a certain extent challenge the apolitical nature of the 
epistemic community theory. The distinction between political interests and 
consensual knowledge propagated by epistemic actors requires further 
understanding when epistemic actors occupy an insider position in policy-
making. The application of stakeholder analysis to understand the wider 
political context in which drug policies emerged, provided new insights on the 
strength and influence of the national epistemic community on drug control in 
Sri Lanka. The potential of consensual knowledge became influential and 
realised through the involvement of elite decision-makers. In other words the 
strength of the Sri Lankan epistemic community on drug control lies in the 
alliance and proximity between epistemic actors and elite decision-makers.  
 
Most epistemic activity was funded by UN organisations, Colombo Plan and the 
USA. Chapter Five discussed the funding sources of epistemic communities, 
the pressure and coercion applied by external stakeholders in the transfer of 
global norms and principles on drug control, often tied to aid and other 
incentives granted to Sri Lanka. External influence to enact drug legislation in 
Sri Lanka questions the independence of consensual knowledge diffused by 
international epistemic communities as they cannot be considered distinct from 
those who fund their epistemic activity. International epistemic communities on 
drug control were part of an international donor community and there exists 
little bargaining power for developing nations when confronted with external 
influences. Further research is required to investigate the dynamics between 
international epistemic communities and their donor organisations in explaining 
the independence of consensual knowledge on drugs and their impact on 
policy transfer.   
 
Stakeholder analysis incorporates a much broader role for policy actors, and 
permits examination of how their ideologies, beliefs and interests are brought to 
the policy agenda, as opposed to limiting drug policy analysis to expert 
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knowledge generated by epistemic communities. As discussed, drug policies in 
Sri Lanka affect, and are affected by, many different actors both directly and 
indirectly. This was also shown by Houborg et al., (2015) in their study of 
stakeholders in addictions policy in Europe. The continuation and stability in 
policy approaches partly explains this. The thesis was able to identify 
government and non-government organisations, epistemic communities, 
individuals and professional groups, Buddhist monks, tobacco and alcohol 
policy actors, political parties, the public and other interests groups as 
stakeholders in drug policy. As noted, external stakeholders significantly 
influence the activities of national stakeholders in the developing world. 
Stakeholder activities were located within the broader economic, political and 
social contexts in which policies emerged in the history of Sri Lanka. Analysis 
of stakeholders discloses information about their power, interests, influence 
and legitimacy of action in the area of drug control. Against this background, 
stakeholder analysis is a useful tool for the analysis of drug policy and is able to 
provide a much broader narrative on the drug problem and its policies in time 
and place. Stakeholder analysis is also able to provide an understanding of 
how the policy agenda is set and add further meaning to the consensual 
knowledge produced by epistemic actors, their influence, salience and 
legitimacy based on stakeholder interests.   
 
Similar to Thom et al., (2013) this thesis was able to demonstrate that some 
stakeholders occupy a core position and others are on the margins of policy-
making. Those who occupied a core position and had close working 
relationships with elite decision-makers were more influential in drug policies 
than those who occupied a marginal position. The public is also an important 
stakeholder group and ensured that their interests are heard in the policy 
process, particularly when drugs disrupted local communities which gained the 
interest of politicians. The alliances the public had with Buddhist monks and 
Parliamentarians ensured the legitimisation of their local agenda and relevance 
to policy outcomes.  
 
 231 
 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, drug policy innovation and reform in 
Sri Lanka originated from external influences. The thesis argued that policy 
transfer takes place across time, based on the economic, political, social 
interests and ideologies of national stakeholders. Of particular interest is the 
examination of policy learning from other jurisdictions in relation to the 
development of drug policy in a developing country. International epistemic 
communities are agents of policy transfer when considering their role in the 
diffusion of drug-policy knowledge. National policy makers’ engagement with 
epistemic activities resulted in policy learning. This study identifies the policy 
beliefs of epistemic communities and their common policy enterprise, the 
resources they bring into the process of policy orientated learning and identifies 
the nature of policy transfer epistemic actors were seeking to make in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
There exists a mixture of policy convergence and translation as opposed to 
straight-forward copying of international policy and legislation on drug control. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, policy transfer and translation are action-
orientated intentional learning mechanisms. However, policy convergence 
differs and is concerned with unintentionality where human agents are not 
actively involved in the transfer of policies but other forces such as 
industrialisation, globalisation and regionalisation are at play when policies in 
two or more countries become more alike over time (Knill, 2005; Evans, 2009; 
Stone, 2012). The introduction of the death sentence for drug related offences 
in Sri Lanka is an example of policy convergence as there is a lack of any 
evidence to denote that this was transferred from human actors. As discussed 
in Chapter Six, parliamentary debates at the time on the introduction of the 
death sentence revealed that harmonising macro-economic forces and 
legislation in the region under a new capitalist government became relevant 
and important. The government emulated an Asian approach to managing 
some aspects of the drug problem due to geographical proximity to countries 
such as Malaysia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Indonesia, which explains policy convergence of the death sentence.  
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The majority of drug policies translated can be located in the norms and 
principles identified within international drug control conventions, policies and 
practices. As discussed, negotiated and coercive forms of drug policy transfer 
existed in the history of Sri Lanka. The idea of compulsory treatment, 
suggested as far back as the 1980s, was translated into national policy in 2007 
with national policy actors’ learning through exposure to Malaysian treatment 
models. While the legislation concerning compulsory treatment between the 
two countries has a number of similarities in terms of its content and identical 
text, there had been modifications from the Malaysian legislation, adapting it to 
suit a Sri Lankan context.  
 
This thesis also highlighted that the epistemic consensus on the drug problem 
and the need for policy innovation was adequately framed but insufficient for 
translation into policy as stakeholder interests and legitimacy are important 
factors that ensure a successful translation. Nevertheless, policy transfer 
analysis contributes significantly to the study of drug policy-making in nation 
states, helping to understand how decision-makers acquire knowledge and 
legitimate policy transfer based on national interests and a host of other factors.  
 
Limitations and Contributions of this Research. 
 
As discussed before, where perspectives are limited to a group of elite 
individuals whose activities were located within government decision-making 
processes, this means that only a relatively small number of stakeholders were 
interviewed.  Although confidentiality was guaranteed and key informants were 
reassured that information they supplied would not identify them, their position, 
or the organisation they currently or previously represented, data generated 
through interviews may have either restricted or amplified information. 
 
Similarly, the researcher’s background in mental health and addiction treatment 
services in the UK with familiarity of international treatment approaches and 
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sponsorship to gain access to key informants for interview through known elite 
individuals may also have influenced the data in unknown ways.  
 
Stakeholders such as those involved in the delivery of drug treatment services, 
particularly front-line staff, were not interviewed. Similarly, drug users, often the 
objects of drug policy and who can be considered as an important stakeholder 
group (Houborg et al., 2016) and the media who also have a role in framing the 
drug problem also did not form part of this study. They could have provided 
valuable insights into the study of the drug problem and policy development 
from a different perspective. 
 
Due to practical reasons this thesis was unable to interview and capture the 
lived experiences of international stakeholders representing organisations such 
as the UNODC, INCB, WHO and Colombo Plan. Policy actors who represented 
or currently represent these organisations are likely to be a geographically 
dispersed population and would prove difficult to access for interview. Although 
national stakeholders were able to provide an account on the role and influence 
of international epistemic communities and other stakeholders, the value of 
interviewing these groups is acknowledged.  
 
There were some shortcomings from the available documents which could 
affect their analysis. For example, internal inconsistencies existed in terms of 
style, content and comprehension. A very few were written in Sinhalese and its 
translation into English might have led to misinterpretation or misrepresentation 
of the actual content meaning. However, the researcher’s ability to read 
Sinhalese and cross-checking with key informants mitigated this short-coming 
to a certain extent.  The researcher is also unable to state that the transcript of 
workshops and conferences on drug control are free from error and distortion.  
 
This study constitutes a number of contributions to knowledge. Considering the 
limited research on public policy-making and the lack of research on 
contemporary drug policy-making in Sri Lanka, the findings are of pivotal 
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importance as they provide new insights and meanings to the drug problem 
and policy development in Sri Lanka and from the perspective of a developing 
nation. The thesis also generated insights on how, why and by whom drug 
policies were developed, and it contributes to the literature in identifying the 
epistemic communities and other stakeholders involved with drug policies in 
non-western countries. Furthermore, the thesis analyses and contributes to the 
understanding of the expert-role and its influence on policy transfer, the 
dynamics of such transfer in a non-western setting, the conditions by which the 
transfer occurs and the role of political structures in accepting or rejecting ideas 
diffused by epistemic communities.   
 
The adoption of a historical-social science approach to carrying out the work 
provided new insights and understanding of the narratives of the drug problem 
and drug policies in time and place. Contextualising drug policy in the history of 
Sri Lanka through a chronological approach facilitated the analysis of political, 
economic and social factors in exploring the emergence, maintenance and 
shifts in drug policies, their associated epistemic communities, other 
stakeholders, and particular discourses, all of which are embedded in time and 
in particular historical situations. This approach also enabled the tracing of 
epistemic and other stakeholder activity, their ideologies, interests, alliances 
and if they were located within the core or margins of decision-making 
structures. Given the lack of drug policy research in Sri Lanka, attention to 
history offered a rich reservoir of information and sufficient material with which 
to further analyse policy preferences, current policy issues, events and their 
inter-relatedness.  
 
Future Directions for Drug Policy and Research in Sri Lanka. 
 
Drug policies continued in the political focus after 2008, the end of this analysis 
of Sri Lankan drug policies. No new policy or legislation emerged after 2008, 
and the context of stability and consensus in policy approaches has continued 
without any major divergence. The penal approach has been kept as the 
subject of drugs has become increasingly used as a political tool. After the war 
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in 2009, stakeholder action, influence and their dynamics explain this as 
opposed to any knowledge driven model in explaining policy development. 
 
The LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009 by the Mahinda Rajapakse 
government ending almost three decades of civil war. There was immense 
popular support for him from large political groups, particularly prominent 
Buddhist monks and the JHU who previously advocated on a righteous society 
and drug policies. As argued by Zuhair (2016), the initial post-war support was 
based within Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, a deliberate traditional political 
strategy to consolidate the majority vote. Soon after the war ended, national 
newspaper articles were printed stating drugs were in the political limelight as 
President Rajapakse declared war on drugs. President Rajapakse stated that 
the next challenge of the nation is the ‘eradication of the drug menace’. Drugs 
continued to be framed as a threat to economic growth and political stability in 
post-war Sri Lanka.  Issuing a special press release to mark the International 
Anti‐Narcotics Day on 26th June 2009, President Rajapakse stated: 
 
“The nation is now facing the challenge of ensuring the country's development, 
which has been set back due to the terrorism. The drug menace makes this 
task rather challenging. Each and every day from this moment should be used 
to defeat the drug war” (Colombo Page, Friday 26 June 2009).  
 
Against this background, the “Mathata Thitha” or full stop to intoxicants 
campaign intensified and gained more traction from the JHU and other 
stakeholders. The campaign continued to feature in government activities and 
had popular public support. As the historical accounts showed, drug policy 
continues to be located within economic, political, social and moral debates 
with the hope of achieving a drug-free society. A chair of the NDDCB, in a 
public interview, echoing these post-war aspirations stated: 
 
“The NDDCB believe that we will be able to reduce the drug circulation in the 
country at a considerable rate by the year 2015 and ultimately we will be able 
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to achieve the goal of drug-free Sri Lanka by the year 2020” (Sunday Observer, 
Sunday 11 May, 2014).  
 
Economic debates over the high prison cost of accommodating drug-related 
offenders increased as funds were being diverted away from the country's 
socio-economic development (Sunday Observer, Sunday 11 May, 2014). A 
past President of the Colombo Plan International Society stated: 
 
“The upkeep of drug addict prisoners also costs the state over Rs. 8000/- a 
day. The Colombo Plan International Society has campaigned vigorously for 
the establishment of separate prisons for drug offenders, who amount to about 
35% of the prison population. The drug addicts should be separated from 
common criminals as the drug addicts find ingenious ways to smuggle drugs 
inside the Prisons and induce other inmates to their habit. The state announced 
some time ago that they will establish separate prisons at Pallekelle, Talduwa 
and Wirawila exclusively for drug offenders. We urge the state to immediately 
act on these measures which are vital for arresting the spread of this scourge 
to our society” (Island, Friday 26th June 2009).  
 
The Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and Rehabilitation Act 2007 was 
implemented after the war with some prisons operating and dedicated for 
compulsory drug treatment. This implementation is a result of the socio-
economic debates and the moralised policy agenda that continues to exist. 
Drugs again became a political tool during and after the Presidential election in 
2015. ‘Yahapalanaya’ or Good Governance, “the slogan upon which 
Mathiripala Sirisena was elected President, augured well as a cross-cutting 
theme, which  resonated well with all the communities united in their dejection 
of the Rajapaksa regime’s extensive corruption, nepotism and other excesses” 
(Zuhair, 2016: 6). Drugs remained a contentious subject that was included into 
this ‘good governance’ policy agenda. The same stakeholders who propagated 
the righteous society concept, the JHU and prominent Buddhist monks, formed 
a coalition with President Sirisena to claim that the implementation of their ‘full 
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stop to intoxicants’ campaign had been hampered by the Rajapakse 
administration. The new Minister of Public Administration, Local Government 
and Democratic Governance, Karu Jayasuriya stated that The Mahinda 
Chinthana Election Manifesto promised to totally eradicate the drug problem by 
2008 but an opposite result has occurred (Ada Derana News, July 30th, 2015).  
 
President Sirisena established a Presidential Task Force on Drugs soon after 
his election as President. 
 
“The Presidential Task Force for Drug Prevention is committed to pave way for 
economic, social and cultural development through making Sri Lanka a drug-
free nation in accordance with the manifesto of President Maithripala Sirisena; 
‘Compassionate Government, a Stable Country” (President’s Media Division, 
2016).  
 
The same stakeholders as before continued to feature in drug policy 
development although a substantial number of prominent Buddhist monks are 
members of the Presidential Task Force for Drug Prevention. The Buddhist 
monks in the JHU political party who supported the newly elect President to 
come into office under the cross-cutting theme of ‘good governance’ appear to 
have a significant stake and influence on drug policy-making. Law enforcement 
also continues its central role as senior legal and penal representatives feature 
in the Presidential Task force, particularly with a focus on dealing with major 
drug traffickers. For these stakeholders, ‘good governance’ also means 
ensuring stringent law enforcement for those major drug traffickers who 
allegedly had not been dealt by the law under the previous administration. The 
aspiration of a drug-free society is perceived to be hampered by these large 
scale drug traffickers. 
 
Additionally, and similar to debates on the drug problem during the study 
period, drug trafficking continues to be framed as a matter that has an adverse 
impact on political stability, socio-economic development and of a ‘righteous 
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society’. The religious-moral model to policy-making has gained traction within 
the recently established Presidential Task Force for Drug Prevention whereby 
aspiration towards becoming a drug-free society continues to prevail with little 
debate on the public health aspects of the drug problem. Drug, tobacco and 
alcohol use continue to be regarded as intoxicants that compromise 
development and moral values of Sri Lankans.  
 
Presidential involvement on matters concerning drug control signifies the 
continued importance placed on the subject of drugs with the economic, 
political and social decision-making in post-war Sri Lanka. Recently, the 
continuation of the penal approach and the ways in which the drug problem has 
been framed has arisen from political struggles and continues to sustain the 
criminal justice model.   
 
The role for external epistemic communities on drug control continues to be 
less noticeable after 2008, as the drug problem is perceived as stable with no 
uncertainties in relation to its management. Today’s drug policies should be 
viewed and contextualised from the point of the 2015-elected government 
having a deep desire to repair its international relations and restore 
membership with various external organisations. This includes the desire to 
secure foreign aid and multi-million dollar finance for the country’s 
developmental work which had been hampered by the long civil war. To this 
extent, the dynamics of international relations have changed in the recent past 
and dialogues between the Sri Lankan government and external organisations 
have re-commenced following a period when the international community had 
shown its dissatisfaction over the country’s regard for human rights. 
 
The Sri Lankan government appears to be keen on re-engaging with 
international policy coordination, particularly with regards to coming into line 
with the previously mentioned international conventions on human and labour 
rights and good governance. They occur in the backdrop of national interests, 
particularly with regards to the country’s economic development under a new 
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government that places an increased emphasis on good governance. For the 
government, particular importance is placed on the re-negotiation of the GSP 
beneficiary status that was withdrawn by the European Commission in 2010. 
Institutionalising the international conventions that Sri Lanka had acceded to in 
earlier years would be the priority both for the government and for external 
organisations such as the United Nations, European Commission and countries 
such as the USA and UK. National drug policies are likely to be influenced by 
these events as drug policies are co-located alongside a large number of 
international conventions when re-negotiating the GSP beneficiary status.  
 
There is a complex relationship between people, power and politics in the 
development of drug policy in Sri Lanka and that seems likely to endure. 
Evidence from the steady rise in drug seizures, arrests, drug-related 
incarcerations, drug use and relatively stable drug prices suggests that the 
nation’s policy on drugs needs re-thinking. While there exists consensus on the 
prohibitionist paradigm for drug control, a debate needs to begin to ensure a 
public health agenda is incorporated into policy-making. Stakeholders with 
divergent views, including the knowledge experts whose views on the drug 
problem had not been heard should be included in this debate so that 
consensual knowledge on the drug problem expands. 
 
There is a need for investment in robust scientific research into the nature and 
prevalence of drug problems, the outcomes of the available demand reduction 
programmes, including compulsory treatment in Sri Lanka. The study of Sri 
Lankan drug policy in general also requires investment. This should inform 
future policy debate and development. The historical analysis of drug policies 
suggests that any new consensual knowledge on the drug problem needs to be 
re-framed as being of national interest and has legitimisation from powerful elite 
decision-makers and Buddhist monks to ensure policy innovation. Attention 
should be paid to successive shifts in drug policies of other countries, from 
which Sri Lanka has previously learned and from which policies have been 
transferred or translated. For example, Malaysia has moved from solely having 
harsh punitive measures to include a public health approach in the wake of an 
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HIV epidemic (Tanguay, 2011). The cessation of compulsory treatment and the 
establishment of voluntary drug treatment facilities indicate that Malaysia’s 
response is beginning to include a health-oriented approach as part of its 
overall drug policies. The perceived absence of a current crisis situation, 
particularly the continuing low prevalence of an injecting drug problem, should 
not underestimate vulnerability to an HIV epidemic in Sri Lanka.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Interview questions around amendments made to the Poisons, Opium 
and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance in 1984 
1. What are some of the reasons to amend the law in relation to drugs in 
1984? 
Prompts: 
 National concerns 
 International concerns 
2. Who was mainly involved in making those changes? 
Prompts: 
 Institutions, people and international actors 
3. How was the drug problem perceived at the time? 
4. What were the main reasons to create the NDDCB? 
5. Can you please tell me about the nature of the drug problem in early 
1970s? 
     Prompts: 
 How big was the drug problem? 
 Was it a crime issue, medial issue, social issue, legal issue? 
6. Who was most affected by the drug problem and why? 
7. Can you please tell me about the reasons behind the establishment of a 
National Narcotics Advisory Committee in 1973? 
8. Can you please tell me about the membership of the NNAC? 
9. Who was influential in policy decisions at the time? 
10. Why have they been most influential? 
11. Can you describe some of the work carried out by the first NNAC? 
 260 
 
Appendix B 
Sri Lankan National Policy for the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse 
 
The government of Sri Lanka being conscious of the illicit drug problem 
especially in relation to heroin and cannabis and its far reaching and 
destructive socio-economic implications, reaffirms its political will and 
determination to combat the problem by developing effective strategies based 
on: 
 
(a) Enforcement: 
(b) Preventative education and public awareness; 
(c) Treatment rehabilitation and after care; and  
(d) International and regional co-operation 
 
Strategies and Mechanisms of Implementation of the National Drug Policy 
 
1.0  Introduction to the drug problem in Sri Lanka 
Since the early 1980’s Sri Lanka has had to face a growing problem of drug 
abuse, mainly heroin amongst the youth, introduced originally by tourists. It 
is estimated that there are about 50,000 users of heroin and about 200,000 
users of cannabis in Sri Lanka today. To a nation which firmly believes that 
its citizens have a right to decent life with moral, humanitarian and spiritual 
values in a healthy and safe environment, this matter is of grave concern 
specially as it involves the youth who are the wealth of the nation. 
 
The causes of drug addiction are many and include increased availability of 
drugs, expansion of communication, socio-economic factors, migration and 
rapid urbanisation, changes in attitudes and values toward society, 
community, family, religion, morality etc. and the ruthless exploitation of 
fellow human beings by drug traffickers. Social costs are heavy and are due 
to the drug crime and disease, increasing poverty among addicts, 
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overcrowded prisons, social and family disruption, human suffering and the 
like. Since the group at risk is primarily in the 15-35 years category the loss 
of productivity and manpower is enormous. 
 
2.0 The role of the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board 
To combat the growing problem of the drug abuse effectively, it is vital that 
all agencies of the government, provincial councils and non-governmental 
organisations join in a cooperative endeavour. The board will coordinate the 
implementation action based on the policies and guidelines approved by the 
government. To this end the NDDBC Secretariat will be expanded and will 
consist of the following sub divisions. 
 
(1) Enforcement 
(2) Preventative Education and Public Awareness 
(3) Treatment Rehabilitation and after care 
The Board will, in addition also have the following divisions 
(4) Research and Training 
(5) Drug Analytical ( to facilitate law enforcement, treatment, and 
research) 
 
Each division will have a suitable and permanent staff in order to engage in 
these activities more fully and to co-ordinate and monitor implementation 
strategies. 
 
The short term and long term action plans developed will be based on national 
priorities and would be formulated keeping in mind the local needs and suitably 
adapting the strategies which are outlined in the United Nations 
Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse 
Control (CMO). The CMO is the compendium of practical action for combating 
drug abuse and illicit trafficking. The UN General Assembly has on several 
occasions urged the governments to use the CMO in the formulation of their 
own programmes. 
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3.0 Strategy Outline 
The Strategy for implementation will be presented under the following policy 
subject headings which will also contain appropriate lists of relevant 
government and other agencies. 
(a) Enforcement, 
(b) Preventative Education and Public Awareness 
(c) Treatment, Rehabilitation and After care 
(d) International and Regional Co-operation  
 
4.0  Enforcement  
 
It is necessary to ensure vigorous enforcement of the law in order to reduce the 
illicit availability of drugs, deter drug related disease and to create an 
environment favourable to drug abuse prevention. 
 
Thus, enforcement will be made more effective through the following: 
 
4.1  Building- up intelligence on trafficking, effective interdiction at all 
points of entry and strengthening operational capabilities of all 
enforcement agencies and personnel.  
4.2  Extend scope of existing legislation to deal effectively not only with 
carriers but also more importantly with traffickers and financiers with 
maximum penalties and deprivation of the proceeds and their crimes. 
4.3  Taking necessary steps to (1) expedite the hearing of drug cases (2) 
establish standard procedures for the safe handling of court 
productions of drugs. 
4.4  Tightening controls over legal drugs prescribed in Sri Lanka to 
prevent “leakage” to the illicit market. 
4.5  Stressing alternatives to imprisonment such as treatment and 
rehabilitation programmes for the dependants wherever appropriate. 
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4.6  Giving adequate resources to the enforcement agencies at all times 
and facilitating maximum use of specialised personnel.  
4.7  Monitoring the effectiveness of present enforcement agencies 
island-wide to assess the extent of their impact on the trafficking and 
availability of drugs at street level. If it is found necessary that a 
combined enforcement thrust should be wielded by a new single 
agency establishing such an agency under the NDDCB. 
4.8  Supporting international efforts to curb the production, transiting and 
trafficking of drugs. 
4.9  Entering into treaties with other states to cover exchange of 
prisoners, mutual legal assistance, extradition and controlled 
delivery. 
4.10 Government and other Implementing agencies. 
(a) Ministry of Defence (Police, Armed Services, Immigration and 
Emigration, NDDCB) 
(b) Ministry of Finance ( Customs, Excise) 
(c) Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(d) Ministry of Health 
(e) Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs ( Courts, Prisons, 
Attorney Generals Department) 
(f) Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs (Provincial 
Councils) 
 
5.0 Preventative Education and Public Awareness  
 
Accepting that prevention is more efficient and cost effective than either 
enforcement and/or treatment, the government will facilitate better use of all 
preventative educational opportunities. Focus will be on formed curricula, 
informal and non-formal education activities and the use of mass media. 
 
Awareness and educational programmes will utilise all mass media. Measures 
will also be taken to impact relevant, facets of knowledge, positive attitudes 
coping skills, particularly to young people. 
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 5.1 The role of mass media 
5.1.1 A multi-media approach will be taken, paying attention to 
allocation of media space/time, supplementary media inputs, 
appropriate material selection and effective presentation of 
material. 
5.1.2 Each media will be promoted to have specialised 
preventative education cells and personnel. 
5.1.3 The board and other appropriate organisations will facilitate 
dissemination of relevant knowledge to media specialised in 
skills is presentation of material, conduct and update training 
programmes and where possible play and monitoring role on 
media effectiveness.  
5.1.4 Guidelines and ethical codes will be evolved with regard to 
the portrayal o drug abuse related incidents in the media. 
 
 5.2 Prevention through Education 
5.2.1 Modules pertaining to drug abuse will be included where 
possible in programmes of formal and non-formal education. 
5.2.2 Extracurricular activities will be carefully planned and 
organised in    order to supplement the class room learning 
5.2.3 All educational institutions will have access to a functional 
counselling service which also will have the capability of 
dealing with drug related problems. Access will where 
necessary be made available for the testing or the presence 
of drugs in the body and for treatment and rehabilitation.  
 
 5.3 Prevention in the work place 
  5.3.1 Employers will publicise among the work force the    
                               information regarding consequences of peddling or the use  
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of drugs. Employers “and workers” organisations will develop joint action 
programmes for this purpose. 
  5.3.2 Testing for the presence of drugs in the body will be 
recommended where necessary. 
  5.3.3 Employee assistance programmes will be initiated. 
 
 5.4 Leisure time activities 
  5.4.1 The provincial councils and local authorities will have 
community based programmes to cater to a wide range of interests of persons 
at risk, especially the school drop outs and the unemployed. These 
programmes will act as viable alternatives and discourage deviant behaviour 
such as drug abuse.  
 
 5.5 Development of employable work skills 
  5.5.1 Relevant institutions will provide vocational training for youth 
with a view to opening up avenues of appropriate employment.  
 
 5.6 Government and other Implementing Agencies 
(a) Ministry of Defence (NDDCB) 
(b) Ministry of Education, Cultural affairs and Information              
(Institute of Higher Education, NIE, Department of Information, 
SLBC, SLRC, ITN, Lankapuwath) 
(c) Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
(d) Ministry of public administration and Home Affairs (Provincial 
Councils, Municipal Councils) 
(e) Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (NYSC, NAB) 
(f) NGO’s 
 
6.0 Treatment, Rehabilitation and After Care 
In order that the process of treatment to be completed, the phase of treatment 
and detoxification must be integrated with the phases of rehabilitation and after 
care. 
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Treatment, rehabilitation and after care will be through the following measures: 
6.1.1 In the view of the large number of persons voluntarily seeking 
treatment, a short term Action Plan will be drawn up by the Ministry 
of Health to deal with the immediate problem. 
On the long term basis the Department of Health will be 
responsible for coordinating and giving guidance to the 
development and maintenance of the comprehensive national 
treatment programme for drug dependants. 
6.1.2 The active cooperation and collaboration of the non-governmental 
sector will be encouraged. 
6.1.3 Treatment facilities will be made freely available. Where possible it 
will be encouraged. 
6.1.4 Appropriate health care professionals cadres will be given training 
in the treatment and care of drug abusers. 
6.1.5 Treatment/ Detoxification will be supported with counselling, 
educational and other social measures. 
6.1.6 Legislation will be enacted and facilities will be provided for 
compulsory treatment where appropriate. 
 6.1.7 Government and other Implementing Agencies 
(a) Ministry of Defence (NDDCB) 
(b) Ministry of Health 
(c) Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (Prisons) 
(d) Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (Department of 
Probation and Child Care) 
(e) NGO’s 
 
6.2 Rehabilitation and After-care 
The objective of rehabilitation and after-care will be the integration of 
former dependants into society.  
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Rehabilitation and after-care will consist of regular follow up, giving 
social support and training and channelling into appropriate vocations. 
Trained personnel of the implementing government agencies listed 
below will take part in this process. If the magnitude of the problem 
warrants it the NDDCB may engage in a coordinating or catalyst role. 
 
6.2.1 Government and other Implementing Agencies 
(a) Ministry of Defence (NDDCB) 
(b) Ministry of Health 
(c) Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (Prisons) 
(d) Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (Department of 
Probation and Child Care) 
(e) Ministry of public administration and Home Affairs 
(Provincial Councils, Municipal Councils) 
(f) NGO’s 
 
7.0  International and Regional Co-operation 
 
It is accepted that no country could tackle its drug problem in isolation. The 
government will encourage the relevant agencies to actively engage in formal 
international co-operation through bilateral, regional and international 
collaboration as follows: 
 
7.1 Sri Lanka government has been a party of the 1961 Single 
convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Amendment protocol of 1972. 
Expeditious action will be taken to accede to the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention on Illicit 
Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In 
pursuance of this undertaking the NDDCB will take appropriate 
action and will assist the relevant Ministries to do likewise. 
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7.2 International cooperation will also be encouraged through NGOs 
which have international connections or dealings and collaborative 
mechanisms.  
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Appendix C 
 
Interview questions around the first Sri Lankan National Policy for the 
Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse (1994) 
 
1. What are some of the reasons for the government to introduce a national 
policy on drugs in 1994? 
2. Why was it important to produce a national policy on drugs at the time? 
3. Who was mainly involved in formulating the first national policy on 
drugs? 
Prompts: 
Key individuals/people, departments/organisations, interest groups, 
contribution of stakeholders in the production of initial national policy 
4. Who was influential in the entire process? 
5. Why have they been most influential? 
Prompts: 
 The role of the Chairman and Executive Director 
 The relationship with the Defence Minister who was also in-
charge of all drug related activities in the country. 
6. Can you give me some examples on how they (identified people) 
influenced policy? 
7. Who were the religious leaders who may have influenced policy? 
8. Can you please tell me the role of religious leaders when formulating the 
policy?  
9. What were some of the differences/tensions between departments or 
people when formulating the first national policy? 
10. Can you please give me some examples on how these differences were 
managed? 
11. In general, how were issues raised and discussed during policy 
formulation? 
12. What are some of the barriers to the development of a national 
treatment programme for drug users? 
 270 
 
13. Were there any political issues that had to be taken into consideration 
when formulating the first national policy on drugs? If so, what were 
they? 
Prompts: 
 Local and international issues 
 New left wing government coming into office (broad 
alliance/coalition government) 
14. How were these political issues managed? 
15. What were some of the statistics or data used when drafting the first 
national policy on drugs? 
16. Can you give me some examples on how this data or information was 
used in the policy? 
17. Finally, can you please identify someone who shares your perspective 
and another person who may have a different perspective? 
18.  Who else should I interview? 
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Appendix D 
Interview questions around the role of different stakeholders in policy 
formulation and implementation 
 
1. Looking at available literature, am I right to say that there has been a 
shift in drug policies since mid-1980s? 
2. Can you please tell me about those changes? 
3. Why was it necessary to bring these changes? 
4. What was your involvement in response to the drug problem in the 80s? 
5. Can you please tell me about your involvement prior to 1980s? 
6. How did the medical profession respond to the drug problem at the 
time? 
7. Can you give me some examples on how the medical profession was 
involved in policy-making? 
8. How did the medical profession perceive the drug problem at the time?  
9. Did the drug problem require a medical response at the time? 
10. If so, why? And if not, why not? 
11. Which groups or individuals were more powerful or influential in drug 
policy in the 1980s? 
12. Can you give me some examples on how the medical profession 
influenced drug policy? 
13. Have you noticed a change in those people who advocated on drug 
policy over the last twenty years?  
 Groups 
 Organisations 
 Individuals 
 Other professional groups (E.g. lawyers) 
14. Are there any particular reasons for these changes? (only if identified) 
15. At any point, has the medical profession worked closely with either the 
legal profession or any religious leaders in the creation of drug policy?  
16. If so, can you give me some examples? 
17. How has the medical profession implemented the national drug policy?  
18. How have others implemented the national drug policy? 
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Can you please provide some examples 
19. Is the current drug policy working? Please give examples. 
20. How could we improve drug treatment in Sri Lanka? 
21. How could we improve drug control in Sri Lanka? 
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Appendix E 
Interview questions around the President’s Election Manifesto 2005 
1. The President’s election manifesto 2005, in its first chapter titled 
“towards a disciplined society” looks at the drug problem in the country. 
Why was it important to include a section titled “an end to the drug 
menace”? 
Prompts: 
 The government’s/President’s view on the drug problem 
 Public views on the drug problem known to the 
government/president 
 Previous election manifestos  
2. Who was mainly involved in formulating the section on “an end to the 
drug menace”? 
Prompts: 
 Key individuals, organisations, interest groups 
 The role of the NDDCB 
 
3. Who influenced the content of the section “an end to the drug menace” 
and why have they been influential? 
 
4. Can you please give me some examples on how they (identified people 
and organisations) influenced the content of this document? 
Prompts: 
 Power and why have they been powerful 
 
5. What was the role of religious leaders when formulating the section on 
“an end to the drug menace”? 
Prompts: 
 Buddhist views on abstinence 
 Buddhist support for the election being based on this policy 
 
6. How was this pledge different from the opposition? 
Prompts: 
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 UNP opposition leader’s views on the drug problem and his pledge 
 
7. What are some of the political issues that had to be taken into 
consideration when formulating this pledge? 
Prompts: 
 Coalition views and opinions 
 Public/interest group views and demands 
 International interests 
 
8. How were these political issues managed? 
 
9. What were some of the differences between people, parties or 
organisations when formulating this pledge? 
 
10. The Presidential election pledge states “I will be dedicated to the task of 
totally eradicating the drug menace presently experienced in Sri Lanka. I 
will do so within a period of three years through a co-ordinated effort 
covering the implementation of laws, the actions of police and other 
social institutions”. Why was it important to make this pledge to the 
public? 
 
11. Can you give me some examples of evidence or information that was 
used when this pledge was made? 
Prompts: 
 Examples from neighbouring countries 
 Election manifestos from other countries 
 Information/data from the NDDCB or any other organisation 
 
12. To what extent has this pledge been delivered so far and what are some 
of the lessons learned? 
Prompts: 
 Availability of drugs and its use at present 
 Rehabilitation for drug users 
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13. How has this election pledge had an impact on policy developments? 
Prompts: 
 Introduction of the Treatment & Rehabilitation Act in 2007 
 Revision of the first master plan 
 
14. Finally, can you please identify someone who shared your perspective 
and another person who may have a different perspective? 
 
15. Who else should I interview? 
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Appendix F 
Interview questions around the Drug Dependant Persons Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Act No. 54 of 2007 
1. What are some of the reasons for the government to introduce a Drug 
dependant Persons Treatment & Rehabilitation Act in 2007? 
Prompts: 
 The rationale for compulsory treatment 
 Overcrowded prisons 
 Regulating treatment & rehabilitation in the country (rationale for 
implementing a licensing system) 
 Political vision outlined in the President’s election manifesto 
 
2. Compulsory treatment as an alternative to imprisonment was identified 
as far back as 1994. Why do we see its introduction in 2007, 13-years 
later?  
 
3. Who was mainly involved in formulating this Act and why? 
Prompts: 
 Key individuals/people, international organisations, national 
departments/organisations, interest groups, contribution of 
stakeholders in the creation of this Act 
 The role of the medical profession/Ministry of Health 
 Role of NGOs (FONGOADA) 
 Any new stakeholders/players entering the policy arena 
 
4. Who was influential in this entire process? 
 
5. Why have they been most influential? 
Prompts: 
 The role of the Chairman and Executive Director 
 The relationship with the Defence Minister who was also in-
charge of all drug related activities in the country. 
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 The role of international organisations- e.g. UNODC, Colombo 
Plan, WHO 
 Role of other countries and their knowledge experts 
 Role of religious leaders (if appropriate) 
 
6. Can you give me some examples on how they (identified 
people/organisations) influenced the creation of this Act? 
 
7. Have you or any other person attended any national or international 
workshops or conferences on compulsory treatment for drug users?  
Prompts: 
 Who facilitated them/where/which country? 
 What did you/they learn from it? 
 Did Sri Lanka follow any models/policies from another country? 
 
8. What were some of the differences/tensions between departments and 
national/international organisations when formulating this Act? 
 
9. Can you please give me some examples on how these differences were 
managed? 
 
10. In general, how were issues raised and discussed during policy 
formulation? 
 
11. Were there any political issues that had to be taken into consideration 
when formulating this Act? If so, what were they? 
Prompts: 
 Election manifesto/Mathata thita 
 Local and international issues/interests 
 
12. How were these political issues managed? 
 
13. What sort of information/data have you used to support/formulate this 
Act? 
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Prompts: 
 Treatment and rehabilitation statistics 
 Outcome data (from rehab centres, prisons, treatment centres) 
 Crime/prison statistics 
 
14. Were there any other policies that influenced the development of this 
Act? 
Prompts: 
 Mathta Thita election manifesto 
 Policies at international level (UN Policies) 
 
15. Finally, can you please identify someone who shares your perspective 
and another person who may have a different perspective? 
 
16.  Who else should I interview? 
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Appendix G 
Information Sheet for Research Participants 
Study Title 
 
Drug Policy-making in Sri Lanka: an exploratory study 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The research is a study on drug policy in Sri Lanka. It will involve key person 
interviews and a review of the literature. The aim of the study is to explore and 
analyse strengths and weaknesses of drug policies in Sri Lanka.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not to take part. However, your 
decision to take part in this study can make an important contribution to the 
research. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time 
without having to give a reason. 
 
How do I take part? 
 
If you are happy to take part in this research, you will be requested to sign a 
consent form and take part in a face-to-face interview. This can be arranged at 
your convenience. The interview lasts 45-60minutes. With your permission, it 
will be tape recorded. The interviews are tape recorded because I can capture 
all the details for analysis at a later stage. Recorded tapes are stored safely 
and destroyed after they have been analysed. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
Whilst there may be no personal benefits to your participation in this research, 
the information you provide can contribute to the future development of policy 
and practice. 
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Is this confidential? 
 
Information provided by you will be kept strictly confidential at all times. Your 
responses to interview questions and information you provide will be 
anonymous. For example, no personal details relating to you, your position or 
where you work will be recorded anywhere.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results are likely to be published upon successful completion of this 
research. Your confidentiality will be ensured at all times. Your name, position 
or where you work will not be identified in any publication. At the end of the 
study, the results can be made available to you should you wish. 
 
For further information contact: 
 
Nimesh Samarasinghe  
Tel 0044 1895 258 130 (U.K) or 0777 106 867 (Mobile in Sri Lanka) 
Email: nimesh.samarasinghe@nhs.net 
 
Your help is greatly appreciated. Thank you for taking part in the study. 
You will be given a copy of this sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
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Appendix H 
Research Consent Form 
Study title: Drug Policy-making in Sri Lanka 
(The volunteer and researcher should complete this sheet) 
Have you read the information sheet for research participants?                         
Yes   No 
 
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?             
Yes   No 
 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?                           
Yes  No 
 
Have you received enough information about the study?                                    
Yes  No 
 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time 
without having to give reason 
Yes  No 
 
Do you agree for the interview to be tape-recorded?                                           
Yes  No   
  
Would you like a copy of the transcribed interview so you can add or change 
anything you have said?   
Yes  No    
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Do you agree to take part in the study?                                                                
Yes  No 
 
YOUR NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS:............................................................. 
 
YOUR SIGNATURE:.............................................................  
Date:....................... 
 
NAME OF PERSON OBTAINING CONSENT 
NIMESH SAMARASINGHE 
 
Signature:..............................................  Date:...................... 
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Appendix I 
SAARC CONVENTION ON  
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES 
 
 
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR 
REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) 
 
MINDFUL of the principles of cooperation enshrined in the SAARC Charter; 
 
RECALLING that at the Islamabad Summit on December 29-31, 1988, Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States of SAARC expressed grave 
concern over the growing magnitude and the serious effect of drug abuse and 
drug trafficking and recognised the need for urgent and effective measures to 
eradicate this problem including the possibility of concluding a Regional 
Convention on Drug Control; 
 
RECOGNISING that a regional Convention on Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances would be a step forward in augmenting SAARC 
efforts to eliminate drug trafficking; 
 
ALSO RECOGNISING the need to re-enforce and supplement, at the regional 
level, the measures provided in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961, as amended by the Protocol of 1972, the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, 1971, the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, taking into account 
concerns which are specific to the SAARC region; 
 
DESIRING to eliminate the root causes of the problem of abuse of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances, including the illicit demand for such drugs 
and substances and the enormous profits derived from illicit traffic; 
 
TAKING COGNIZANCE of the links between illicit drug trafficking and other 
related organised criminal activities, which undermine the economies and 
threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States; 
 
CONVINCED of the importance of strengthening and enhancing effective legal 
means for regional cooperation in criminal matters for suppressing international 
criminal activities of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; 
 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
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Article I 
DEFINITIONS 
 
 Except where otherwise expressly indicated or where the context 
otherwise requires, the following definitions shall apply throughout this 
Convention: 
(a) "Cannabis plant” means any plant of the genus Cannabis; 
(b) "Coca Bush" means the plant of any species of the genus Erythroxylon; 
(c) "Confiscation" which includes forfeiture where applicable; means the 
permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent 
authority; 
(d) "Controlled delivery" means the technique of allowing illicit or suspect 
consignments of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, substances listed in 
Table I and Table 11 annexed to the 1988 UN. Convention, or substances 
substituted for them, to pass out of; through or into the territory of one or more 
countries, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent 
authorities, with a view to identifying persons involved in the commission of 
offences established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1 of this 
Convention; 
 
(e) "1961 Convention" means the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961; 
 
(f) "1961 Convention as amended" means the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; 
(g) "1971 Convention" means the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
1971; 
(h} ”1988 UN Convention" means the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988; 
(i) "Freeze” or "Seize" means to temporarily prohibit the transfer, 
conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming 
custody or control of properly on the basis of an order issued by a court or a 
competent authority; 
(j) “Illicit traffic" means the offences set forth in Article 3, of this Convention; 
(k) "Narcotic Drug" means any or the substances, natural or synthetic, listed 
in Schedules I and II of the 1961 Convention and the 1961 Convention as 
amended; 
(l) "Opium poppy” means the plant of the species Papaver Somniferum L; 
(m) "Proceeds" means any property derived from or obtained, directly or 
indirectly, through the commission or an offence established in accordance with 
Article 3, paragraph 1 of this convention; 
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(n) "Property" means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, 
movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or 
instruments evidencing little to, or interest in, such assets; 
(0) "Psychotropic Substance" means any substance natural or synthetic or 
any natural material listed in Schedules I, II, III and IV of the 1971 Convention; 
(p) "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
 
 
Article 2 
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION 
 
1. The purpose of this Convention is to promote cooperation among 
Member States, so that they may address more effectively the various aspects 
of prevention and control of drug abuse and the suppression of illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which are specific to the SAARC 
region, 
2. Member States in carrying out their obligations under this Convention 
shall take necessary measures, including legislative and administrative 
measures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their respective 
domestic legislative systems. 
3. Member States shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in 
a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 
States 
4. A Member State shall not undertake in the territory of another Member 
State, the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions, which are 
exclusively, reserved for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law. 
 
Article 3 
OFFENCES 
 
1. Each Member State shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences tinder its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally: 
(a) the production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for 
sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, 
dispatch  in  transit,  transport,  importation  or exportation of any narcotic drug 
or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 
Convention, The 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention; 
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(b) the cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the 
production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention 
and the 1961 Convention as amended; 
(c) the possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic 
substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in (a) above; 
(d) the  manufacture,  transport  or  distribution  of equipment or materials, 
or of substances as listed in Table I and Table II of the 1988 UN. Convention, 
knowing that they are being or are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, 
production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; 
(e) the organisation, management or financing or any of the offences 
enumerated in (a), (b), (c) or (d) above; 
(f) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from the proceeds from any offence or offences established in 
accordance with sub-paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (C) of this paragraph, or from 
an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing 
or disguising the illicit origin of The properly or of assisting any person who is  
involved  in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions; 
(g) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from an offence or offences established 
in accordance with sub-paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this paragraph or 
from an act of participation in such an offence or offences; 
(h) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences established 
in accordance with sub-paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this paragraph or 
from an act of participation in such offence or offences; 
(i) the possession of equipment or materials, or of substances listed in 
Table I and Table II, of the 1988 UN. Convention knowing that they are being or 
are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; 
j) publicly inciting or inducing others, by any means, to commit any of the 
offences established in accordance with this Article or to use narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances illicitly; 
(k) participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit 
and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the 
offences established in accordance with this Article. 
2. Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system, each Member State shall adopt such measures as may be necessary 
to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of 
the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 
Convention. 
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Article 4 
SANCTIONS 
 
1. Each Member State shall make the commission or the offences 
established in accordance with Article 3 punishable by appropriate penalties, 
which take into account their grave nature. 
2. The Member States may provide in addition to conviction or punishment 
for an offence established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1 that the 
offender shall undergo measures such as treatment, education, after-care, 
rehabilitation or social re-integration. 
3. Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding paragraphs, in 
appropriate cases of a minor nature, the Member States may provide, as 
alternatives to conviction or punishment, measures such as education, 
rehabilitation or social re-integration, as well as, when the offender is a drug 
abuser, treatment and after-care. 
4. The Member States shall ensure that their courts and other competent 
authorities having jurisdiction can take into account factual circumstances 
which make the commission of the offences established in accordance with 
Article 3, paragraph 1 particularly serious, such as 
(a) the involvement in the offence of an organised criminal group to which 
the offender belongs; 
(b) the involvement of the offender in other international organised criminal 
activities; 
(c) the involvement of the offender in other illegal activities facilitated by 
commission of the offence; 
(d) the use of violence or arms by the offender; 
(e) the fact that the offender holds a public office and that the offence is 
connected with the office in question; 
(f) the victimisation or use of minors; 
g) the fact That the offence is committed in a penal institution or in an 
educational institution or social service facility or in their immediate vicinity or in 
other places to which school children and students resort for educational, 
sports and social activities; 
(h) prior conviction, particularly for similar offences, whether foreign or 
domestic, to the extent permitted under the domestic law of a Member State. 
5. The Member States shall also ensure that their courts or other 
competent authorities bear in mind the serious nature of the offences 
established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1 or the circumstances 
enumerated in paragraph 4 of this Article, when considering the eventuality of 
early release or parole of persons convicted for such offences. 
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Article 5 
JURISDICTION 
 
1. Each Member State shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with Article 
3, paragraph 1 when: 
(a) the offence is committed in its territory; 
(b) the offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft, 
which is registered under its laws at the time the offence, is committed; 
(c) the offence is committed by one of its nationals or by a person who has 
his habitual residence in that territory; 
(d) the offence is one of those established in accordance with Article 3, 
paragraph 1(k) and is committed outside its territory with a view to the 
commission, within its territory, of an offence established in accordance with 
Article 3,. paragraph 1. 
2.  Each Member State may likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in 
accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1, in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in its territory and it does not extradite him to another Member State. 
3. This Convention does not exclude the exercise or any criminal 
jurisdiction established by a Member State in accordance with domestic law. 
 
 
Article 6 
 
PROVISION OF INFORMATION 
 
1. The Member State in which any or the offences established in 
accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1, has been committed shall, if it has 
reason to believe that, an alleged offender had fled from its territory, 
communicate to all other States concerned all the pertinent facts regarding the 
offence committed and all available information regarding the identity of the 
alleged offender. 
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the Member 
State in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall take appropriate 
measures under its domestic law so as to ensure his presence for the purpose 
of prosecution or extradition. Such measures shall be notified, without delay to: 
(a) the State where the offence was committed; and 
(b) the State or States of which the alleged offender is a national or if he is a 
stateless person in whose territory he permanently resides. 
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Article 7 
PROSECUTION 
 
 The Member State in whose territory the alleged offender is present 
shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and 
without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. 
 
Article 8 
EXTRADITION 
 
1. To the extent that the offences established in accordance with Article 3, 
paragraph 1, are not listed as extraditable offences in any Extradition Treaty 
existing between Member States, they shall be deemed to be included as such 
therein. 
2. Member States undertake to include the offences established in 
accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1, as extraditable offences m every future 
Extradition Treaty to be concluded between them. 
3. If a Member State which makes extradition conditional on the existence 
of a Treaty receives a request for extradition from another Member State with 
which it has no Extradition Treaty, the requested State may, at its option, 
consider this Convention as the basis for extradition in respect of the offences 
established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1. 
4. Member States which do not make extradition conditional on the 
existence of a Treaty, shall recognise the offences established in accordance 
with Article 3, paragraph 1, as extraditable offences between themselves. 
5. Extradition shall be subject to the law of the requested State. 
 
 
Article 9 
NON-FISCAL AND NON-POLITICAL OFFENCES 
 
 The offences established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph shall 
not be regarded as fiscal offences or as political offences or as offences 
connected with a political offence or as offences inspired by political motives, 
without prejudice to the constitutional limitations and the fundamental domestic 
law of the Member States. 
 
Article 10 
CONFISCATION 
 
1. Each Member State shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
enable the confiscation of: 
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(a) Proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with Article 3, 
paragraph 1, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such 
proceeds; 
(b) Narcotic drugs and  psychotropic substances, materials and equipment 
or other instrumentalities used in or intended for use in any manner in offences 
established in accordance with Article 3. 
2. Each Member State shall also adopt such measures as may be 
necessary to enable its competent authorities to identify, trace and freeze or 
seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other things referred to in 
paragraph 1 or this Article for the purpose of eventual confiscation. 
 
Article 11 
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
 
1. The Member States shall afford one another pursuant to this Article, the 
widest measures of mutual legal assistance in investigations prosecutions arid 
judicial proceedings in relation to criminal offences established in accordance 
with Article 3, paragraph I. 
2. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this Article 
may be requested for all or any of the following purposes: 
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons; 
(b) Effective service of judicial documents; 
(c) Executing searches and seizures; 
(d) Examining objects arid sites; 
(e) Providing information and evidentiary items; 
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and 
records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records; 
g) Identifying or tracing proceeds, property, instrumentalities or other things 
for evidentiary purposes. 
3. The Member States may afford one another any other forms of mutual 
legal assistance allowed by the domestic law of the requested State. 
4. Upon request, the Member States shall facilitate or encourage, to the 
extent consistent with their domestic law and practice, the presence or 
availability of persons, including persons in custody, who consent to assist in 
investigations or participate in proceedings 
5. A Member State shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance 
under this Article on the ground of bank secrecy. 
6. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the obligations under any 
other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in 
part, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters 
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7. The Member States shall designate an authority, or when necessary 
authorities, which shall have the responsibility and power to execute requests 
for mutual legal assistance or to transmit them to the competent authorities for 
execution the authority or the authorities designated for this purpose, shall be 
notified directly to each Member State and to the Secretary-General. 
Transmission or requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication 
related thereto shall be effected between the authorities designated by the 
States; this requirement shall be without prejudice to the right of a State to 
require that such requests and communications be addressed to it through 
diplomatic channels and, in urgent circumstances, where the States agree, 
through channels of the International Criminal Police Organisation, if possible. 
 
8. Requests for mutual legal assistance shall be made in writing. In urgent 
circumstances, and where agreed to by the States, requests may be made 
orally, which shall he confirmed in writing forthwith. 
(a) The identity of the authority making the request; 
(b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation prosecution or 
proceeding to which the request relates and the name and the functions of the 
authority conducting such investigation, prosecution or proceeding; 
(e) A summary of the relevant facts, except in respect of requests for the 
purpose of services of judicial documents; 
(d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular 
procedure the requesting State wishes to he followed; 
(e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person 
concerned; 
(f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought. 
10. The requested State may request additional information when it appears 
necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its domestic law 
or when it can facilitate such execution. 
11. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the 
requested State and where possible, in accordance with the procedure 
specified in the request. 
12. The requesting State shall not transmit nor use information or evidence 
furnished by the requested State for investigations, prosecutions or 
proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of 
the requested State. 
13. The requesting State may require that the requested State keep 
confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent 
necessary to execute the request. If the requested State cannot comply with 
the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting State. 
14. Mutual legal assistance may be refused: 
(a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this Article; 
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(b) If the requested State considers that execution of the request is likely to 
prejudice its sovereignty, security, public order (ordre public) or other essential 
interest; 
(c) If the authorities of the requested State would be prohibited by its 
domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar 
offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or proceedings under 
their own jurisdiction; 
(d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State relating 
to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted. 
15. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance. 
16. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State on 
the ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or 
proceeding. In such a case, the requested Slate shall consult with the 
requesting State to determine it the assistance call still be given subject to such 
terms and conditions as the requested State deems necessary. 
17. A witness, expert or other person who consents to give evidence in a 
proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in 
the territory of the requesting State, shall not be prosecuted, detained, 
punished or subjected to any other restriction of his personal liberty in that 
territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his departure from 
the territory of the requested State. Such safe conduct shall cease when the 
witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive 
days, or 0 for any period agreed upon by the States, from the date on which he 
has been officially informed that his presence Is no longer required by the 
judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained 
voluntarily in the territory or, having left it, has returned of his own free will. 
18. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the 
requested State, unless otherwise agreed to by the States concerned. If 
expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfill 
the request, the States shall consult to determine the terms and conditions 
under which the request will be executed as well as the manner in which the 
costs shall be borne. 
 
Article 12 
MEASURES TO ERADICATE ILLICIT CULTIVATION OF NARCOTIC PLANTS 
AND TO ELIMINATE ILLICIT DEMAND FOR NARCOTIC DRUGS AND 
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES 
 
1. Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to prevent illicit 
cultivation of and to eradicate plants containing narcotic or psychotropic 
substances, such as opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plants, cultivated 
illicitly in its territory. 
2. The Member States may cooperate to increase the effectiveness of 
eradication efforts. Towards this end, Member States shall also facilitate the 
exchange or scientific and technical information and the conduct of research 
concerning eradication. 
 293 
 
 
3. The Member States shall adopt appropriate measures aimed at 
eliminating or reducing illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, with a view to reducing human suffering and eliminating financial 
incentives for illicit traffic. 
4. The Member States may also take necessary measures for early 
destruction or lawful disposal of the narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances 
and substances listed in Table I and Table II of the 1988 UN. Convention, 
which have been seized or confiscated. 
 
Article 13 
SUPPRESSION OF OFFENCES 
 
1. The Member States shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent 
with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, with a view to 
enhancing the effectiveness of law enforcement action to suppress he 
commission of offences established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1. 
For this purpose they may establish and maintain channels of communication 
between their competent agencies to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange 
or information concerning all aspects of such offences. 
2. The Member States may take necessary measures to allow for the 
appropriate use or controlled delivery on the basis of bilateral agreements with 
a view to identifying persons involved in offences established in accordance 
with Article 3, paragraph 1, and to taking legal action against them. 
 
Article 14 
COOPERATION AND INFORMATION 
 
 The Member States shall furnish information to each other and lo the 
Secretary-General on the implementation of this Convention in their territories 
and in particular; 
(a) The texts of laws and regulations promulgated in order to give effect to 
the Convention; 
(b) Particulars of cases of illicit traffic within their jurisdiction, which they 
consider important because of new trends, disclosed, the quantities involved, 
the sources front which the substances are obtained or the methods employed 
by persons so engaged. 
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Article 15 
APPLICATION OF STRICTER MEASURES 
 
 A Member State may adopt more strict or severe measures than those 
provided by this Convention, if in its opinion, such measures are desirable or 
necessary for the prevention or suppression of illicit traffic. 
 
Article 16 
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION 
 
1. The Convention shall be open for signature by the Member States of 
SAARC at the Fifth SAARC Summit at Male' and thereafter, at the SAARC 
Secretariat at Katmandu. 
2. It shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of Ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General. 
 
Article 17 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
 
 This Convention shall enter into force on the fifteenth day following the 
day of the deposit of the seventh Instrument of Ratification with the Secretary-
General. 
 
Article 18 
DEPOSITORY 
 
 The Secretary-General shall be the depository of this Convention and 
shall notify the Member States of signatures to this Convention and all deposits 
of Instruments of Ratification, The Secretary-General shall transmit certified 
copies of such instruments to each Member State. The Secretary-General shall 
also inform Member States of the date on which this Convention will have 
entered into force in accordance with Article 17. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being duly authorised thereto 
by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention. 
 DONE AT Male’ on this Twenty Third day of November One Thousand 
Nine Hundred and Ninety, in Eight originals, in the English Language, all texts 
being equally authentic. 
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